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FOREWORD
This investigation was conducted for the NASA Marshall Space Flight
Center by the Convair Aerospace Division of the General Dynamics
Corporation under Contract NAS 8-27048.
The NASA technical monitor was Mr. John Key (S&E-ASTN-AAS).
Mr. J. E. Jensen was the Principal Investigator for General Dy-
namics/Convair Aerospace, assisted by Mr. P. J. Wilson and Mr.
N. E. Strandlund of the Space Structural Analysis Group, Mr. T. C.
Johnson of the Economics Analysis Group, Mr. H. B. Sturtevant of
the Reliability and Safety Analysis Group, and Mr. C. J. Kropp of the
Materials Research Group.
The investigation was conducted from April 1971 to June 1972.
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SUMMARY
A study was made of the factors governing the structural design of the fully re-
usable Space Shuttle booster to establish a rational approach to select optimum .........
structural factors of safety. The study included trade studies of structural .......... : :
factors of safety versus booster service life, weight, cost, and reliabilitY, Sire!- - ....
lar trade studies can be made on other vehicles using the procedures developed.
The major structural components of a selected baseline booster were studied in ....... -
depth, each being examined to determine the fatigue life, safe-life, and fail--
safe capabilities of the baseline design. Each component was further examined =:
to determine its reliability and safety requirements, and the change of struc- ___
rural weight with factors of safety. The apparent factors of safety resulting from
fatigue, safe-life, proof test, and fail-safe requirements were identified. The __ ___
feasibility of reduced factors of safety for design loads such as engine thrust,
which are well defined, was examined.
It was found that:
a. Fatigue is not a critical design criterion for the baseline B-9U due to its
short design service life. - .......
b. All baseline B-gu components except the wing have safe-lives in exCess:of
the 100 mission design life. -
c. The baseline propellant tanks are not fail-safe, and attempts to providerfrae- _
ture arrest capability result in prohibitive weight increase. The baseline
wing and thrust structure require beef-up to attain a fail-safe capa:: ....
bility of 100% of limit load. .....
d. All baseline components except the aft orbiter support frame have strucr ..........
tural reliability well in excess of the required 0.9999 for ultimate strength
and 0.999 for yield strength. The support frame, with a yield reliability ....
of 0.998, just barely falls short of the requirement.
e. Of the four design approaches for which factors of safety were studie_[, the
only approach that produces a cost and weight decrease is the one for which ...............
fail-safe design is applied to components that lend themselves to this de- - --
sign philosophy and safe-life to the remaining components. This appro_ach_
and its associated criteria are selected as the optimum design approach.
f. For pressure-designed structure it was found that large apparent factors
of safety resulted from proof test and fail-safe considerations for tension ..........
structure. Conversely, it was found that reduced factors of safety are
feasible on highly redundant structural systems (i.e. thrust structure a_nd-_:_:__ ii_
wing) using a fail-safe design approach. -
_vii ........
g. Weight and cost decreases for the optimum approach are approximately 1%.
h. The factor of safety selection procedure is found to be highly se_itive to
to fracture mechanics calculations.
i. The data used in the study for fracture mechanics analysis was found to be
..... highly:conservative as a result of an experimental test program, which was
..... _ k conducted for two candidate materials. On the basis of the experimental
data, the s_e-lives of the components should be much larger than those
calculated,
xxviii
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
i.1 DISCUSSION
Structural factors of safety for aerospace systems have traditionally been established
on a deterministic basis, relying on experience and engineering judgment. Parameters
considered in establishing factors of safety have included 1) confidence in determining
critical loads, 2) mission, 3) design service life, 4) redundancy, 5) replacement/repair
philosophy, 6) development status of the selected materials, 7) confidence in analysis
methods, and 8) the scope of the structural development and qualification test program.
Typical ultimate factors of safety of 1.5 for aircraft and 1.3 for unmanned space launch
vehicles have provided generally satisfactory structures on past systems.
The Space Shuttle system represents a major advance in structural technology. It em-
bodies the characteristics of aircraft, spacecraft, and launch vehicles and their associ-
ated severe environments and loads, long mission life, high reliability requirement,
and considerations for low cost and weight. Conventional aircraft factors of safety
could result in excessive structural weight, cost, reliability, and service life. Con-
versely, use of low launch vehicle factors of safety could result in an unreliable struc-
ture with inadequate service life. For the Space Shuttle it will become necessary to
carefully select structural design criteria (i. e., factors of safety, service life factors,
etc. ) on a rational basis that account for the previously mentioned considerations, yet
are optimum with respect to mission requirements, performance, service life, cost,
reliability, and safety, and that will lead to the most effective Space Shuttle system.
New requirements (Reference 19) for "fracture control" to prevent catastrophic service
failures of propellant tanks, crew cabins, and other primary structural components
necessitate consideration of fracture mechanics analysis, fail-safe and safe-life de-
sign practices, and the additional factors of reduced design stresses and proof testing.
Preliminary fracture control studies serve notice that large "apparent factors of
safety" may result from this requirement.
1.2 MAIN STRUCTURAL SAFETY VARIABLES
1.2. 1 DESIGN LOADS. The Space Shuttle booster will experience a large number of
applications of a wide variety of loads during its service life. Considering any one
particular loading (e. g., loads arising from lateral gusts or winds during ascent, or
loads arising from booster entry after staging) it is apparent that the vehicle is sub-
jected to a large number of small-magnitude loads, a small number of high-magnitude
loads, and, between, a decreasing number of loads of increasing magnitude.
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Loads selected to design the structure are usually based upon a statistical treatment of
the mission, aerodynamic, control, and aero-struetural parameters that influence the
load magnitude. These loads are then expressed deterministically for use in designing
the structure. Table 1-1 presents examples of parameters that are examined and varied
in selecting design loads for the Space Shuttle booster entry condition.
Table 1-1. Booster Entry Condition Load Parameters
Type of Parameter Parameter Effect when Varied
Mission
Aerodynamic
Control
Staging velocity
Staging altitude
Life coefficient (CL)
Drag coefficient (CD)
Autopilot accuracy
and redundancy
Control system response
Establishes boundary of a design
entry corridor with variable
velocities, accelerations, and
transition altitudes
2
Aero-Structural Aeroelastic
Stiffne s s
Buffet response
Results in load redistribution
or magnification
The usual procedure is to vary the parameters from the nominal values in a rational
manner and produce a load probability density distribution, as illustrated in Figure 1-1.
The design load is then selected as that load that has the probability density of appoxl-
mately 1/1000 (i. e., one chance in 1000 of occurring). Expressed in Statistical terms,
the design load is the mean load plus three times the standard deviation (T. + 3cT£). This
approach is "the use of probabilistic methods to arrive at deterministic loads. "
Determining design loads on this basis was beyond the scope of the study. Loads from
Phase B Space Shuttle and/or loads that resulted from References 22 through 26 will
be used to provide design load information for this study.
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1.2.2 STRUCTURAL STRENGTH. An effort is made to restrict the variation of
strength between apparently identical structures by controlling the manufacturing of
the materials employed and the fabrication of the structure. Materials are controlled
by adherence to strict limits in the chemical composition and in the manufacturing
methods (heat treatment, rolling, etc. ). For most metallic materials, this control
alone minimizes variation among various samples of materials to the same specifica-
tion. In certain cases, where it is less easy to control the manufacturing process
(e. g., in casting) the results are more scattered. Inspection controls are super-
imposed on these controls. By visual ex_lnation, radiographic examination, and
strength tests of specimens, it is possible to maintain a check on variations by re-
jecting batches that include bad samples.
The same general remarks apply to assembled structures. Strict control of dimen-
sional tolerances and workshop practices (e. g., riveting, welding) is practiced.
Visual inspection or, in certain cases, strength checks of sample pieces of construc-
tion minimize variation. However, in spite of this rigid control some variation in
strength between apparently identical structures still results.
When plotted, these results appear as shown in Figure 1-2. As might be expected,
the majority of specimens have strength values at or near the average, and the num-
ber of specimens having strength less or greater than average becomes less as the
deviation from the average increases. Though the variation of the strength of the
structure arises from a large number of individual causes, the resulting scatter
generally produces a smooth curve. There are, however, two points to note. The
ratio of the width of the diagram to the mean strength differs for different materials
and forms of construction, corresponding to the degree of scatter. Materials or
structures subject to wide scatter are represented by a broad curve shape. Second,
in some cases, the diagram is not symmetrical about the vertical axis; for example,
the inspection methods applied may prevent very low strengths from being included,
but may accept very high strengths.
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Material design allowables are usually obtained by testing enough material to establish
the minimum strength (i. e., "A" basis) that has the probability density of approximately
1/1000 (i. e., one coupon in I000 has the chance of having this low strength). Tests of
structural components to establish component design allowable strengths on this basis
are usually not done because of the large costs required to fabricate and test a large
number of complex test components. To gain confidence in the strength of structural
components, additional factors, conservative analytical methods, and development
tests should be considered.
Determining component and material design allowable strengths was beyond the scope
of this study. Existing material and component strength data has been used to deter-
mine the variation of strength of the candidate Space Shuttle materials.
1.2.3 FACTORS OF SAFETY AND RELIABILITY. Most current aerospace vehicles
use the factor of safety approach for structural component design. This factor is de-
signed to account arbitrarily for the load and strength variability described in Sections
1.2.1 and 1.2.2, and to allow for unknowns in internal stress distribution and uncer-
tainties in strength analysis methods.
The factor of safety concept is illustrated in Figure 1-3, where the probability density
of load distribution of Figure 1-1 and the probability density of structural strength of
Figure 1-2 are superimposed. It can be seen that there is a remote possibility that
an applied load (greater than the design load) can exceed the strength of the structure
(less than the design allowable strength) represented by the area where the probability
load distribution curve and the probability strength distribution curve overlap. It can
also be seen that the spacing between the design load and the design allowable strength
is a measure of the factor of safety used. The area of overlap between the Ioad and
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strength curve is a measure of the probability of a structure's failing and can be re-
lated to structural reliability, as discussed in Section 7. It can be seen that the prob-
ability of structural failure can be reduced and the structural reliability increased with
the use of larger factors of safety.
In practice, this factor is applied to the maximum anticipated loads or combinations
of loads (defined as design limit loads) that the vehicle is expected to experience
(Figure 1-1). The formal definition of limit load is "the maximum anticipated load,
or combination of loads, that a structure may be expected to experience during the
performance of missions. " At limit load, the structure is required to have sufficient
strength to withstand the limit loads with other accompanying environmental phenomena
without excessive elastic or plastic deformation.
Ultimate load is the product of limit load and the ultimate factor of safety. At ultimate
load, the structure is designed to withstand simultaneously the ultimate loads and other
environmental phenomena without failure but with no limit on yielding or deformation.
No factor of safety is applied to any environmental phenomena except loads.
An additional load is often defined and denoted as yield load. Yield load is defined as
the product of limit load and the yield factor of safety. The rationale and usage of
this factor and load condition are to provide a small margin of safety against exces-
sive yielding and deformation at limit load conditions.
Burst and proof loads and factors of safety are specified for such pressure-carrying
structures as pressure vessels and cabins. Burst or proof factors are applied to these
tanks to provide extra engineering checks because of the high hoop stresses to which
these structures are subjected. Of these, the burst pressure is the pressure that a
test article must sustain at a singular loading without rupture. Burst tests are usually
limited to one or two test specimens in the case of large tanks and a statistical sampl-
ing of production units in the case of smaller bottles.
Proof pressure is a pressure applied to each vessel in a production run as a test to
demonstrate adequate workmanship, material quality, and service life. Requirements
for proofing and the derivation of proof factors are discussed in detail in Section 5.
Different values of factors of safety are used for aerospace vehicles to reflect the
designers t varying confidence in different structures, or increased conservatism
when the vehicle is manned. In addition, different factors are used for flight or non-
flight conditions. A typical set of these factors is presented in Table 1-2. Of interest
is that factors in the major structure are divided into two categories pertaining to
pressure-loaded and nonpressure-loaded structures.
The effects of temperature must be considered In fl_e vehicle design. Heat sources
are aerodynamic heating using critical trajectories, engine gas radiation, and internal
heat and cold sources. The effect of these fluxes will be different on different sections
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Table 1-2. Typical Factors of Safety for Aerospace
Vehicle Primary Structures
Type of Vehicle Type of Structure Limit
Factor of Safety
Yield Ultimate Burst
Aircraft
Unmanned Launch
Vehicle
General structure 1.0
Pressure cabins 1.0
General structure critical 1.0
for flight loads
General structure designed 1.0
by nonflight loads and dan-
gerous to ground personnel
Propellant tanks 1.0
1.0to 1.2 1.5 --
1.33 1.5 2. O
1.1 1.25
1.1 1.5
1.1 1.25 1.25
Manned Launch
Vehicle
General structure critical
for flight loads
1.0 1.1 1.4
General structure designed
by nonflight loads and dan-
gerous to ground personnel
Propellant tanks
1.0 i.I 1.5
1.0 1.1 1.5 1.5
==
of the vehicle. Hence, it is necessary to generate time-temperature histories for all
pertinent vehicle structures. These temperatures are used unfactored during analysis
at both limit and ultimate conditions.
-- I
Main integral propellant tanks normally fall into the class of pressure-relieved struc-
tures, meaning that axial and bending loads on the tank walls are relieved by the tank
internal pressure. In calculating design loads, this relief is used unfactored with fac-
tored airloads.
1.2.4 BRITTLE FRACTURE. Pressure vessels are stressed to very high levels and
use welding to save weight or prevent leakage. Discontinuity stresses, structural de-
fects, and initial flaws always exist and are difficult to control or predict because of
variations and limitations of manufacturing and inspection processes. As a result,
any poor workmanship or material can cause premature tank failure.
Other structural components also contain flaws, defects, or anomalies of varying
shape, orientation, and criticality that are either inherent in the basic material or
introduced during fabrication. Most cracks found in aerospace structures are initiated
by tool marks, manufacturing defects, and the like. Under the combined driving forces
of environment and service loading, these flaws may grow to catastrophic proportions,
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resulting in serious reduction of service life or complete loss of the vehicle. Final
fracture is often sudden, unexpected, and totally devoid of gross plastic deformation
or yielding. It is important to note here that this "brittle like" behavior (crack in-
stability) while perhaps most spectacular in so-called "high-strength" alloys, does
occur to some degree in most aerospace structural materials.
Recent cases of catastrophic failure in primary structure have emphasized the need
for a fresh look at the structural integrity process currently used to design and qualify
structural systems. Perhaps the most obvious deviation that becomes apparent is the
need to consider the existence of flaws in "new" structures and to account for their
presence during the criteria development, design analysis, and test phases.
Fortunately, linear elastic fracture mechanics analysis and testing techniques have
reached the state of development where they can be used with some level of confidence
to assess the degree of flaw criticality, to predict the extent of subcritical growth
before catastrophic fracture, and to determine the resultant failure modes.
Much of the basic _ound work for the current application of linear fracture mechanics
to "real" structures can be attributed to the investigators associated with the examina-
tion and solution of tankage and pressure vessel failures in recent years. Application
to other structural components, on the other hand, while numerous, have been almost
entirely motivated by independent requirements and desires within the particular air-
frame company to ensure adequate fracture control.
Specific criteria, guidelines, and requirements to consider fracture mechanics in the
design and procurement cycle for the Space Shuttle are presented in References 10, 19,
and ZS. The role of the fracture mechanics discipline in pressure vessel design and
proof test qualification is rather straightforward (Reference 19); however, its impact
upon weight and performance, and its relationships to factors of safety are more com-
plex. For long-life pressure vessels that require large proof factors, lower design
stresses, and higher weights than those required for the specified factors of safety may
exist and result in large apparent factors of safety that should be considered when
selecting and trading off structural design criteria.
The role of the discipline in designing and qualifying other nonpressure-carrying struc-
tural components is less obvious. The approach to be taken in this program is to as-
sume initial flaws and to select design stress levels that do not allow the flaw to grow
to critical size during the design life of the vehicle. Again, large apparent factors of
safety may exist and are determined.
1.2.5 PROOF FACTORS AND TEST METHODS. An approach using the principles of
fracture mechanics has been developed recently by Tiffany (References 14 and 19) and
can be used as a design tool for safe-life design of pressure vessels. Tiffany's ap-
proach, sometimes called a fracture control program, consists of integrating residual
crack strength analysis, flaw growth, and a structural proof test into a closed loop.
1-7
===3
As a result of the proof test, the vessel is said to be "crack proof," and catastrophic
failures are "eliminated" at the operating stress levels over the design service life.
Some limitations exist in such a program, and improper use can cause the component
to be scrapped.
The proof test consists of statically loading the structure to a level of stress greater
than the maximum level expected in service. In addition, the test should be conducted
at a temperature consistent with the lowest expected operating level. If completed
successfully, this scheme provides assurance that all existing flaws or defects are less
than the critical size required for fracture. With the aid of linear elastic fracture
mechanics, this critical level includes all flaws of equal stress intensity and thus a
wide variety of shapes.
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Figure 1-4. Proof Test Concept
The length of service life ensured by the
proof test is the time required to grow the
smaller "proof" stress flaw to the larger
critical size associated with maximum
service operating stress (Figure 1-4).
It is important to note that the length of
service time achieved by proof testing is
applicable only to those flaws, defects,
and cracks present at the time of test.
No regard is given to flaws that may
appear during service. Thus, the importance of separate fatigue test is fully realized
since it is the only means available to detect design deficiencies that occur in service.
Thus, for most applications, the single-cycle proof test concept cannot be extrapolated
to cover the entire design or service lifetime of the aircraft.
Like components on individual vehicles may have different toughness values (Kic).
Thus, proof testing in production to equal values of stress will screen out smaller
flaws In the less tough material. Life after proofing, however, is independent of Kic
and depedent only on Kii/Kic (Figure 5-9). This is true so long as relatively short
periods are considered and loading is fairly uniform. Catastrophic failure of each
component will occur when the critical value of K is achieved; thus, for equal crack
lengths the less tough component will fail first. It is not unreasonable to presume
that in aerospace applications, unequal flaws, screened out in the proof test, will at
some time during the service period be at the same length. This is due mainly to the
wide variation in usage and environment. Thus, the tougher component can realistic-
ally be expected to achieve a longer life under these conditions.
The practical considerations of proof testing must be evaluated during the structural
component design. Figure 2-19 shows the relationship of the proof test pressure
envelope to the design and normal operating pressure envelopes for the B-9U Space
Shuttle booster liquid oxygen tank. The cryogenic proof test with liquid nitrogen was
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selected becauseit duplicated the tank operating temperature and provided a relatively
safe proof test medium. It canbe seen that the upper portion of the tank is overpres-
surized during the proof test and must be designed to account for this proof test limit-
atlon. For the design pressure, this overdesign for the proof test condition results
in an apparent factor of safety larger than the ultimate factor of safety specified.
i.2.6 SAFE-LIFE AND FAIL-SAFE DESIGN PHILOSOPHY. All vehicles are designed
for fatigue life in excess of the expected service life; however, the approach to pro-
viding residual strength or residual life in structures in the event of induced or inherent
damsge can be provided by designing for fail-safe or safe-life. For example, in com-
mercial transport aircraft where safety is of utmost concern, fail-safe capability is
provided to the greatest possible extent. For military aircraft where performance is
of primary concern, fail-safe capability is not provided where it would cost weight to
do so, reliance being placed on the fatigue analysis and tests to screen out potential
structural damage, and safe-life analysis of assumed defects is used to establish safe
inspection intervals. For single-mission launch vehicles and spacecraft, reliance is
placed on safe-life analysis of assumed defects and proof tests of each article to pro-
vide safe-life in excess of the short service life.
Fail-safe design requires that the failure of any single structural component will not
degrade the strength or stiffness of the remainder of the structure to the extent that
the vehicle cannot complete the mission at a specified percentage of limit loads. Fail-
safe design is normally achieved by providing structural redundancy and the means for
arresting unstable crack growth. On the other hand, safe-life design requires suffici-
ently low design stresses that catastrophic failures of critical structural components
will not occur during a specified service life due to initiation and growth of fatigue
cracks, or due to the growth of flaws and defects that already exist in the structure.
The safe-life of a structure is usually taken as an arbitrary multiple or increment of
the specified service life depending on whether the concern is for the initiation of fatigue
cracks or the growth of existing defects. For fatigue the arbitrary multiple is usually
taken as four service lives, and for the growth of flaws or defects the increment is
usually taken as the interval between major scheduled inspections.
Some confusion exists in Reference 26, the aerospace industry, and NASA regarding a
precise definition of safe-life. Some engineers, particularly aircraft designers con-
cerned with long life structures, define safe-life as the life of a component to the initia-
tion of fatigue cracks. Other engineers, particularly those with fracture mechanics
training, define safe-life as the component life for initial defects in the component to
grow to critical size and failure. A third group, including the authors, feel that safe-
life encompasses both of these failure modes. For purposes of this report and to be
consistent with the definitions of Reference 26, two definitions are adopted: 1) fatigue
life is the life of an unflawed structural component to the initiation of visible fatigue
cracks, and 2) safe-life is the life for initial defects in a component to grow to a critical
size for catastrophic failure.
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1.3 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY
The present studywas undertakenwith the following objectives:
a. To determine the required yield and ultimate factors of safety for selected Space
Shuttle booster structural components.
b. To determine the apparent factors of safety that exist due to other design consider-
ations such as fatigue, safe-life, fail-safe, and proof testing.
c. To determine the variation of component structural weight when the factors of
safety are varied for all or only individual design conditions (i. e., factor of safety
varied on thrust loads but held at specified value for other design conditions).
d. To provide the capability of making structural criteria trade studies in terms of
performance, cost, service life, reliability, and crew safety.
1.4 STUDY APPROACH
The study approach consisted of selecting a baseline Space Shuttle booster vehicle,
mission, preliminary criteria, and cost model, and performing theoretical and experi-
mental studies using this vehicle and certain selected components as references to
establish booster vehicle weight, cost, reliability, and safety sensitivities for variations
in structural design criteria (i. e., factors of safety, design life scatter factors, etc. }.
Study results are then used to develop a procedure to identify the impact of design cri-
teria changes (i. e., factors of safety, design service life, life scatter factors, relia-
bility factors, etc. ) on the total booster weight, performance, and cost. The proce-
dures developed clearly show the relative criticality of the various design criteria
on the selected baseline vehicle. Similar investigations and criteria trade studies can
be performed on other Space Shuttle vehicles by following the procedures and examples
presented.
Theoretical studies consisted of development of design loads, service load spectra,
structural sizing, and performance of fatigue, safe-life, fail-safe, reliability, and
cost analyses. Crew safety areas of risk were identified and evaluated qualitatively.
Preliminary investigations showed that safe-life and proof test requiremenis designed
a large portion of the booster structure (i. e., main propellant tanks and wing}. Proof
test factors (and hence the design) are based on analytical predictions of the rate of
growth of crack-life flaws that exist or are assumed to exist in the structure. The
analysis consists of calculating flaw growth under cyclic and sustained load conditions
and assumed atmospheric environmental conditions. Conditions of alternate chilling,
heating, drying, and exposure to a salt-laden sea-coast atmosphere could produce
significantly higher crack growth rates that, in turn, would produce higher proof
factors and structural weight, ff accounted for.
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Since these factors resulted in large apparent factors of safety and have a significant
impact on the results of this study, a small experimental flaw growth test program was
accomplished. Specific objectives of the experimental program were 1) to assess the
effects of life cycle condition on crack growth rates, proof factors, factors of safety,
and struct_tral weight; and 2) to verify analytical predictions of flaw growth and proof
factors.
The study did not include the orbiter because of lack of detail knowledge and data on
the orbiter (i. e., Convair Aerospace Phase B studies have been limited to the Space
Shuttle booster) and the low funded effort. It is believed by the authors that the study
results are generally applicable to the orbiter; however, caution should be exercised
and orbiter studies accomplished before this conclusion can be fully satisfied.
The scope of the program also did not permit study Of the entire booster structural
system; however, the major structural components were studied. These included the
crew cabin, main LO 2 and LH 2 propellant tanks, thrust structure, vertical tail box,
aft orbiter support frame, and wing boxes, which represent approximately 45% of the
booster primary structural weight, 25% of the booster dry weight, and 60% of the total
booster structural system cost. Not included in the study were the thermal protection
system, canards, intertank adapter, and other miscellaneous subcomponents.
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SECTION 2
BASELINE BOOSTER DEFINITION
2.1 BOOSTER MISSION
The Space Shuttle Program is designed to provide a space transportation system capable
of placing and/or retrieving payloads in earth orbit. The specific mission considered
in this study consists of launching an orbiter vehicle into a 100 n.mi. south polar orbit
from WTR with a 40,000-pound payload. These objectives are achieved using a two-
stage (booster and orbiter) vehicle capable of boost and earth entry with cruise-back
to a designated landing site. This cycle is accomplished with reasonable acceleration
levels and shirt-sleeve cabin environment. The significant elements of this mission
are ground operations, mating of booster and orbiter, launch followed _y staging of
the two vehicles, with the booster returning to the launch area and the orbiter continu-
ing on to its prescribed orbit. A complete mission cycle is shown in Figure 2-1.
A typical mission flight profile for the booster is shown in Figure 2-2.
2.1.1 ASCENT. The ascent phase is defined as beginning with engine ignition and
ending with the initiation of separation. In the ignition/lift-off sequence, the thrust
rises to 50 percent of full thrust and holds at that level until main-stage in all engines
can be verified and holddown release is verified. Upon verification, the thrust is in-
creased at a controlled rate to 100 percent. The vehicle lift-off occurs when the
thrust-to-weight ratio (T/W) is greater than 1.
After the vehicle has cleared the service towers, the vehicle is oriented to the correct
azimuth and pitch to provide the proper trajectory such that the vehicle assumes a
wing-level, pilot-side-up attitude and correct azimuth. As propellant is depleted,
along with increased thrust at altitude, the vehicle acceleration increases to 3 g. At
this point, the main engines are throttled to maintain 3 g for crew comfort and vehicle
design loads. Ascent phase is terminated by initiation of separation based on attain-
ment of desired velocity or by indication of fuel depletion. Figure 2-3 gives a variety
of ascent trajectory parameters.
2.1.2 SEPARATION. Near booster burnout, the booster engines are throttled to 50
percent thrust. When both sets of engines are at 50 percent thrust, the restraint
mechanism between orbiter and booster is released, booster thrust decays to zero,
and the orbiter rotates upwards and aft, relative to the booster, on separation system
linkages until the orbiter is free and accelerating under its own thrust. The control
of all sequencing functions necessary for separation and maintaining control of both
orbiter and booster is accomplished by software in the main computer.
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The staging conditions for the 100 n. _. south polar circular orbit mission from WTR
are:
Mission: South Polar Launch
Altitude: 244,784 ft
Velocity: 10,824 fps
Gamma: 5.654 degrees :
Heading Azimuth: 182.495 degrees
The booster weight decreases from 4,188,000 pounds at launch to about 808,000 pounds
at separation. After separation the orbiter continues on its mission and the booster
positions itself for entry, using ACPS engines.
2.1. 3 ENTRY. The entry mode for the booster is a supersonic gradual transition.
Highlights of the entry are shown in Figure 2-4. During _e first 40seconds after
staging the booster pitches to 60 degrees angle of attack and banks to 48 degrees.
That attitude is maintained until the resultant lo_ factor reaches 4. 0 g, occurring
at Mach 8.4 and 144,000 feet altitude. Pitch modulation starts at _is time to keep
from exceeding 4. 0 g. The lower stability limit constrains the angle of attack from
going below 30 degrees during this maneuver. Upon reaching 30 degree s , the bank
angle is raised to 75 degrees, which is held until the vehicle has completed its turn.
A maximum q of 409 psf is reached at Mach 6.3 and 110,800 feet altitude. By Mach
3.25, the angle of attack has returned to 56 degrees. Beginning there, the angle of
attack is constrained by the upper stability limit, reducing to 5 degrees at Mach = 1.1.
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Figure 2-4. Booster Entry Trajectory Key Events
When the booster reaches 20,000 feet, the flyback range is 404 n. mi. At the com-
pletion of the entry phase the gross weight of the booster has decreased slightly to
about 787,000 pounds.
2.1.4 ABORT. The space shuttle provides safe mission termination capability. This
capability includes rapid crew and passenger egress prior to liftoff and intact abort
after liftoff. Intact abort implies the capability of the booster and orbiter to separate
and continue flight to a safe landing.
For flight test phases an ejection system is provided for the crow. The selected sys-
tem was an open ejection seat using pressure and "g" suits.
The approach to abort in the operational program is intact abort. Prelatmch or pad
abort is concerned with aborts during the 45-minute time period from when the crew
and passengers enter the vehicle until lfftoff. The failures in this time period that can
be cause for abort can be classed as noncritical or critical. Noncritical failures are
those failures in which there is no danger of vehicle or crew loss. The abort proce-
dure would be vehicle shutdown and egress through the tower. Critical functional fail-
ures are those that present the danger of vehicle loss and personnel loss if they re-
main with the vehicle. The selected abort mode for critical pad failures is rapid
egress using dedicated semi-free-fall elevators in the launch tower that would descend
to a safe area below the tower.
Mated ascent refers to the time period from liftoff through staging. Noncritical fail-
ures are those that by definition allow continued safe mated flight to booster propellant
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depletion. After separation the booster performs a conventional entry and flyback,
Critical failures are those failures in which continued mated flight to booster propel-
lant depletion is not possible and early separation is required. After separation, re-
covery procedures are initiated for both vehicles, providing the critical failure that
caused the early separation does not prevent this.
The entry phase for the booster is that time period from stage separation through en-
gine deployment and start. As with orbital entry vehicles, such as Apollo or Mercury,
there is little that can be done in the way of abort procedures during this phase.
2.1.5 ATMOSPHERIC FLIGHT. At approximately 20,000 feet, the air-breathing
engines are deployed and the return cruise is initiated.
The vehicle descends to approximately 13,000 feet and is flow n at the altitude that is
for best cruise specific range (maximum n. mi. per pound of fuel) for the required fly-
back range of 404 n. mi. Landing is based on a touchdown speed at the trimmed power-
off C L for an angle of attack of 14 degrees. The landing distance varies with the ve-
hicle gross weight, but with a touchdown weight of 628,000 pounds, about 5625 feet are
required for landing over a 50-foot obstacle. This distance is for a standard day con-
dition at sea level using braking on a dry concrete runway.
2.1.6 FERRY. Thebasic design of B-9U is evolved from satisfying reference mission
requirements; no design penalties are incorporated to accomplish ferry missions. The
takeoff capability of the booster is critical to the ferry mission requirements. Cruise
performance for the ferry mission consists of flying against a 50-knot headwind to the
point of no return with all engines operating, and then cruising to the destination against
the 50-knot wind with one engine inoperative. Cruise altitudes are selected that mini-
mize total mission fuel requirements. Fuel reserves are included in the total mission
fuel requirements.
2.2 BOOSTER STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATION
The space shuttle baseline configuration selected for this study consists of the GDC
B-9U booster and the NR 161C orbiter, as reported in References 1 and 2. The B-9U
booster is a low, delta wing vehicle with a single vertical tail and a small canard sur-
face mounted forward above the body centerline. The body is basically a cylinder with
fairings added to streamline the intersections with the aerodynamic surfaces. Figure
2-5 shows a general view of the booster, Figure 2-6 gives the three view, and the in-
board profile is given in Figure 2-7.
The baseline booster configuration consists of cylindrical tanks to contain the launch
propellants and to serve as the structural backbone. Surrounding the basic body
structure is an outer heat shield assembly that provides the protective layer against
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1. Pilot Seats
2. Instrument Panel
3. Consoles
4. Overhead Panel
5. Crew Module
6. Crew Module Support
7. Avionics Equipment Racks
8. Nose Gear _%eel Well
9. Crew Access Hatches
10. Retractable Heat Shield
11. Nose Structure
12. Nose Gear Support Bulkhead
13. TPS Support Lines
14. Main LO_ Tank Structure
15. LO Tan_ Frame
16. Or5,ter Mechanism Support Bulkhead
17. Nose Landing Gear Doors
18. Nose Landing Gear Assembly
19. Nose Gear Support Structure
20. TPS Support Structure
21. Canard Structure Assembly
22. Canard Actuators
23. Forward Orbiter Attachment Mechanism
24. Orbiter Mechanism Attachment Fittings
25. Orbiter Mechanism Attachment Fitting
26. Orbiter Mechanism Support Bulkhead
27.. Aft Orbiter Attachment Mechanism
28. Orbiter Mechanism Attachment Fittings
29. Orbiter Mechanism Attachment Fitting
30. Orbiter Mechanism Support Bulkhead
31. Orbiter Mechanism Support Bulkhead
32. Main Hydrogen Tank Structure
33. Main Landing Gear Support Bulkheads
34. Main Landing Gear Assembly
35. Main Landing Gear Doors
36. Landing Gear Drag Load Structural Link
37. Wing Drag Load Structural Link
38. Wing Body Vertical Attach Links
39. Wing Body Side Load Attach Link
40. Wing Structure Assembly
41. Vertical Tail Structure Assembly
42. Vertical Tail Attach Fittings
43. Thrust Structure Assembly
44. Base Heat Shield Assembly
45. Pad Hold-Down & Support Fittings
46. Main Rocket Engines
47. Air Breathing Engine Pods
48. Engine Deployment Power Hinge
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49. JP Fuel Tanks 61. tlydrog
50. JP Fuel Distribution System 62. Main I,_
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52. JP Fuel Vent Line to Wing Tip 64. Main I_
53. JP Fuel Rise-Off Disconnect 65. Gas E_
54. Main LO Tank Vent Line 66. Purge
55. LO Tan_ Pressurization Line 67. Aft Nit
56. Ma_n LO 2 Feed Lines 68. Purge :
57. Main LO 2 Distribution System 69. Forwa;_
58. Main LO 2 Fill/Drain Line 70. Air Cy
59. Gas Exhaust Line 71. Rcfrig¢
60. Main Hydrogen Tank Vent Line 72. APS L(
Figure 2-7. B-9U Booster Inboard Profile
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78. APS LO Heat Exchanger (3)
79. APS LO22 Turbopumps (3)
80. APS LH 2 Heat Exchanger (3)
81. APS [.li 2 Turbopumps (3)
82. APS GO Accumulator
83. APS GH22 Accumulator
84. APS LO 2 Storage Tank Vent Line
85. APS LH 2 Storage Tank Vent
86. APS GO Distribution Line
87. APS GH 2 Distribution Line
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88, Auxiliary Power Unit (4)
89. APU Exhaust Lines
90. Alas Thrusters - (4) Fwd. Pi
91. AlaS Thrusters - (8) LH Fwd
92. APS Thrusters - (8) RH Fwd
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105. APS GO Ground Charge
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aerodynamic heating and an aerodynamic surface for the body. This aerodynamic sur-
face varies from a round body sect.on at the nose to a fiat-bottomed section at the delta
wing, which is attached to the underside of the body structure. The delta wing, with its
elevons, canards, and the vertical tail, provides the aerodynamic surfaces required
for stability and control for both supersonic and subsonic flight.
For the vertical launch, mated with the orbiter, the booster thrust is provided by 12
main propulsion engines, with a nominal thrust of 550,000 pounds per engine, that
burn liquid hydrogen and oxygen and are arranged in the aft end of the vehicle.
Control of the vehicle during powered ascent is provided by gimballing the main en-
gines for thrust vector control and by using elevons for additional roll control. Sub-
sonic cruise thrust for flyback after a space mission or for ferry flight is provided
by 12 air-breathing engines mounted in nacelles. These engines are normally stewed
within the wing and body structure envelope during the vertical flight and entry.
Attitude control outside the earth's atmosphere is provided by the attitude control
propulsion system {ACPS) engines installed on the fuselage and wings. The ACPS
engines use LO2/LH 2 propellants and provide 2100 pounds thrust each.
Landing is accomplished using a conventional tricycle landing gear, including two 4-
wheel-bogie main landing gear assemblies and a dual-wheel steerable nose gear
assembly.
The booster incorporates a mating and separation system on its top surface to support
the orbiter during vertical flight and to perform the separation of the two vehicles.
Basic data for the booster are given in Table 2-1.
Internally, the booster is arranged with the LO 2 tank forward and the LH 2 tank aft. The
selection of cylindrical tanks with separate, state-of-the-art bulkheads, and of cylindri-
cai intertank section and thrust barrel all combined into a primary load-carrying struc-
ture, was made to maintain simplicity of the design and manufacture, to increase con-
fidence, and to reduce development risk. The breakdown of the booster body main load-
carrying structure is shown in Figure 2-8.
The tanks have ellipsoidal bulkheads with radius-to-height ratios equal to J'2 to mini-
mize hoop compression effects. The tanks are of aluminum alloy, with longitudinal
integral T-stringers. They provide the primary load-carrying structure of the booster
as well as functioning as pressure vessels. The tank diameters are 33 feet. All struc-
tural frames are external to the main tanks. The LO 2 tank is 667 inches long and is
shown in Figure 2-7 and Figure 2-9. The LO 2 tank is not insulated.
Four main LO 2 lines are routed through the lower body main structure/heat shield
interspace, past the main landing gear and aft to the vehicle base.
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Table 2-1. B-9U Basic Data
Item Item
Booster
Launch weight, M lb 4.188
Empty weight, M lb 0.627
Cruise weight, M Ib 0.787
Landing weight, M Ib 0.639
Orbiter weight, M Ib 0.859
Landing e.g. station, in. 3,166
Flyback range, n.mi. 404
Staging velocity {relative), fps 10,824
Staging altitude, ft 245,000
Wing (Exposed}
Area, ft z
Span (semi), in.
Aspect ratio
MAC (_), in.
Wing station, in.
1/4 _, in.
1/4 _ station, in.
Load landing, Ib/ft2
Max cruise, Ib/ft2
Body
Planform area, ft2 8,728
Volume, ft3 274,650
Tank diameters, in. 396
Length, in. 3,067
LH 2 tank volume, ft3 120,161
LO 2 tank volume, ft3 40,901
Wing (Theoretical)
Area, ft2 8,451
Span, in. 1,722
Aspect ratio 2.436
MAC (C)) in. 860.6
Wing station, in. 314.3
i/4_, in. 215.2
1/4 _ station, in. 3,421
5,047
645
2.289
671.8
456
167.9
3,563
126.6
155.9
397
1,539
285
0. 101
Location, c.g. to 1/4 _, in.
Canard pivot to 1/4 _, in.
Wing 1/4 U to tail i/4 U, in.
Thickness ratio t/e
Miscellaneous
Canard area (exposed), ft 2 504
Canard pivot to c.g., in. 1,142
Canard span, in. 800.4
Vertical tail area(exposed), ft 2 1,500
Tail 1/4 _ to c. g., in. 682
Tail span (exposed), in. 533.8
Gear axis to e.g., in. 129.0
The LH 2 tank is similar in geometry to the LO2 tank, except for the length of 1779
inches, and is shown in Figure 2-7 and Figure 2-10.
For the mixture ratio of 6:1, with added volume of 7.1 percent (for ullage, potential
tanking at minimum specific impulse, and for internal insulation) a total LH 2 tank
volume of 120,160 cubic feet results; for the LO 2 tank, which does not have any in-
sulation, a factor of 4.5 percent is added to cover ullage and minimum specific im-
pulse, for a tank volume of 40,900 cubic feet. The LH 2 tank construction is similar
to the LO 2 tankb except that there are no anti-slosh baffles in the LH 2 tank because
the low density fuel does not require them. Internal insulation is used to reduce
thermal shock at tanking and to reduce heat leaks and cryopumping potentials associ-
ated with external insulation. The basic structural external frames are increased in
section modulus at the aft attach points to the orbiter and in the main landing gear and
wing box attach link pickup points.
The tanks are joined by a cylindrical intertank section that supports the canard pivot
and the forward attach links to the orbiter. The intertank section is shown in Figure
2-11.
The intertank section is a conventional skin-_tringer--frame assembly with built-up
frames to support the orbiter attach links and the canard pivot points. The LO 2
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B-9U Intertank Section
lines run aft and occupy the lower intertank space. The canard pivot actuators are
shown, four per side below the pivot point 50 inches above the body centerline. The
intertank section contains the LH 2 and LO 2 tanks for the ACPS and auxiliary power
unit (APU) supply. A single LH 2 tank for both systems is provided. The orbiter for-
ward attach points are at the aft LO 2 dome/intertank joint and take the axial loads as
well as pitch and side loads, while the aft attach points, which take pitch and sideloads
only, are at Station 2666 in the LH 2 tank region (Section G-G of Figure 2-7.)
The top of the booster is fiat in the stage interface region to fair out the attach frames
of the booster and to accommodate the booster linkage after separation. The booster/
orbiter separation system is a linkage type using booster thrust and orbiter inertia to
produce positive separation. It is selected as the only system with the present con-
figuration that will operate feasibly in the case of high dynamic pressure separation,
as is required by abort criteria. The orbiter is arranged piggyback on the booster.
This mating was initially done to allow rollout of the mated configuration to the
launch pad on the booster main gear.
The aft end of the LH 2 tank picks up the cylindrical thrust skirt, which is also 33 feet
in diameter and includes truss-type thrust beams that intersect to form the main
engine thrust pad/gimbal support points. The thrust structure is a structurally con-
nected titanium truss beam assembly with intersecting parallel vertical and horizon-
tal beams, as shown in Figure 2-12. The beam intersections support the gimbal pad
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Figure 2-12. B-9U Thrust Structure
points. The beams are constrained by peripheral frames that transfer the loads into
the cylindrical thrust skirt. The LH 2 tank exits via a vortex baffle into a sump that
branches into 12 fuel ducts to each engine. The engines have afixed, low-pressure
pump attached to the lx_ster structure and a high-pressure pump o n the engine, This
arrangement allows the feed lines traversing the gimbal point to be of reduced dia-
meter, eliminating the need for heavy pressure volume compensating ducts, and facili-
tating gimballing to the required +10 degrees. The four LO 2 lines branch at the aft
end of the booster into three lines each to serve the 12 engines. The engine propellant
inlets and thrust structure are arranged for acceptable clearance in the selected pattern.
The LO 2 lines are designed to have equal lengths from tank exit to pump inlet to mini-
mize residuals. Each individual propellant feed line has a prevalve for a total of 12
for LO 2 and 12 for LH 2. .
The aft skirt that flares out for the rocket pump packages is an extension of the thermal
protection system (TPS). The fairing is pocketed to accommodate th e four support and
hold-down longerons that transmit their axial load directly into the thrust barrel. The
external skirt that protects the thrust structure and engine pump packages from ther-
mal and aerodynamic loads is shaped to minimize booster base _trea as is seen in
view M-M of Figure 2-7. The base heat shield consists of corrugated sheet with in-
ternal insulation. The heat shield is located in a plane through the nozzle throats of
the main engines. Each engine has a spherical radius collar at the throat that wipes
a matching hole in the heat shield to allow gimbal moUon while maintaining a seal.
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The base heat shield is penetrated by fill-and-drain lines and pressurization-and-purge
lines. Electrical and other service disconnects are located as shown. The JP tank will
be pressure fueled via a single point in the upper surface of the wing root.
The forward end of the LO2 tank supports a tapered skirt that terminates in a bulkhead
that supports the nose landing gear. The main landing gear is supported from trunnion
points on external frames attached to the LH 2 tank. As shown in Figure 2-7, the main
gear retracts forward into the wing root fillet region. The main gear bogies incorporate
60 x 20 inch 40 PR tires. The nose gear has dual 47 × 18 inch tires.
The outer heat shield provides an aerodynamic surface for the body which varies from
a circular cross-section at the nose gear station to a gradually flattening lower sur-
face transitioning into the wing fillet. The heat shield is primarily of shallow corru-
gated frame stiffened panels utilizing Rene _41 alloy priacipally, and titanium alloy in
the regions of lower aerodynamic heating. The heat shield is supported via links from
the primary structure to allow for expansion. The forebody ahead of Station 1479 is
supported as an extension of the heat shield itself and moves with it, except for the
nose gear that, as previously explained, is supported from an extension sldrt on the
primary load-carrying LO 2 tank. The body heat shield frames are on 20-inch centers
below the body maximum breadth and on 40-inch centers above it.
The delta wing is mounted below the LH 2 tank. The wing carrythrough spars are
tapered in the center section to allow the wing to overlap the tank in the side view and
thus minimize base area. The wing attaches to the hydrogen tank frames and to the
thrust structure via a series of links designed to take out relative expansion differen-
tials between the wing and the body. See Figure 2-7. A low wing is selected princi-
pally to reduce the entry reradiation wing/body intersection temperature increase
effects in a high wing arrangement. The low wing/fillet arrangement also provides
main landing gear stowage space.
The wing is located aft for balance purposes. Because of the large weight of boost
engines it is necessary to move the aerodynamic center aft to accommodate the aft
cg in a balanced configuration. A low aspect ratio delta wing of 53-degree sweep is
selected to provide minimum fiyback system weight, within the constraints of satis-
factory stability characteristics and landing speed. The delta wing also allows suffi-
cient thickness to stow the flyback engines internally, which is particularly desirable
since the shock impingement of lower surface nacelles creates excessively high tem-
pera£ures. The high-sweep delta wing tends to minimize both heating and boost drag
(also reduced with retracted flyback engines) and promises better transonic charac-
teristics.
Figure 2-13 shows the general arrangement of the delta wing. The wing is spliced at
span Station 507.5 to allow disassembly fo_ shipping. Five ACPS engines are located
next to the rear spar.
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Figure 2-13. B-9U Wing General Arrangement
The delta wing has a theoretical area of 8451 square feet and an exposed area of 5047
square feet installed at +2-degree angle of incidence to the body centerline to facilitate
cruise and to reduce landing angle within the constraints of the boost loads on the wing.
The leading edge sweep is 53 degrees. The installation of the JTF22A'4 air-breathing |
engines in the wing requires a maximum thickness chord ratio of 10.3 percent at wing
Station 507.5 just outboard of the outboard engine. Installation of these engines below
the body in the center section requires a 7.1-percent theoretical root thickness at the :
vehicle centerline. The airfoils are NASA four digit series with modifications to the
leading edge radii and with conical camber at the tips to improve L/D. The trailing
edge of the wing is perpendicular to the body centerline with elevons segmented into
three spanwise parts for varying degrees of control. The wing structure is primarily |
titanium alloy with two main structural boxes. The forward box accommodates the
air-breathing engines. The lower surface of the wing is thermally protec_d by a
system of dynaflex insulation with metallic radiation cover panels.
Flyback engines are selected from among off-the-shelf candidates. The JTF22A-4
is the lowest bypass ratio candidate and presents the smallest package for installation, m
This condition permits low wing thickness-to-chord ratio (t/c) thus minimizing poten- Z
tial control problems during transonic passage at the end of entry, Overall system
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weight differences between the JTF22A-4 and the F101 (higher bypass ratio engine)
are small, the savings in fuel being offset by the increase in engine and installation
weight and increased cruise drag effects. The air-breathing engines are installed in
podded configurations, pivoted at the aft support point. Each engine assembly has its
own deployment rotary actuators. Longitudinal doors in the lower surface open to
allow deployment of the air-breathing engines to the subsonic cruise position. The
engines rotate through 180 degrees to the locked-extended position. Upon engine de-
ployment the engine bay doors close to present a clean surface for cruise and landing.
See Figure 2-14.
The JP flyback fuel is currently stowed in a single tank on the booster centerline,
near the center of gravity. While no fuel transfer is currently anticipated in the B-9U
configuration for balance purposes, JP fuel presents an advantage in this respect for
configurations having a closely coupled hypersonic/subsonic relationship requiring
fuel transfer for cg control. The fuel is fed to the four engines under the body at
Station 3560 and to the four engines in each wing.
The fully pivoting canard is selected as a trim and control device and as an adjunct to
rotation for takeoff on ferry flights. The canard is located as far forward of the wing
as feasible to increase control effectiveness. Use of the canard allows reduction in
wing area and elevon size and permits the use of wing high-lift devices at landing and
for cruise improvements in the typical high drag booster configuration. The canard
DEPLOYMENT METHOD ]
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Figure 2-14. B-9U Nacelle Location, Retracted and Deployed Positions
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provides a total exposed area of 540 square feet. The leading edge sweep is 60 degrees
and the thickness is 14 percent. The entire surface is pivoted at 56 percent of the root
chord and moves 65 degrees nose down to decouple the effect of the surface during hy-
personic entry. The surface wipes a body fairing to maintain a seal at all points along
the down travel. This seal is to minimize entry heating. Upward travel of the leading
edge of the canard is 30 degrees.
= =
!
The vertical tail is on the centerline of the body to minimize weight relative to tip
fins that weigh more in themselves and impose an added weight to the outboard wing
sections due to maximum boost _ q loads and the attach complexity. Directional sta-
bility is maintained in the booster during reentry in the high-angle-of-attack mode by
using the ACPS yaw engines. Even after the heat sink leading edge and the extra
ACPS weights were incorporated, a centerline vertical still showed the least overall
system weight. The general configuration of the vertical tail structure is shown in
Figure 2-15•
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The vertical stabilizer has an area of
1500 square feet with a leading edge
sweep of 35 degrees to provide orbiter
separation clearance consistent with
weight and aerodynamic considerations.
The tail thickness varies from 13 percent
at the root to 11 percent at the tip. A
35-percent chord rudder is provided with
+ 25 degrees of travel. The base of the
rudder is cut off at 15 degrees to provide
plume clearance for the upper rocket en-
gines. Vent and exhaust lines are term-
inated at the fin tip trailing edge. The
leading edge of the vertical tail has in-
creased material thickness to act as a
heat sink during the brief period of plume
impingement during orbiter separation.
The crew module is conventionally located
in the nose structure (see Figure 2-5).
Swivel seats adjustable for the vertical
flight, entry, and cruise flight are pro-
vided in conventional locations for captain and co-pilot. The crew module is pressur-
ized for shirtsleeve environment. Heat shields are provided over the windshields,
which are sized for adequate landing visibility at the maximum 15-degree touchdown
angle. Access with the booster in the vertical position is via a door to the left of the
pilot seat. Access with the booster in the horizontal position is via a door in the
compartment floor reached through the nose-gear wheel well• Immediately behind
the crew is space for an additional jump seat available for horizontal flight test or
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checkout purposes. Aft of the crew compartment are the booster avionics systems
installed in a controlled environment but separate from the crew compartment. Below
the crew and avionics compartments is the nose-gear wheel well.
Figure 2-16 shows the general arrangement of the crew module. It is a seml-monocoque
structure incorporating frames and longitudinal stringers. Where space between the
module and the nose shell structure permits, structure is installed on the exterior side
of the skin. There are four openings in the structure: the windshield, the aft compart-
ment access hatch, and two hatches opposite the pilots' seats. The module consists of
two compartments, the pilots' station and the electronics compartment. These com-
partments are separated by an internal bulkhead. The aft end of the module is closed
by an eUipsoidal bulkhead. The electronics compartment is cylindrical in section while
the crew compartment is faired to maintain as much curvature as is compatible with
the hot nose structure contour and internal furnishing envelope.
FWD ATTACH
PTS,
_,FTSUPT
TRUSS
FUSED SiLiCA
GLASS
WIN DOWS
INTER-COMPARTMENT
BULKHEAD
CREW ACCESS HATCH
Figure 2-16. B-9U Crew Module
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The crow module is supported by the nose structure at four points: at two points just
aft of the crew compartment and at two points on the frame at the end of the electronics
compartment. The gap between the nose structure and the crew compartment at the
aft support is spanned by a pin-ended truss. This truss minimizes thermal loads on
both the nose structure and the module structure as the outer shell expands.
The Environmental Control Life Support System (ECLSS) provides thermal and pressure
control for equipment and personnel. The ECLSS also provides a shirt-sleeve environ-
ment for the crow and maintains atmospheric constituents within acceptable physiological
limits. The following summarizes the operation of the ECLSS during various phases of
the mission.
7
Prelaunch. During prelaunch operations, cooling is accomplished by supplying condi-
tioned air from GSE to one of the air supply ducts through a rise-off disconnect. This
air is then distributed to the flight deck and equipment bay. The airflow is exhausted
through the outflow valves into the area between the liquid oxygen tank and the nose
structure. This area is being purged with GN2 and, therefore, the pressure in the crew
module will be 15 psia which is higher than the purge area pressure which is in turn
higher than the ambient pressure. At lift-off, blowers mounted in both the flight deck
and equipment compartment are turned on and air is recirculated to provide continued
cooling.
Boost. During boost, the cabin pressure regulator is closed and the module pressure
decay-'----sbecause of leakage. Since it isn't possible to determine what the leakage rate
will be, it is assumed for purposes of structural analysis that the internal cabin pres-
sure remains at 15 psia throughout the mission. Cooling is maintained by recirculating
air in the individual compartments which transfers personnel and equipment heat to
siructure and furnishings.
Reentry. Operation is continued as in the boost phase. The outflow valves remain
closed and cabin pressure continues to decrease due to leakage. As decent continues,
the outflow valve negative relief function prevents the module from becoming more than
two to three inches of water negative with respect to ambient pressur e. During this
period, the thermal capacity of the system and the surrounding structure will limit
temperature rise to an acceptable level. Because of the short time of closed-loop
operation, the only lifesupport needs are temperature and pressure control.
Flyback. After the cruise engines have been started, the air-cycle refrigeration sys-
tem is used to provide cooling and cabin pressure control.
Post-Landing. Operation continues as during flyback until the cruise engines are shut
down.
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2.3 BOOSTER STRUCTURAL MATERIALS
Materials for the space shuttle booster structure fall into several categories: (1) alu-
minum alloys, (2)beryllium alloys, (3)titanium alloys, (4)nickel base alloys, (5)
cobalt base alloys, (6) columbium alloys, and (7) composite materials. Primary
candidate materials have been selected on existing properties data or data generated
under space shuttle studies. To provide an efficient final design, the properties of
some of these materials must be investigated to determine their allowable properties
after exposure to the expected environments. Table 2-2 lists the primary structural
materials for the B-9U major structural components selected for detailed study.
The wing box is primarily fabricated from titanium with a thermal limit of 800 ° F.
Titanium was selected due to its high specific modulus and strength and low thermal
stress index at 650 ° F. Titanium has well defined mechanical and physical properties
and the fabrication, machining, and welding techniques are well known.
The basic structural concept of the wing is based on the use of a metallic standoff heat
shield combined with insulation between the shield and the wing lower surface struc-
ture to provide thermal protection for the whole wing structure except for the hot lead-
ing edge. This allows efficient use of titanium for all of the primary and secondary
structure above the TPS while the TPS shield itself can be made of HS188 and coated
cohmbium. The Haynes 188 material is thermally limited to about 1900°F and the
coated columbium to 2500 ° F. Both these materials were selected for their thermal
strength properties.
The vertical stabilizer structural arrangement is a three-spar, multi-rib configuration
with integrally stiffened skin/stringer panels. Spar and rib webs are of corrugated or
trussed construction to allow for differential thermal expansion. The rudder is of
similar construction. The entire structure is titanium except for the leading edge
which is Inconel 718. The segment of leading edge that is subjected to the orbiter en-
gine exhaust impingement is "heat sink" designed to withstand the increased tempera-
ture. Again titanium is selected due to its Strength at temperatures that preclude
aluminum, and its adaptability to a variety of proven fabrication techniques.
The crew module is constructed of 2219-T87 aluminum alloy except in those areas
where the hot nose structure is in close proximity to the module structure. In these
regions, such as the windshield frame and the pilots' hatches, the structure is fabri-
cated from annealed 6A1-4V titanium alloy. With the exception of the glazed areas,
the entire compartment is shrouded by a fibrous insulation blanket. The inner door
windows are fabricated from heat tempered glass. The outer door windows are made
from fused silica glass. The windshield is a laminated glass with an electrically con-
ductive film for anti-icing. The floor and the bulkhead separating the electronics com-
partment from the crow station consist of aluminum alloy honeycomb panels backed
up by a grid work of beams.
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Table 2-2. Booster Materials
Booster
Components Sub- Components Materials
Wing Box Spar Caps Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Spar Webs Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Rib Caps Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Rib Webs Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Intercostals Annealed Titanium (6AI-4V)
Lower Surface Thermal Skins Haynes HS-188/Coated Columbium
Upper & Lower Sti'uctural Skins Annealed Titanium
Trusses Annealed Titanium
Fasteners Conventional Except for Lower
i
Vertical
Tail Box
LO 2 Tank
LH 2 Tank
Thermal Sldn
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Conventional
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Conventional
Same as LO 2 Tank Except for Poly-
phenylene Oxide Insulation
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Spar Caps .
Sp._r Webs
Ribs and Bulkhead Ca-)s
Ribs and Bulkhead Webs
Integrally Stiffened Skins
Stiffeners
Fasteners
Integrally Stiffened Sldns
Frame Caps
Frame Webs
Bulkheads (Dome)
Fasteners
Note LO 2 Tank
Orbiter Beam Caps
Support Beam Web
Bulkhead Bulkhead Caps
Bulkhead Webs
Fasteners Conventional
Thrust Skins Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Structure Thrust Beams Annealed Titanium (6Al-4V)
Thrust Posts Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Bulkheads Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Vertical Stabilizer Attach Annealed Titanium (6AI-4V)
Fittings
Intermediate Frames Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Attachment Flange Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Fasteners Conventional
I
Base Heat Shield Rene 41 & coated Columbium
Crew Skin Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Module Frames Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Longerons Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Bulkheads Aluminum Alloy 2219-T87
Hatches Annealed Titanium (6A1-4V)
Windshield frame Annealed Titanium (6Al-4V)
i
i
i
i
m
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The main IX) 2 and LH 2 fuel tanks are fabricated almost entirely of 2219 aluminum.
Both 2219 and 2014 aluminum alloys were considered for the main tanks and other
body structures. Both alloys possess excellent strength-toughness properties in the
base metal at all temperatures down to -423°F, with the 2014 alloy being somewhat
stronger than 2219. However, welded joints in the 2014 alloy exhibit a tendency to-
wards brittle fracture and greater sensitivity to minor weld flaws at liquid oxygen to
liquid hydrogen temperatures. The significantly greater resistance to stress corro-
sion possessed by the 2219 alloy has been thoroughly demonstrated, as has its super-
ior weldability and weld repairability. The combination of better fracture toughness
in welded joints at reduced temperatures and superior resistance to stress corrosion
result in a significantly higher reliability for the 2219 alloy as compared to 2014.
Both 2219 and 2014 exhibit a decrease in strength properties as the plate thickness
increases. Both the ultimate and the yield tensile strengths of 2014 decrease with
increasing thickness at a greater rate than does the yield strength of 2219. Conse-
quently, if the tank walls must be machined from 3 to 4 inch plate in order to accom-
modate integral stiffeners or weld lands, the strength advantage of 2014 is minimized.
Although 2014 shows an advantage in strength of the base metal, Convair Aerospace's
choice of the 2219 aluminum alloy for the space shuttle propellant tankage is based
upon its superior weldability, much better resistance to stress corrosion cracking,
better overall toughness, and better reliability for the reusable manned space launch
vehicle.
Table 2-3. B-9U Weight Summary
Weight (lb)
Wing Group 59,063
Tail Group 17,908
Body 174,229
Induced environment, protection 86,024
Landing, recovery, dock 28,457
Ih'opulsion-aseent 124,786
Propulsion-cruise 49,513
Propulsion-auxiliary 12,126
Prime power 1,930
Electrical 1,682
Hydraulics 2,201
Surface controls 9,620
Avionics 5,582
Environmental control 1,648
Personnel provisions 1,636
Co ntinge ncy 50,705
Dry weight 627,110
Personnel 476
Residual fluids 11,503
Inert weight 639,089
Inflight losses 21,718
Propellant-ascent 3,382,307
Propellant-cruise 143,786
Propellant-A CS 1,500
Gross weight 4,188,400
2.4 BOOSTER WEIGHT SUMMARY
Table 2-3 is a summary weight statement
for the B-9U booster in the launch condition.
This launch condition is for the mission de-
scribed in Section 2.1, and assumes that the
orbiter launch weight will be about 859,000
pounds. In Table 2-3, weights are broken
down to show individual major system
weights. The weights were taken from
Reference 6.
A more detailed breakdown of the weight
of the major structural components chosen
for study is given in Table 2-4.
Table 2-5 gives the booster mass properties
sequence during the mission detailed in
Section 2.1. Changes in weight, center of
gravity, moment of inertia, and product of
inertia are given.
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Table 2-4. B-9U Component Structural Weight Breakdown
Weight Subtotal Total
Description (Ib) (lb) (Ib)
Wing Group 59,063
Box*
Spar Caps, Upper 6,105.3
i
Spar Caps, Lower 5,685.0
Rib Caps, Upper 1,345. 6
Rib Caps, Lower 1,312.7
Upper Cover 4,256. 9
Lower Cover 6,802.6
Inner Spar Webs aJ_d Trusses 6,287. 8
Inner Ribs and Webs 7,248.4
Miscellaneous 4,059.2
Wing-Fuselage Attach Fittings and Links
Leading Edge, Trailing Edge and Tips
Secondary Structure
Control Surfaces
Tall Group
Canard
Vertical Taft Box*
Spar Caps 692.7
Cover 4,168. 0
Spar Webs m_d Stiffeners I, 161.3
Miscellaneous 705. 0
Vertical Tail Leading Edge, Trailing Edge and TIps
Rudders
Body Group
LH 2 Tank *
Skin Panels 52,486
Frames 2,966
Forward Dome Assembly 2,483
Aft Dome Assembly 2,468
TPS Support Frnmes 1,201
Orbiter Support Structure 5,754
Miscellaneous 287
LH 2 Tank Insulation
LO 2 Tank*
Skin Panels 7,090
Frames 405
Forward Dome Assembly 1,715
Aft Dome Assembly 2,998
Miscellaneces 2,919
Forward Orbiter Support Structure
Nose
Forward Skirt Structure
Later tank Structure
Thrust Structure*
Skin Panels 7,180
Frames 1,721
Thrust Beams 4,874
Thrust Posts 1,134
Ground Fittings 3,992
Bulkheads 4,400
Miscellaneons 1,766
Crew Module
Skin* 610
Bulkhead and Frames* 271.6
Longerons 36
Doors 446
Floor 194
Windshield 145
Miscellaneous 274
Base Heat Shield
hterstage Mcchaaism
Main Landing Gear Provision
Thermal Protection System
43,103
1,056.8
3,825.7
5,149.8
5,926.9
4,629
8,779
2,371
2,129
67,645
9,168
15,127
2,616
9,598
3,652
16,500
25,067
1,976o6
7,496
4,603
12,780
17,908
174,229
86,024
* Component selected for study.
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2.5 DESIGN CRITERIA
The booster vehicle is designed to provide adequate structural strength for a safe-life
of 100 missions, or for a ten year life, without the need for major repairs. This de-
sign is capable of withstanding the service life of flight and pressure loads combined
with the thermal and acoustic environment. Booster structure is designed for mini-
mum weight commensurate with overall costs and the vehicle is designed to minimize
post-flight inspection requirements for rapid turnaround.
Structural components are designed to provide the yield and ultimate factors of safety
and proof factors shown in Table 2-6. Service life factors (scatter factors) are given
in Table 2-7, and safe-life design environments are presented in Table 2-8.
The LO 2 tank is designed to be proof-tested in segments because of weight savings,
using a three-phase proof test. The entire LH 2 tank is designed to be pneumatically
proof-tested at room temperature. The thermal protection system (TPS) structure is
also designed for the load factors in Table 2-6, as applicable. In addition, an allowable
creep strain of 0. 2 percent per 10 hours exposure at maximum temperature will be
used, and for corrugated panels in the transverse direction, 1.0 percent creep strain
per 10 hours exposure at maximum temperature. A minimum clearance of 1. 0 inch be-
tween the inner tank structure and the outer TPS structure will be maintained at limit
load.
The booster is designed to withstand the repeated loads (fatigue) incurred in 400 flights
without failure, including a scatter factor of four. Consideration will be given to the
effects of acoustic fatigue loads. The booster will withstand the mission thermal en,
vironments with a minimum of post-flight inspection and subsequent structural refur-
bishment and/or replacement.
The primary structural components will be designed fail-safe insofar as practical,
considering weight, cost, and manufacturing. When primary structure fail-safe design
is not practical, a safe-life design concept will be applied. The primary structure in-
cludes the wing box, tanks, fin box, thrust struc_xre, major bulkheads, intertank
adapter, and similar major load-carrying structural components or elements such
as spar caps and wing/body attach links.
Safe-life designs will be compatible with latest NDI (nondestructive inspection) tech-
niques and limitations and residual strength and crack propagation analyses will be
used to ensure that adequate safe-life has been provided. The booster is designed to
provide a safe-life of 150 missions, including a scatter factor of 1. 5.
Conventional strength, fail-safe, and fatigue analyses will be supplemented by fracture
mechanics analysis to determine critical flaw sizes and residual life assuming pre-
existing flaws.
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Table 2-6. Design Criteria
Component Yield Ultimate Proof Applied On
Main Propellant Tanks 1.10 1.40 * Maximum relief valve pressure only
Personnel Compartments
Windows, Doors, Hatches
Airframe Structure
Pressure Vessels
Pressurized Lines Fittings
All Components (Abort Conditions)
All Components (Thermal Stresses)
LO 2 Tank
LH 2 Tank
1.10 1.40 -- Loads (+ limit pressure)
1.00 -- -- Proof pressures
1.10 1.50 -- Loads (+ limit pressure)
1.50 2. 00 1.50 Maximum operating pressure only
-- Proof pressure
1._00 3. 00 2.00 Maximum operating pressure only
1.10 1.40 -- Boost + entry loads
1.10 1.50 -- Aircraft mode loads
-- 2.00 1. 50 Maximum operating pressure
-- 2.50 1. 50 Maximum operating pressure
1.10 1.40 -- Abort loads (+ limit pressure)
i. O0 i. O0 -- Thermal forces (+ flight loads)
1.00 1. 25 -- Thermal forces (alone)
1.23 Max. relief valve pressure
1. 13 Max. relief valve pressure
* Based on fracture mechanics analysis
Assumed service life = 100 missions
Table 2-7. Service Life Factors
Item Factor Applied On
Fatigue initiation 4.0
Flaw growth to leak 1.5
Flaw growth to failure 1.5
Creep 4. 0 and 2.0
Design service life
Design service life
Design service life
Accumulated creep strain
Note: Design service life = 100 missions and 10 years of operation.
Table 2-8. Safe-Life Design Environments
Component Design Environment
LO 2 Tank
LH 2 Tank
Intertank Adapter
TPS, Wing, Canard
Empennage, Thrust Structure,
and Orbiter Attachments
LO 2 @ -320°F or GO 2 @ 70°F
Air at 70°F
Air at 70°F
3-1/2% salt solution with alternate drying
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2.6 DESIGNCONDITIONS
&-
Booster design conditions were generated from ground handling procedures and from
mission flight characteristics. The flight conditions investigated include: launch,
ascent, entry, subsonic cruise, and horizontal takeoff and landing. Effects of Mach
number, angle of attack, and control surface deflections on longitudinal and lateral
directional characteristics were also included. The ground conditions investigated
were taxi, towing, mating, and launch preparation and erection.
In most instances, the aerodynamic data was based on available experimental data
adjusted for differences between tested and current configuration.
Table 2-9 summarizes limit flight loads and design load factors for a number of the
critical mission conditions. Maxlmum loads on the body, wing, and canard occur
during maximum g recovery (i. e., entry), while maximum _q during ascent yields the
greatest load on the vertical stabilizer. Critical design conditions and considerations
for aerodynamic surfaces are summarized in Table 2-10.
Internal loads consisting of axial and shear loads and bending and torsion moments
were determined at 48 stations along the body length for 25 load conditions. The
conditions investigated are:
1. One-hour ground headwinds, fueled, unpressurized
2. One-hour ground tailwinds, fueled, unpressurlzed
3. One-hour ground sidewind, fueled, unpressurized
4. Liftoff + 1-hour ground headwinds
5. Liftoff + 1-hour ground tailwinds
6. Liftoff + 1-hour ground sidewinds
7. Maximum _q headwtnds
8. Maximum _q tailwinds
9. Maximum _q
10. Three-g maximum thrust
11. Booster burn-out
12. Maximum g entry
13. Subsonic gust
14. Two-point landing
15. Three-point landing
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Table 2-9. Summary of Booster Design Conditions and Loads
Condition
Two week standby
One day hold
One hour to launch
Lift-off
Max. dynamic pressure
Max r_q
Heachvind
Tailwind
Max _Sq
_ax. thrust
Booster burnout
Max. g recovery
2.5g maneuver
Rudder kick
Subsonic gust
Landing
Component
(or Mass Item
(LO 2 mass)
(LH 2 mass)
(Orbiter & other)
Body
Wing
Canard
Body
Wing
Canard
Body
Wing
Canard
Vertical tail
n
x
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.31 _ 0.15
1.31 ± 0.25
1.31 ± 0.21
1.61
1.61
1.61
1.67
1.67
] .67
1.60
1 .G0
1.60
1.60
Body
Wing
Canard
Body
Wing
Canard
Body
Wing
Can:u_
Wing
Canard
Vcrtical tail
Body
Wing
Canalxt
Vcrtical tail
Body
Wing
Canard
3.3
3.3
3.3
;1.3
3.3
3.3
-y
_= 0.213
0.213
0.213
,_ 0.213
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.5
0.35
i 0.35
± 0.35
n
z
0.51
0.51
0.51
-0.19
-0.19
-0.19
0.016
0. 016
0.016
0.016
0.242
0.242
0.242
0,343
0.343
0o343
4.0
4.0
4.0
2.5
2.5
2.1
2.1
2.1
1.0
2.35
2.35
2.35
LimR --1
Air Load [
(lb/pano Remarks
537,000]
666. 800 I
45,430 I
-220,0001 Provides, with booster
-98,600[ burnout condition, criti-
-45,360[ cal loads for orbiter-
! booster attachment.
130,000 I
485,000[
19,520[
_187,100[, Provides critical intcrtia
h loads for wing-to-bodydrag links, and together
wifll max. _q condition,
critical loads for orbitcr-
1,507,000 booster attachment.
617,607
71 370[
±-204,000[
5Ol,5OOI
-4,9a7[
•272,oo0I
2os,ooo/
376,000[
47,000[
16. Two-g taxi
17. One--day ground headwinds, fueled
18. One-day ground tailwlnds, fueled
19. One-day ground sidewlnds, fueled
20. Two-week ground headwtnds, unfueled, unpressurized
21. Two-week ground tailwinds, unfueled, unpressurized
22. Two-week ground sidewinds, unfueled, unpressurtzed
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Table 2-10. Summary of Design Conditions for Aerodynamic Surfaces
Structural Design Summary Chart
. . ,, ,,, , ,
Structural Component Critical Condition Design Considerations
Wing:
Primary Sub-Structure
Upper Skin Panels
Lower Skin Panels
TPS Heat Shield
Elevon Sub-Structure
Leading Edge
Wing/Body Attachment:
Fwd Vertical Attach
Center Vertical Attach
Aft Vertical Attach
Drag Attach
Fwd Side Load Attach
Aft Side Load Attach
Center Side Load Attach
Canard
Primary Substructure
Torque Tube
Vert. Tail
Primary Structure
Max _ q -_ Boost
Liftoff Sound Pressure
Max g -_ Recovery
Liftoff Sound Pressure
Max g --"Recovery
Max Heating _ Recovery
Subsonic Gust -_ Flybaek
Max (_q -.- Boost
Max _ q -_ Boost
Max Thrust -_ Boost
Max Thrust _ Boost
Max Thrust --- Boost
Taxi
Max g .-. Recovery
Max _q ,-, Launch
Wing Shear & Bending
Sonic Fatigue
Pressure & Temp Differential
Sonic Fatigue
Air Pressure
Pressure & Temperature
Safe-Life
Safe-Life
Safe-Life
Fail -Safe
Fail-Safe
Fail-Safe
Fail -Safe
Canard Structure & Torque
Tube Shear, Bending, Torsion
Box Shear, Bending
23. 2.5g positive maneuver
24. -1. 0 g negative maneuver
25. Maximum operating pressure
An envelope of the resulting peak load intensities (Nx) for the most critical conditions
is shown in Figure 2-17, where Nx is the longitudinal axial los d in the tank wall. The
major loading conditions on the forward skirt are due to axial loads occurring during
boost phase and shear loads during landing and taxiing conditions.
. =
Proof pressures on the LO 2 tank determine the skin gages of domes and the cylinder.
Stiffening on the cylindrical body is required for flight and ground loads. The aft dome
Is grid-stiffened close to the equator because of compressive hoop loads occurring in
the partially filled condition. External stiffening, consisting of tee stringers and
trussed frames, was optimized for the low load intensities typical of the LO 2 tank.
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Figure 2-17. B-9U Booster Peak Limit Load Intensities
LH 2 tank skin gages of the domes and cylindrical section are determined by proof-test
requirements at the forward end of the tank, and by ultimate shear and axial load plus
pressure for flight conditions in the central and aft portions of the tank. Optimized
tank stiffening in the form ofltee stringers and external frames, critical for axial and
bending loads occurring during ground winds and boost, is provided.
Critical design conditions for the intertank structure are derived from axial loads due
to the LO 2 weight forward and the bending and _lal load introduced at the forward
attachment by the eccentric orbiter weight.
A total of 30 loading conditions on the thrust structure were investigated, including
ground-wind, launch, and boost phase loads with and without engine-out conditions.
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Ground-wind conditions are critical for hold-down fittings, back-up longerons, and
adjacent skin on the skirt. Thrust beams, posts, frames, and skin away from hold-
clown longerons are critical for maximum _q and 3g maximum thrust conditions with
one engine out.
Table 2-11 summarizes the orbiter/booster interconnection loads, including loads for
a number of critical conditions.
k_
Net limit pressure (including dynamic head) versus tank station at various times during
boost is shown in Figure 2-18 for the LH 2 tank. These pressures correspond to the
upper bound of a 3 psi regulating band. Also shown is the pressure line for a pneumatic
proof test, which requires a proof factor equal to 1. 13 based on 150 missions.
Table 2-11. Booster/Orbiter Interconnection Loads
CONDITION
TWO-WEEK GROUND WINDS,
UNFUELED, WITH TOWER
SUPPORT
ONE-DAY GROUND WINDS,
FUELED, WITH TOWER
SUPPORT
ONE-HOUR GROUND WINDS,
FUELED, UNSUPPORTED
DYNAMIC L1FTOFF PLUS
ONE-HOUR GROUND WINDS
MAX ,_-q _-q = 2800
a-q = -2800
MAX j3- 9 +2400
.,=
3gMAX N x=3.3 Ny
THRUST N x 3.3 Ny
BOOSiER N, =3.S
BURNOUT N x = 3.3
N t=0 Nz =-0.46
N =+_.0.1N,=-0.36.]
Fx Fy Fz Ay Az
WIND (KIPS) (KIPS): (KIPS) (KIPS) (KIPS)
HEAD 268 0 56.9 0 -33.0
TAIL 268 0 -119.0 0 149.0
SIDE 268 ÷98.5 28.8 +30.2 34.9
/'lEAD 859 0 95.2 0 62.7
TAIL 859 0 -0. 1 0 161.0
SIDE 859 ÷53.3 80.0 +16.3 99.5
-'- .
HEAD 859 0 89.5 0 76.5
TAiL 859 0 30.0 0 138.0
SIDE 859 i+_.33.3 80.0 :.(:10.2 99.5
HEAD 1296 0 i19.0 0 134o0
TAiL 1295 0 82.2 0 182.0
SIDE 1296 ±20.5 121.0 _+2.92 150.0
HEAD 1798 0 224.8 0 234.8
TAIL 1804 0 83.0 0 950,3
NO WIND 1808 0 137.4 0 625.6
SIDE 1802 +81.2 128.8 _+166.8 653.7
,=.
2849 J 135.2 0 424.5
2849 +...55.4 179.3 +_30.7 394.5
2841 0 62.9 0 459.0
2841 +_55.4 i!8.3 4-30.7 428.0
Mx
(X 106 IN-LB)
|i
0
0
_'17. I
0
0
"_9.28
0
0
¥5.80
0
0
V4.14
0
0
0
_72.3
°0
.T-7.6
0
_7.6
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Net limit pressure for the LO 2 tank (including dynamic head) versus tank station at
various times during boost is shown in Figure 2-19. These pressures pertain to the
upper bound of the relief valve tolerance band. Also shown are the pressure lines for
a three-phase proof test program using a lg L_N2 head on a vertical tank position for
the first two phases and a room-temperature pneumatic phase. A proof factor of 1.23
is required based on 150 missions.
The tank proof test factors of 1. 13 and 1.23 are based on fracture mechanics analysis,
assuming the given service life spectrum, material, and flaw growth characteristics.
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Figure 2-19. LO 2 Tank Net Pressures vs Tank Station
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Critical design conditions for the body, wing, canard, and vertical tail structure are
summarized in Table 2-7.
Figures 2-20, 2-21, and 2-22 present critical shear moment and torque values, together
with bending moment curves, for the wing, canard, and vertical tail respectively.
The major critical thermal environment for the booster occurs during the entry por-
tion of the mission. Local critical heating of the base heat shield and rudder occurs
during ascent, and the top of the body and the vertical tail leading edge receive criti-
cal heating during orbiter separation.
Design temperatures used in sizing the booster outer thermal protection system struc-
ture are shown in Figures 2-23 and 2-24.
The acoustical environment to which the booster will be exposed during launch is
shown in Figure 2-25, and summarized for all conditions in Table 2-12. For rocket
noise at launch the exposure is general over the entire vehicle surface. For boundary
layer shock wave interaction and for the air-breathing engine noise, the excitation is
fairly localized. Figure 2-26 shows the wing acoustical environment for both booster
noise at launch and air-breathing engine noise during cruise. The vertical tail acous-
tical inputs for launch are shown in Figure 2-27.
200 _.
-_------- BODY
'o., . \\_
"_ 120-
.
0
_1 40
0
200 300
I [- I r I '
ATTACHMENT LOADS AT BODY ATTACHMENT
COND V (lb) M ilb-in) T (Ib-in)
MAX "_q 705,546 189.1 x 106 28.2 x 106
 00,000 °
\ i .........
.
400 500 600 700 800 900
SPAN STATION (inches)
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Figure 2,20. Wing Loads (limit)
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LOADS SUMMARY AT TORQUE TUBE
COND V (lb) M (lb-in) T (lb-in)
MAX aq 38,584 3.2 x 106 -1.1 x 106
_IMAX g RECOVERY MAX g 1....... x 1^6 _ 6 1^6
_j_._ ___ RECOVERY- ua,_,_ -,.u u J. x u
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Figure 2-21. Canard Loads (Limit)
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Figure 2-22. Vertical Tail Loads (Limit)
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Figure 2-23. Body Design Temperatures
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Figure 2-25. Acoustics on Launch Pad
2400
/
/
A. BOOSTER AT LAUNCH (BOTH SURFACES)
Figure 2-26.
dB
150
151
152
153
154
156
158
159
161
l
/
dB
140
150
155
160
165
165
160
155
B. ABESNOISEFERRY MISSION(LOWERSURFACE)
Contours of Equal Overall Sound Pressure Levels, Wing
2-37
Table 2-12. External Noise Levels on Booster Structure
Flight
Condition
Launch
Ascent
Reentry
Cruise*
(per engine)
Ferry
itakeoff*
I(per engine)
Max. Max.
113 113
OASPL OBSPL OBSPL
Noise Source (db)(4) (rib)(4) GMFfHz)(4)
Rockets 165( 1 ) 153 250
154.5 (2) 143 63-250
Unperturbed 149 (2) 140 4000
boundary laye_
(B.L.)
Shock- B.L. 154.5 (2) 146 10
interaction
Unperturbed 151 (2) 141 4000
B.L.
ABES @ 133(3) 123 560
10,000-ft
alt. and
0.5 Mach
ABES @ S.L. 170(3) 160 1000
and zero air-
speed
Corre-
lation
Incidence Distance
Random Large
Random Large
Grazing Small
Grazing Small/
medium
Grazing Small
Grazing/ Small/
random medium
Grazing/ Small/
_andom medium
Notes: (1) 15 feet above rocket nozzle plane.
(2) Area of crew compartment.
(3) About 10 feet aft of engine exhaust nozzle and 5 feet off engine
eenterline.
(4) OASPL = overall sound pressure level
OBSPL = octave band sound pressure level
GMF = geometrical mean frequency
*These levels are given per engine because they represent very near field data that
are subject to wide variations for small changes in reference coordinates. The
levels shown are for a plane through the apex of the jet exhaust core.
Figure 2-27.
dB
BOOSTER ENGINE NOISE AT LAUNCH (BOTH SIDES}
Contours of Equal Overall Sound _'
Pressure Levels, Vertical Tail
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2.7 SERVICE LOAD SPECTRA
This section presents the flight load and pressure load spectra expected during the 100-
mission service life of the space shuttle booster. Load spectra for the components
selected for detail study (i.e., tanks, wing, vertical tail, thrust structure, and orbiter
support) are presented.
2.7. 1 WING LOAD SPECTRA. Figure 2-28 presents the wing flight load spectra for
a 100-mission vehicle life under ascent, entry, cruise/landing, and taxi conditions.
The spectra are expressed in terms of number of exceedences versus alternating and
mean bending moment, which are shown in percent of the critical value for the condi-
tion considered. These values are converted to number of cycles of mean and alter-
nating stress, with the ascent condition represented by various segments of the total
ascent flight to orbiter separation.
2.7.2 VERTICAL TAIL LOAD SPECTRA. The vertical tail flight load spectra are
presented in Figure 2-29. As with the wing, the numbered lines represent various
segments of the ascent flight.
2.7. 3 FUSELAGE LOAD SPECTRA. The spectra of booster fuselage axial load in-
tensity (i. e., net longitudinal load in the tank shell due to axial and bending loads, in
lb/in. ) are presented in Figure 2-30 for the top and bottom centerline locations at
Fuselage Station 2600. Station 2600 is located at the aft orbiter-to-booster attach-
ment and is the most highly loaded fuselage section. For the top centerline location,
the design load intensity and cyclic load are compression. For the bottom centerline
location, the design load intensity and cyclic loads are tension.
2.7. 4 ORBITER-TO-BOOSTER ATTACHMENT LOAD SPECTRA. The forward
orbiter-to-booster attachment flight load spectra are presented in Figure 2-31.
Only vertical (Fz) and lateral (Fy) loads are shown, as the drag load (i. e., FX)
is taken through the aft attachment. The aft orbiter-to-booster attachment flight load
spectra are given in Figure 2-32.
2.7. 5 THRUST LOAD SPECTRA. Figure 2-33 is a plotof the total mean thrust
versus time for the 12 booster main rocket engines. Superimposed on this is the
transient thrust load spectrum presented in Figure 2-34.
2.7.6 PROPELLANT TANK PRESSURE SPECTRA. The main LH 2 and LO 2 propellant
tank pressure schedules are presented in Figure 2-35 and 2-36, respectively. Nominal
ullage and ullage plus fuel head pressure at the lower tank apex are shown. In addition,
the maximum design pressure (i. e., maximum relief valve setting plus fuel head) as-
suming a pressure regulator malfunction is shown. For fatigue and flaw growth studies,
it will be assumed that a pressure regulator malfunction occurs once every 20 flights.
2.7. 7 CREW MODULE PRESSURE SPECTRUM. The pressure schedule for the crew
module is presented in Figure 2-37. This curve is based on an absolute internal pres-
sure of 15 psi at liftoff and no pressure leakage after the closing of the pressure regulator.
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SECTION 3
STRUCTURAL SIZING AND SENSITIVITY OF WEIGHT
TO FACTOR OF SAFETY PERTURBATIONS
FOR BASELINE BOOSTER
This section presents the sizing analysis of the booster structural components selected
for study under this contract. The components studied are the liquid oxygen tank, liquid
hydrogen tank, aft orbiter support frame, thrust structure, wing, vertical tail, and
crew module. The sensitivity of the weights, determined through this sizing procedure,
to factor of safety perturbations are then determined.
3.1 LIQUID OXYGEN TANK
3.1.1 LO 2 TANK STRUCTURAL SIZING. The LO 2 tank is critical for the internal
pressures and external loads presented in Section 2.6. Sizing of the various elements
of the tank and the sensitivity of their weights to factor of safety perturbations are
presented in the following paragraphs.
3.1.1. 1 LO 2 Tank End Domes. Upper and lower LO 2 tank end domes have been sized
for ultimate, yield, and proof test loads: Dome sizing and weight calculations were
performed by means of a propellant tank dome synthesis computer program (Reference
12). This program determines the skin thickness requirements at four locations along
a dome meridian and calculates dome weight assuming a stepped thickness change.
The upper dome is not in contact with liquid oxygen during critical design conditions;
consequently, the structure will be near room temperature. Proof testing of the upper
dome will be performed at room temperature.
The lower dome is in contact with liquid oxygen during critical design times and will be
proof tested with liquid nitrogen.
Dome structural material is 2219-T87 aluminum alloy with the following properties:
Room
Temperature
-297 ° F (liquid
oxygen temperature)
-320 ° F (liquid
nitrogen temperature)
Ftu (ksi) 63 75 78
Fty (ksi) 52 61 62
E c (psi) 10.8(10) 6 10.8(10) 6 10.8(10) 6
w (lb/in 3) O. 102 O. 102 O. 102
3-1
Design conditions are as follows:
J_'_"___--_ t4/_Nk 1 UltImate design'Upper// / "_ft3 t °_sB dome pressure =17.5 psi
o.,, Lower dome pressure = 40.0 psiV
, 0.4, ullage
} Ultimate factor = 1.4
Yield factor = 1. 1
Proof pressure test design
(proof factor, o_ = 1.23)
LO 2 TANK END DOME Skin TlflCKNESSFS, IN.
FORWARDDOME AI.'T,X)m: Upper dome pressure = 17.5 (1. 2a)
PROOF ULTIMATE PROOF UI.TIMATE : 21.6 psi
T:-320"F T RT T:-320*F T -297"F
[ti o.o44 0.o4, o.o,J_ : o.0ss Lowerdome pressure = 40 (1. 23)
I t2 O. 048 O. 045 O. 099 O. 095
_3 0.053 0.040 0.,0.', o.,05 = 49.1 psi
'4 0,058 0.054 0.120 0.[15
Results of this analysis are shown in the accompanying sketch.
Both LO 2 tank domes are therefore designed by proof pressure for the baseline.
3.1. 1. 2 LO 2 Tank Plate-Stringers. Plate-sWingers for the LO2 tank have been sized
to carry tank pressures and fuselage external loads. Plate-stringers were optimized
by sizing the skin for pressure and then sizing longimdin_al stiffeners (stringers) for :
axial loads. Skins are critical for proof pressure, as shown in this analysis, and
stringers are sized for the maximum axial compression load.
Material: 2219-T87 plate, three inches thick
Properties at
Ftu (ksi)
Fty (ksi)
Fsu (ksi)
E c (psi)
w (lb/in 3)
Room Tern
_erature
63
51
38
10.8(10) 6
0. 102
-320 ° F
63(1.24) = 78
51(1.19) = 61
-2970F
63(1. 19) = 75
51(1.17) = 60
Allowable working tension stress at limit pressure:
At room temperature,
63
Ultimate design 1.---4= 45.0 ksi (1.4 ultimate factor)
3-2
_1 1 [:
51
Yield design 1_ = 46.4 kst (1. 1 yield factor)
51
Proof design 1-_ = 41.5 ksi (1. 23 proof factor)
At -297°F,
75
Ultimate design 1-_ = 53.6 ksi
6O
Yield design _-_ = 54. 5 ksl
At -320 ° F,
61
Proof design 1_ = 49. 5 ksi
For pressure design the skins are proof test critical.
Tank skins from the lower dome to LO 2 tank Station 310 will be tested with LN 2 at
-320 ° F.
Proof pressure at lower dome equator: p = 38. 8 psi
_ pa 38.8(198)
train - F'-_ = 61,000
= 0. 126 in. (at lower dome equator)
Proof pressure at LO 2 Station 310: p = 32.2 psi
= pR = 32.2(198)
tmin Fty 61,000 = 0. 105 in. (at Station 310)
Tank skins from the upper dome to LO 2 tank Station 310 will be tested at room
temperature.
Proof pressure: p = 21. 5 psi
_ pR 21.5(198)
train - F--_ = 51,000 = O. 084 in.
The drawing skin thickness tolerance is :_0. 015 inch for nominal thicknesses less than
0. 100 inch and _0. 010 inch for 0. 100 and over. A minimum thickness of 0. 084 inch
would require a callout of 0. 099 i-0. 015 because it is less than 0. 100. A callout of
0. 100 :_0. 010 will be used, giving a minimum skin thickness of 0. 090.
3-3
ZNx4. / Nx5
Nx2/ f"NNXNxI/ 8
The critical ultimate load intensities in
the liquid oxygen tank shell at eight points
around the circumference of the tank, as
shown in the accompanying sketch, are
given in Table 3-1.
The baseline stringers have a tee cross-
section and are integral with the 2219-T87
skin. Stringers are not critical for ten-
sion loading. The maximum longitudinal
compression load in the LO 2 tank wall is
N x =-985 lb/in ultimate, which is pro-
duced by the liftoff +1 hour ground head-
winds condition.
Table 3-1. LO 2 Tank Critical Ultimate (FS u = 1.4) Load Intensities
Tension
Compression
Station
(in.)
1481
1600
1750
1864
1481
1600
1750
1864
Nxl
(Ib/in)
2654 (12)
2765 (12)
2943 (12)
3098 (12)
m
-350 (6)
-682 (4)
-985 (4)
( ) Indicates condition number.
Nx2 & Nx8
(1b/in)
2583 (12)
2658 (12)
2778 (12)
2883 (12)
-233 (6)
-480 (19)
-702 (6)
Nx3 & Nx7
(lb/in)
2425 (25)
2425 (25)
2425 (25)
2425 (25)
-375 (22)
Nx4 & Nx6
(lb/in)
2425 (25)
2425 (25)
2569 (8)
2674 (8)
i-214 (15)
Nx5
(Ib/in)
2425 (25)
2425 (25)
2887 (8)
3064 (8)
-440 (15)
Section Data:
Stringer _} = 0.0_ _6 inch
F c = 8000 psi
L' = 70 inches
N x = -997 lb/in minimum allowable
The same stringer section is used for all of
the tank. A plot of skin thickness, ts, and
equivalent plate stringer thickness, t, is
presented in Figure 3-1.
i
2.0
0.110
--_ _--- 0.110
t (0.100 MIN}
B
Plate-Stringer Section
(Stringers are spaced at
12.0 inches on centers)
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L._O2 TANK WEIGHT SENSITIVITY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY PERTURBATIONS.
The results of weight sensitivity analyses for perturbations in ultimate and yield fac-
tors of safety axe presented in this section for the liquid oxygen tank. All elements of
the liquid oxygen tank except the orbiter support bulkhead at Station 1866 were included
in the analysis. The curves presented, in general, show the variation of weight as a
function of ultimate factor of safety (FSu) assuming ultimate design is critical. The
figures also give cutoffs for certain yield factors of safety (FSy), assuming yield de-
sign is critical, and for proof design for a service life of 100 missions and a scatter
factor of 1.5.
3.1. 2.1 Forward and Aft LO 2 Tank Domes. Figures 3-2 and 3-3 present the weight
sensitivities of the LO 2 tank forward (upper) and aft (lower) dome assemblies to factor
of safety perturbations. The curves labeled ULTIMATE DESIGN are based on the
assumption that the design of the domes is critical for the ultimate strength of the
material when loaded by FS u multiplied by the limit operating load. The two cutoffs
for FSy = 1.0 and 1. 1 are based on the assumption that the design of the domes is
critical for the yield strength of the material when loaded by FSy multiplied by the limit
operating load. The cutoff for proof design establishes the baseline weights for the
domes, and is shown in these figures for comparison purposes. The proof design cut-
offs are determined by application of a proof factor to limit operating loads, and then
designing the structure to withstand this load without yielding. The proof test at this
load then guarantees a 100 mission safe-life for flaw growth at a scatter factor of 1.5.
The proof factor, q, is 1.23 for the liquid oxygen tank. The baseline weight for the
forward dome is 1715 pounds, and for the aft dome it is 2998 pounds.
3.1. 2.2 L_O2 Tank Skins. The weight sensitivity of the liquid oxygen tank skin to factor
of safety perturbations is presented in Figure 3-4. Weights for the skin were determined
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in the same manner as for the domes (Section 3.1.2.1), except that for proof design, the
proof pressure varies along the length of the tank due to the planned three-phase proof
test. The baseline weight of the skin, as required for proof, is 5616 pounds.
3.1. 2.3 L.__O2 Tank Stringers. The weight sensitivity of the liquid oxygen tank stringers
to factor of safety perturbations is presented in Figure 3-5. The upper curve in that
figure is based on a skin designed by proof pressure for a safe-life of 100 missions and
a scatter factor of 1.5, and constant section stringers designed for the maximum com-
pression in the tank. The two lower curves give the stringer weight based on th e design
of the stringers for the actual maximum compression load at a given station. Th e up l_er
curve of these two is based on the skin being designed for the same factor of safety as _ :
the stringers, whereas the lower curve uses a skin designed for proof pressure just as
the curve for constant section stringers does. The baseline stringer weight is 1474 pounds.
3.1. 2.4 Liquid Oxygen Tank. The weight sensitivity of the liquid oxygen tank to fac-
tor of safety perturbations is presented in Figure 3-6. The curve labeled ULTIMATE
DESIGN is based on the design of all LO 2 tank elements for the ultimate strength of
the material when loaded by FS u multiplied by limit operating load. The two curves
labeled YIELD DESIGN for FSy= 1.0 and 1.1 are based on the design of all LO 2 tank
elements except the stringers for the yield strength of the material when loaded by FSy
multiplied by the limit operating load. The stringers are not critical for yield design,
and therefore the weight of the stringers on the yield design curves increases with FS u
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as is indicated by the slope of the curves,
which is in contrast to the horizontal cut-
offs in Figures 3-2 through 3-4. The
upper two curves in Figure 3-6, including
the one which goes through the baseline
weight point, are based on proof design
for the end domes and skin. The curve
through the baseline weight point, in addi-
tion, uses stringers designed for the
maximum compression anywhere within
the tank, whereas the lower of the two
curves uses stringers designed for the
maximum compression at a particular
tank station. The baseline LO 2 tank
weight is 15,127 pounds. This weight
excludes the weight of the Station 1866
orbiter support bulkhead, which was not
included in the study of the LO 2 tank.
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3.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK
3.2. 1 LH 2 TANK STRUCTURAL SIZING. The LH 2 tank is critical for the pressure,
axial, and shear loads presented in Section 2.6. Sizing of the various structural ele-
ments of the tank and the sensitivity of their weights to factor of safety perturbations
are presented in the following paragraphs.
3.2. 1. 1 LH 2 Tank End Domes. Upper and lower LH 2 tank end domes have been sized
for both ultimate design and proof test. Dome sizing and calculation of weights was
performed by means of a propellant tank dome synthesis computer program (Reference
12). This program was also used to size LO 2 tank domes.
Dome structural material is 2219-T87 _----_'_ t4
aluminum alloy with the following proper- __ /'_t3"--
ties at room temperature: /z __ _ ..... -. /" "k_j-t_
J _ - '**_"*_'_'_ _'_" tl
Ftu --r" 63'000 psi _ J -#_
Fty = 52,000 psi _ I J
Design conditions are: ' I
Ultimate design, FS = 1.4,
U
Upper dome pressure = 22.3 psi
Lower dome pressure = 26.4 psi
Proof pressure test design
(proof factor, _= 1.13)
t 1
t 2
t3
t4
LH 2 TANK END DOME SKIN THICKNESSES, IN.
FORWARD DOME _' AFT DOME
PROOF ULTIMATE
T=RT T=RT
0. 061 0. 053
0. 066 0. 057
0. 073 0. 063
0. 080 0. 069
PROOF ULTIMATE
T=RT T=RT
0.061 0. 063
O. 060 0. 068
O. 073 O. 074
O. 080 0.082
Upper and lower dome pressure = 26.4 (1.13) = 29.8 psi
10.8B
I B
0.6BI l
0°4B
1
Results of this analysis are shown in the accompanying sketch. _:
The results indicate that the forward (upper) LH 2 tank dome is critical for proof pres_ _i
sure, while the aft (lower) dome iJ critical for ultimate pressure.
3.2. 1. 2 LH 2 Tank Plate-Stringers and Belt Frames. Plate-stringers for the LH 2 tank
have been sized to carry tank pressures and fuselage external loads. The design criteria
and loadings presented in Section 2 were followed in establishing factors of safety, mini'
mum skin thickness for pressure design, and minimum thickness for stability design.
Plate-stringer and belt frame configurations were optimized for axial loads with the
following constraints:
a. Minimum skin required for pressure and/or shear.
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b. Minimum stringer spacing for machining.
c. Maximum stringer height limited by available plate thickness.
Optimum frame spacing was determined for two basic integral stiffener configurations,
tee and blade, by selecting average compressive load intensities and optimum stiffeners
for various effective column lengths. Belt frame required moments of inertia were
calculated by the Shanley criterion, which gives stiffening requirements for the pre-
vention of shell general instability (Reference 13).
Frame cross-sectional areas were calculated for 9. 0-inch-deep frames with truss
webs that would have the required moment of inertia. Effective thickness (t) was cal-
culated for each configuration and plotted as shown in Figure 3-7. As a result of this
study, integral stiffeners with an effective column length of 60 inches were selected
for detailed sizing.
Various sizes of integral stiffener were analyzed to determine the effect of stringer
spacing and height for several minimum skin thicknesses. As a result of this study,
a stiffener spacing of 4. 0 inches was selected for the LH 2 tank.
Detailed sizing of the plate=stringer includes the effects of internal pressure, axial
load, and shear. Minimum skin thickness was determined for pressure design (ultimate,
0.4
0.3
rD 0.2
0,1
2O
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yield, and proof test), shear (principal stress), and axial load. Sizing of the skin is
influenced by axial loads in determining optimum plate-stringer sizes for minimum
weight to carry biaxial load and not exceed the allowable shear strength of the skin.
Four sections of the LH 2 tank were selected for detailed analysis of a clean structure.
The effect of concentrated loads was calculated separately.
Loads for the selected stations are presented in Table 3-2. A typical analysis is pre-
sented and the final plate stringer sizes are in Table 3-3.
Material: 2219-T87 plate, 3 inches thick
Room temperature properties
Ftu = 63 ksi
Fty = 51 ksi
Fsu = 38 ksi
E c = 10.8 (10) 6 psi
w = 0. 102 lb/in 3
Allowable working tension stress at limit pressure
63
Ultimate design _ = 45. 0 ksi (1. 4 ultimate factor)
51
Yield design 1_ = 46.4 ksi (1. 1 yield factor)
51
Proof design 1-_-3 = 45.1 ksi (1.13 proof test factor)
For pressure design the tank skins are ultimate critical. Minimum skin thickness for
the tank will be determined by ultimate design pressure and proof pressure. The proof
pressure is the maximum pressure in the tank multiplied by the proof test factor of
1. 13.
Maximum tank pressure is at the lower dome apex (26. 4 psi).
Proof pressure = 26.4 (1. 13) = 29. 83 psi
Maximum tank pressure in constant section: p = 25.5 psi.
The tank constant section is proof test critical
pR 29. 83(198)
train = _ = 51,000 = 0. 116 inch
Drawing callout = 0. 126 _). 010 inch
Stability design t = 1.05 (0. 116) = 0. 122 inch
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Table 3-2. LH 2 Tank Critical Design Loads (Ultimate)
a. Ultimate Axial Load Intensities
Bottom
Station N x q C*
2400 -4167 0 7
2800 1-6327 0 7
3161 -7269 0 7
3377 -8055 0 7
Bottom Side
N x q C
-4072 49 4
-5614 222 7
-6380 228 7
-7006 66 7
Side
N x q
-6062 6
-6138 319
-6401 346
-6536 362
Top Side
C N x q
6 -8803 5
6 -8485 624
6 -7817 700
6 -7479 743
b. Ultimate Hoop Load Intensities
C
10
10
10
5
Top
Nx
-10,923
-10,412
-9,206
-8,349
Station
2400
2800
3161
3377
Condition 4
Press
11.9
13.3
15.4
16.8
2356
2633
3049
3326
Condition 6
Press Ny
11.9 2356
13.3 2633
15.4 3049
16.8 3326
Condition 7
Press Ny
27.3 5405
27.3 5405
28.7 5683
30.1 5960
Condition 10
Press
31.2
31.2
31.2
32.2
q C
0 10
0 10
0 10
0 10
Ny
6178
6178
6178
6376
* C = Condition number, see Section 2.6.
Table 3-3. LH 2 Tank Plate Stringer Sizing
Sta 2182
Material: 2219-T87; Stringer Spacing: 4.0 inches on centers;
24OO
Lt s =0.122
[ =0.175
ft s = 0.122
= 0.174
/-t s =0. 140
=o. 19o
Stringer Height: 3.0 inches
2800 3161 3377
_-ts = 0. 140
= 0.200
/-ts= 0.130
[ =0. 192
(-t s = 0. 140
t" =0. 193
/-t s = 0. 160
=o. 240
x-ts = 0. 150
= 0.220
rts = 0. 140
t =0.206
(-ts = 0. 140
t" =0.207
r-t s =0. 150
{ =0.236
Fts = 0. 160
= 0.252
_-ts = 0. 150
t =0. 236
,-ts= 0.150
=0. 212
/-t s = 0. 150
[ =0. 223
s = 0.160
=0.246
Note:
_t s =0.160
=0.242
s =0-170
=0.292 t_s 0.170= 0.276
1. t s is skin thickness for stability design.
2. t is the equivalent thickness of skin and stringers.
3. Thickness shown does not include effects of local loads.
3681
--Bottom CL
Bottom Side
_Side
Top Side
Top
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Typical Plate Stringer Analysis -- Section at Station 2800:
Tank Bottom Centerline:
Ultimate loads: N x = -6327 lb/in; Ny = 5405 lb/in; q = 0.
3.0
I 0"i401
!
0.06
, i
.,--0.06
4.0
'|
]
-I
Plate-Stringer Section
(Stringers are 4.0 inches on Centers)
Section Data:
ts = 0.140 inch
= 0.200 inch
Fc = 33,500 psi (L' = 60)
Fsu = 38,000 psi
Note: Thickness shown is for stability
design: I.05 × tmin
0. 140
for pressure t s = 1.0----'5= 0. 133 inch
6327
Compressive stress: f
c 0.200 = 31,630 psi
5405
Tensile stress normalto compressive: f_ = 0.13---"_= 40,700 psi
Maximum shear stress:
[/ft_/z 1 i/2_sp= + is2
fSp = 37,000 psi
Me So _ --
33,500
31,630 -i = +0. 05 (compression)
38,000
M.S. =-_
37,000 -i = +0. 02 (shear)
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Typical Plate-Stringer Analysis - Station 2800 - Upper Side
Maximum compressive condition: 3g maximum thrust
N x = -8485 Ib/in ultimate
q = 621 Ib/in ultimate
Internal pressure maximum ultimate: p = 22.3 (1.4)=30. 7 psi
I
3,00
J
f
0.160 _0.010
_-1"20---I ,1 Nominal Section Properties
l ± 1
! _ t" = O. 242 inch
---.,.I -,---- 0.080 +0.015
4.00
Plate Stringer Section
A = 0. 9696 in2/4 inch width
p = 1.099 inch
Section for Stability Design
Skin t = 0. 150 (1.05) = 0. 157 inch
Stringer t = 0.065 (1.05) = 0. 068 inch
A = 0.9029 in 2
= 0.226 inch
Plate-stringer compression allowable:
p = 1.014 inch
Frame spacing is 66.7 inches
Column fixity is 1.5
L' 66.7
=_.5 =54.6
F = 37,600 psi
C
8485
fc = 0.226
- 37,500 psi
37,600
M.S. = -I = +0.0
37,500
Maximum skin shear: (nominal section)
ft=P =t38,ooopsi
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N X
fc =- = 35,000 psi
q
fs =T = 3880 psi
fSma x = + fs] = 36,500 psi
38,000
M.S. = -1 = +0. 04
36,500
LH 2 Tank Belt Frames:
Frames sized by Shanley criterion:
Typical frame analysis:
Design load intensity: N x = -8000 lb/in
Frame spacing: L = 60 inches
Tank diameter: D = 396 inches
Coefficient: Cf = 62.5 (10) -6
Solution: If =
Frame section:
8000(62.5) (10) -6 _ (396) 4.
4(60) (10.3) (10) 6
i
If = 15. 63 in 4
Frame depth: d = 9 inches
2I
Required cap area: A =- ; A - 2(15.63) = 0. 408 in2/cap
(8.75)2
Effective depth: d e = 8.75
Equivalent web thickness of the truss:
Frame _: _ = [2(0. 408) + 9(0, 060)]
6O
t w =0.06
= 0. 023 inch
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3.2.2 LH 2 TANK WEIGHT SENSITIVITY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY PERTURBATIONS.
The results of weight sensitivity analyses for perturbations of ultimate and yield factors
of safety are presented in this section for the liquid hydrogen tank. Analysis was per-
formed for the forward and aft dome assemblies, the cylindrical section skin-stringer,
the belt and TPS support flames, and the LH 2 tank as a whole. The curves presented,
in general, show the variation of weight as a function of ultimate factor of safety (FSu)
assuming ultimate design is critical. The figures also give cutoffs for certain yield
factors of safety (FSy), and for proof design for a service life of 100 missions and a
scatter factor of 1. 5.
3.2. 2.1 Forward and Aft LH 2 Tank Domes. Figures 3-8 and 3-9 present the weight
sensitivities of the LH 2 tank forward (upper) and aft (lower) dome assemblies to factor
of safety perturbations. The curves labeled ultimate design are based on the assump-
tion that the design of the domes is critical for the ultimate strength of the material
when loaded by FS u multiplied by the limit operating load. Cutoffs for FSy = 1. 0, 1. 1,
and 1.2 are based on the assumption that the design of the domes is critical for the yield
strength of the material when loaded by FSy multiplied by the limit operating load. The
cutoff for proof design establishes the baseline weight for the forward dome, and is
shown in Figure 3-8 for comparison purposes.
The proof design ctuoff is determined by application of a proof factor to limit operating
loads, and then designing the structure to withstand this load without yielding. The
proof test at this load then guarantees a 100 mission safe-life for flaw growth at a
scatter factor of 1. 5. The proof factor, c_, is 1. 13 for the liquid hydrogen tank. The
aft LH 2 tank dome is critical for ultimate operating pressure. Resizing of the end
domes for perturbations of the factors of safety was accomplished by use of the com-
puter program that was also used for the baseline sizing of the dome. The baseline
weight for the forward LH 2 tank dome is 2483 pounds, and for the aft dome it is 2468
pounds.
3.2.2.2 Belt Frames and TPS Support Frames. The weight sensitivity of the LH 2
tank stabilizing belt flames and TPS support frames to factor of safety perturbations
Is given in Figure 3-10. Frame weight for the curves of Figure 3-10 was determined
by means of a computer sizing program that uses the Shanley criterion (Section 3.2.1.2)
and the maximum axial compression load at a station for a particular factor of safety.
One point should be clearly understood when reading the curves of Figure 3-10. This
point is that for these curves the factor of safety, FS u, varies only for the load condi-
tions for which the particular curve is so labeled. On that same curve the factor of
safety, FS u, for other load conditions is held constant at the baseline value. The
curve with the highest slope, which is labeled ALL LAUNCH VEHICLE TYPE CON-
DITIONS (EXCLUDES CONDITIONS 13, 14, 15, 16, 23, 24) is actually the same as the
curve that would have been produced had the factor of safety been varied for all 25 load
conditions investigated. The reason is that the launch-vehicle-type conditions are so
much more critical to the LH 2 tank structure than the aircraft-type load conditions
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(13, 14, 15, 16, 23, 24) that even when the factor of safety on the launch-vehicle-type
conditions was reduced to very low level, the aircraft-type load conditions were still
not critical even with their high baseline factor of safety of 1.5. This curve therefore
provides the overall weight sensitivity to factor of safety perturbations, and also pro-
vides a basis for comparison for the other curves presented in the figure.
Examination of Figure 3-10 reveals that that 3g maximum thrust condition (10) is the
most critical condition for the stabilizing belt frames and TPS support flames and thus
reduction of FS u on this condition provides the greatest opportunity for weight savings,
if it is not desired to alter FS u on all conditions simultaneously as is illustrated by the
curve labeled ALL LAUNCH VEHICLE TYPE CONDITIONS. On the other extreme, the
figure shows that alteration of FS u on the llftoff plus winds load conditions (4,5,6) pro-
duces no weight change for the frames except for large values of FS u, It will be noted
that the curves for maximum _q plus winds (7,8,9) and 3g maximum thrust (10) re-
main constant for lower values of FS u. This occurs because FS u is being pe rturbated
only for a load condition or group of load Conditions at one time; thus, when the curve
becomes constant below a certain FS u, it means other conditions that still have FS u at
the baseline become critical. The baseline weight of the frames is 4167 pounds.
3. 2. 2.3 L_H2 Tank Skin-Strin_er. The weight sensitivity of the liquid hydrogen tank
skin-stringer to factor of safety perturbations is presented in Figure 3-11. Skin-
stringer weights for the curves of Figure 3-11 were determined by means of the same
computer sizing program used to size the baseline vehicle. In most areas the skin is
designed by flight axial and shear loads. In locations where operating loads are low,
however, the skin thickness is determined by proof pressure. In this case the proof
pressure is determined by the requirement for a 100 mission service life with a scatter
factor of 1. 5.
Inspection of Figure 3-11 reveals that comments made in Section 3.2.2.2 for the belt
and TPS support frames also apply to the skin-stringer S_ucture, for the most part.
However, the weight sensitivity of the skin-stringer is not as heavily influenced by
individual conditions. Cutoffs are given where yield design is critical. For the range
of safety factors investigated, FS u = 1. 1 through 1. 6 and FSy = 1.0 through 1.2, yield
design is critical only for FSy > FS u. The cutoffs shown in the figure are for FSy =
1. 2. The baseline weight of the LH 2 skin-stringer is 52,486 pounds.
3. 2. 2. 4 Liquid Hydrogen Tank. The weight sensitivity of the entire liquid hydrogen
tank to factor of safety perturbations is presented inlFigurei3-12. Curves are pre-
sented in Figure 3-12. Curves are presented in this figure for all of the critical design
conditions and for FS u = 1. 1 through 1.6 and FSy = 1.0 through 1.2. All LH 2 tank •ele-
ments discussed in Sections 3.2.2.1 through 3.2.2.3 and presented in Figures 3-8
through 3-11 are included in Figure 3-12 with the addition of the orbiter support frames
at Stations 2666 and 2866 and the associated tank beef-up required. For the curves of
Figure 3-12, the forward tank dome assembly is designed by proof pressure for a 100
mission service life and a safe-life scatter factor 1. 5; therefore, its weight does not
3-18
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vary with factor of safety although the constant dome weight is included in the curves.
For the liftoff plus winds curve (4,5, 6) the weights of the lower dome and the aft orbiter
support frames remain constant since they are not sensitive to factor of safety port r-
bations for this condition. For some of the load conditions of Figure 3-12, there are
NOTE:
FOR THESE CURVES, THE FACTOR BASEI_N_.._
OF SAFETY IS VARIED ONLY FOR
THE THRUST AND DRAG LOADS
FOR THE LOAD CONDITIONS FOR
WHICH THE PARTICULAR CURVE
IS LABELED. THE FACTOR OF
_SAFETY FOR OTHER LOADS ARE
/,/
S <
MAxTHR,  TI
I.I 1.2 1.3 1.4
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY, FS u
ON THRUST AND DRAG If)ADS
Figure 3-13. LIt 2 Tank Weight Sensitivity
to Reduced FS u on Thrust
and Drag Loads Only for
Selected Load Conditions
separate curves for different values of FSy
for the lower values of FS u. The presence
of these differences is explained by the fact
that various elements of the tank are criti-
cal for yield design when FS u becomes low
enough. The baseline weight of the LH 2 tank
is 67,645 pounds.
Figure 3-13 presents the weight sensitivity
to factor of safety perturbations on thrust
and selected critical load conditions. The
factor of safety is held constant at the base-
line for all airload and tank pressure loads
for these conditions. For these same cur-
ves other load conditions are used with their
baseline factors of safety. The curves give
the relative weight effectiveness of reducing
the factor of safety on thrust loads. This
type of information is desirable since thrust
loads are more accurately predicted than,
say, gust loads so that it is possible to use
a reduced factor of safety. The service
life was held constant at 100 missions and
the safe-life scatter factor at 1.5 for the
analysis and therefore the tank skin thick-
ness did not drop below 0. 122 inch.
3.3 AFT ORBITER SUPPORT FRAME
3.3. 1 AFT ORBITER SUPPORT FRAME STRUCTURAL SIZING. The principal aft
support point of the orbiter to the booster is located at Station 2666. A substantial
body frame is provided at this stationto distribute orbiter loads to the booster body
shell. Figure 3-14 shows the criticalapplied loads (ultimate),and Figure 3-15 shows
the element identification.
A finite element computer solution was used to size the frame, and the model, geom-
etry, applied loads, section properties, and internal loads are shown on the following
pages. The material of the frame is 2219-T87 aluminum alloy. The room tempera-
ture properties of this material are:
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592.2K 592.2K
1
Figure 3-14.
477K
542.6K 238.5K
MAX e_q
TAILWIND
Critical Applied Loads (Ultimate),
Aft Orbiter Attachment Frame
MAX
SIDEWIND
Ftu = 63 ksi
Ftu 63
F t at nmit load = 1.4-'--0 = 1. 4--'_= 45 ksi
Fcy = 51 ksi
Fsu = 37 ksi
To allow for the effects of fastener
holes, welds, and other strength
reducers, these properties were
reduced for member sizing to the
following values for use with ulti-
mate loads.
F t = F c = 50 ksi
F = 20 ksi
s
Table 3-4 lists cap axial loads
and cross-sectional areas, and
Table 3-5 lists the web shear
flows and thicknesses.
Figure 3-15.
NUMBER 7
8
12
14
:i
3
16
is
20 15
17
19
l
Aft Orbiter Attachment Frame
Element Identification
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Table 3-4. Aft Orbiter Attachment Frame, Cap Axial
Loads and Cross-Sectional Areas
Bar
Ultimate Axial Loads (kips)
Area*
Length Max. Max. Bq
(inches) _l Left Right (in 2)
1 40 -56 302 -375
2 40 -227 -234 -11
3 50 -125 220 -376
4 53 -130 -180 87
5 52 -223 -1 -260
6 62 44 30 74
7 117 -424 -106 -373
8 64 63 87 -161
9 98 -110 -52 -62
10 91 -120 25 -185
11 102 19 -5 33
12 91 -82 -14 -87
13 55 1 1.7 0
14 47 3 -7. 5 12
15 69 -5 0. 6 -6.
16 57 15 -0.5 22
17 67 -6 -0. 9 -6.
18 53 12 O. 8 14.
19 80 -6 -2. 2 -4.
20 62 6 i. 1 5.
7.5
4.6
7.5
3.6
5.2
1.5
8.5
3.2
2.2
3.7
0.5
1.7
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
*Assume F t = F c 50 ksi ultimate
Table 3-5. Aft Orbiter Attachment Frame, Web
Shear Flows and Thicknesses
Web
Ultimate Shear Flow (kips/in)
Area Max. Max. _q t*
(in 2) _q Left Right (in.)
1 722
2 1493
3 2441
4 2048
5 1471
6 2103
7 1631
8 2483
9 2854
10 3947
I.i 4.3 5.7 0.29
1.9 6.7 4.7 0.34
1.8 2.1 0.11 0.11
7.5 0.57 8.4 0.42
3.5 1.00 2.9 0.50
O. 32 O. 16 O. 66 O. 33
O. 21 0 O. 26 O. 13
O.06 0 O.Ol O.04
0.01 0 0 O. 04
0 0 O. 01 O. 04
*Assume F s = 20 ksi ultimate
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3.3.2 AFT ORBITER SUPPORT FRAME WEIGHT SENSITMTY TO FACTOR OF
SAFETY PERTURBATIONS. The results of weight sensitivity analyses for perturba-
tions of ultimate and yield factors of safety are presented in this section for the Station
2666 aft orbiter support bulkhead. The weight sensitivity curves are presented in Fig-
ure 3-16. The curve marked ULTIMATE DESIGN shows the weight variation of the
frame for ultimate factors of safety ranging from 1. 1 to 1.6 for the two critical design
conditions, maximum _q tailwinds and maximum _q. The cutoffs labeled YIELD
DESIGN give the weights for FSy = 1. 0, 1. 1, and 1. 2. The baseline weight of the
frame is 2450 pounds.
The broken-line curve running between FS u = 1. 1 and 1.4 shows the weight sensitivity
of the frame to the reduction of FS u on thrust loads only (and reacting drag and inertia
loads) with FS u and FSy remaining at the baseline of 1. 4 and 1.1 respectively on all
airloads. The curve reveals that weight is a minimum for FS u = 1.27 on thrust and
drag, The reason that the curve changes slope is that while the reduction of thrust
FS u relieves loading on the frame for maximum c_q plus tailwinds, the maximum _q
condition becomes more critical for the frame as thrust FS u is reduced. As a result
the point at which optimum weight is reached is at FS u = 1.27.
2800
2700 --
260O
2500
24OO
2300
<
220O
2100
2000
1.1
STATION 2666 BULKHEAD /
CRITICAL FOR MAXflq
& MAXot¢ TAILWINDS J
\ -. _ _.--'/ _- BASEnN_
r ::o 1
/ _ Y " /f FS u APPLIES FOR THRUST
--/ . 1_ a DRA_LOADSONLY
__/_FSy l"0_--yFSu = 1.4 ANDFS_= 1.1(BASELI_I
./___]__7 /_ ON OTHER AIRLOADS
Figure 3-16.
1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY, FS u
Aft Orbiter Support Frame Weight Sensitivity to Factor
of Safety Perturbations for All Critical Conditions
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3.4 THRUST STRUCTURE
3.4. 1 THRUST STRUCTURE STRUCTURAL SIZING. A finite element model was
utilized to determine the theoretical weight of the thrust structure. The idealized
model and geometry is shown in Figures 3-17. Figure 3-18 shows thrust structure
model elements.
A total of 14 basic loading conditions were initially investigated, plus one or two engine
failures for the flight conditions. By assuming an identical structural configuration in
each 45-degree segment of the thrust structure model, the number of possible loading
combinations with engine failure was reduced. For one engine failed, one of the four
inner engines or one of the eight outer engines was considered failed - reducing the
number of combinations from 12 to 2. For two engines failed the number of combi-
nations was reduced from 66 to 12. The thrust structure load conditions are:
1. One hour ground headwinds
2. One hour ground tailwinds
3. One hour ground sidewinds
Conditions 4 through 11 were run with:
a. No engines out.
b. With one engine out.
c. With two engines out.
4. Liftoff plus one hour ground headwinds
5. Liftoff plus one hour ground tailwinds
6. Liftoff plus one hour ground sidewinds
7. Maximum (_q with headwinds
8. Maximum c_q with tailwinds
9. Maximum _q
10. Three g maximum thrust
11. Booster burnout
17. One day ground headwinds
18. One day ground tailwinds
19. One day ground sidewinds
A computerized analysis was made with these loading conditions. From the resulting
internal loads it was determined that only seven loading conditions were critical for
design. Conditions eliminated did not occur in the maximum/minimum search or were
slightly critical in only a few areas; consequently, these conditions have a negligible
effect on the overall results. The critical conditions are as follows:
7 Maximum (_q headwinds
7 IE Maximum _q headwinds (inner engine failed)
7 OE Maximum _q headwinds (outer engine failed)
10 Three g maximum thrust
10 IE Three g maximum thrust (inner engine failed)
10 OE Three g maximum thrust (outer engine failed)
19 One day ground sidewinds
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Ultimate applied loads are shown in Table 3-6. Table 3-7 lists the element number,
maximum load, cross-sectional area and thickness, applied and allowable stress, and
element weight based on the material properties given below.
As noted in Section 2.3, the structural members of the thrust structure are of Ti-6A1-4V
annealed titanium, having the following room temperature properties:
Ftu = 130 kst (Reference 9)
Ftu 130
F t at limit load = _ =1.40 1.40
- 92.86 ksi
Fcy = 126 ksi
Fsu = 76 ksi
Table 3-6. Thrust Structure Ultimate Design Loads
÷Z
54 32
,y
1'8 I'6
---4
tit 48
44 42
OLDDOWNS {4)
1 GIMBAL pTS. (12)
WII4G ATTACH _)
UlUmate Loads (pounds)
Conditions Px Py Pz Locations
19 i Day Ground Sidewlnds
7 Maximum alpha-q Headwinds
Maximum alpha-q Headwinds (Inner Engine Out)7IE
70E Maximum alpha-q Headwinds (Outer Engine Out)
10 3g Maximum Thrust
10 IE 3g Maximum Thrust (Inner Engine Out)
10 OE 3g Maximum Thrust (Outer Engine Out)
1,065,367 -38,280 4,202 104
1,065,537 -104,926 4,212 110
2,467,059 -1040926 70,858 116
2,466,689 -38,280 70,858 122
809,000 -187,920 32,36,38,42,44,48,50,54,74,76,78,80
185,610 508,470 109
46,300 112
-185,610 508,470 117
882,610 -205, O0O 32,86,38,42,44,48, 50,54,74,78, 80
185,610 508,470 109
46,300 112
-185,610 508.470 117
882. 610 -205, OOO 32_36,38,44,48,50_54,74, 76, 78, 80
185,610 508,470 109
46,300 112
-185,610 508,470 117
920,990 -67,680 32,36,38,42,44,48,50,54,74,76,78,80
1,004,700 -73,832 32,36,38,42,44,48,50,54,74,78,80
1,004,700 -73,832 32,36,38,44,48,50,54,74,76,78,80
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3.4. 2 THRUST STRUCTURE WEIGHT SENSITMTY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY PER-
TURBATIONS. The weight sensitivityof the B-9U thrust structure to perturbations of
factor of safety is presented in Figures 3-19 and 3-20. The curve labeled ULTIMATE
DESIGN in Figure 3-19 gives the relationship of weight to FS u for the assumption that
structural members are designed for the ultimate allowable strength of the material
when loaded by FS u multiplied by limit operating load. The cutoffs labeled YIELD
DESIGN are based on the assumption that members are critical for the yield allow-
able when loaded by FSy multiplied by limit operating load. Weights for yield design
are given for FSy = 1. 1 and 1. 2. The baseline weight of the thrust structure is 25,067
pounds.
The weight sensitivity of the thrust structure to perturbations of FS u on thrust loads
only, while holding FS u = 1.4 and FSy = 1. 1 (baseline) for other loads is shown in Fig-
ure 3-20. The broken-line curve in this figure is a duplicate of the curve for ultimate
design in Figure 3-19, and is shown for comparison. This comparison shows that the
thrust structure is highly sensitive to the thrust factor of safety, and that significant
weight changes can be obtained by varying FS u on thrust.
29 -- /
%
(J / .T, MATE DESIGN
_ r
° / ;
rDES/SN_
22 _F_ = 1.1
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY, FS u
Thrust Structure Weight
Sensitivity to Factor of
Safety Perturbations for
All Critical Conditions
Figure 3-19.
26
27 -- _-
2Z
2_
21 '
Figure 3-20.
/
/
FS_ VARIED FOR THRIFT
LOADS ONLY, FS u = 1.4 AND
FSy = 1.1 FOR OTHER LOADS
------FS u VARIED FOR ALL LOA/_
Ioi 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY, FS u
Thrust Structure Weight
Sensitivity to Per_'bation
of FSu for Thrust Loads
Only
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3.5 WING BOX
3.5. 1 WING BOX STRUCTURAL SIZING. Primary structural components such as
spars and ribs are sized by maximum _q loads during boost (Condition W1). This
condition is critical because it combines high air loads and low relieving inertia loads.
A finite element solution was programmed using a structural simulation model consist-
ing of 156 nodes and 1073 constant stress elements, as shown in Figure 3-21. Skin
corrugations were simulated in shear with quadrilateral plate elements. Orthotropic
triangles with negligible shear stiffness were superimposed to simulate the unidirec-
tional extensional stiffness of the skins. Spar cap loads obtained from the computer
solution are tabulated in Table 3-8 for Condition W1 and spar sizing data is presented
in Tables 3-9 through 3-13.
SS
267 2_7
327 95 120 I
]/_[97 I1071117127 137
447 7_1 I°a I r
627 / _l [ _[101
687 _3 _ _ 55 , I ,
731 y31 I'_ I [ I
7_125 I _i1312_133 143
5_ 29
SS
WS
fY7 5z5
1-_-633
i-_-751
i-_941
i-_aI042
B-9U space shuttle wing box simulation node points
for upper surface. Add "1" to the upper surface nodes
to obtain the node numbering for the lower surface.
Figure 3-21. B-9U Wing Structural Simulation Model
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Table 3-8. Spar Cap Loads, B-9U Wing
S. STA.
861
801
762
731..
637
l1 6 2-- 7 ll _ 1
5.67
507
447
33"7
327
- ,- 1 ,.
267
207
163
120
6O
I0
PLE
(KIPs)
-3.Z
1:,4
I(K,Ps)
m+Z.0
-50
#1.0
0.0
-Z9.0
+7.0
-i6. o
+43. o
-51.0
• +33.0
-12. o
;_ +37.0
-15.0
+33.0
-12.0
+30.0
-4.ol -I00
+ii0
-220
+255
-295
+375
-315
+415
-335
+420
-365
+440
-4.oo
ll_460
1:'2 1:'3
(flIPPP S ) l (KI,1:'S)
-75
, , = ;
-235
+110
-395
+310
-145 -525
+90 +500
-280 -650
+245 +415
-425 -8Z5
+385 +700
-48o -lOOO
+440 +795
-595 -lZ50
+530 +880
-730 -1385
+670 '- ;lOZO
-735
+715
-755
+540
-790
+760
-830
+765
-1375
+1105
-1400
+1150
i,
-1465
+1225
-1555
+1305
+8.0
-Z.0
+2.0
+ZO
-105
+50
L ,.
-ZOO
+i00
-300
+150
-360
+170
-43_O_
+240
-5Z0
+625
.650
+660
-8!o
+935l
-1035
+945
-1180
+1245
-1190
+1265
-1215
+1290
.' i240 '
+I330
-1960
+1,360
iP5
(KIPs)
-10.
-25
+I0
-47
+18
-85
+40
-120
+80
-145
+135
-17 5
+180
-Z_q
+220
-330
+245
-410
+275
-505
+320
-460
+445
-465
+50,0
-482
+480
-480
+515
.-495
.+510
i
rEP1 -P5
(KIPs)
-i0
-75
+30
-152
+68
-36G
+140
-655
+340
-900
+615
-1275
+1010
-1690
+1505
-2230
+1990
-2800
+2555
-36o5
+2930
Ill 4050
+3755
-4080
+4000
J .
-4187
+3880
-4340
+4270
-4640
+442 0
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Table 3-9. Sizing Data -- Spar No. 1 (WS 515), B-9U Wing
ss Xc wc tc wu t_ wd h
327 3.56 4.08 0. 218 2.09 0. 074 4.14 0. 036
267 5. 19 4.54 0o 285 2° 64 0. 099 4. 39 0. 055
207 6.56 4° 86 0° 338 3° 88 0. 18 4.62 0. 075
163 6.84 3° 90 0° 44 3° 25 0. 107 3° 77 0° 034
120 7° 06 3° 93 0. 45 3.50 0° 11 3.68 0. 023
60 7.30 4.81 0° 38 2.96 0. 081 4. 23 0. 016
0 7° 50 4.84 0. 387 2° 48 0o 060 4. 14 0. 016
A e = Spar cap area (in 2)
W c = Spar cap width (in.)
t c = Spar cap gage
W u = Spar upright width (in.)
t u = Spar upright gage (in.)
W d = Spar diagonal width (in.)
t d = Spar diagonal gage (in.)
t w = Spar shear web gage
R = Spar shear web corrugation radius (in.)
tf = Spar shear web support cap gage (in.)
SS = Spanwise station
t
W
CJ_=
-_0.4W c
t c --4_
mW
0
SPAR CAP
tu, td
t
=-'_ " --t-
W
I1
W d
, , __J__
W
Wd
SPAR UPRIGHT
SPAR DIAGONAL
SPAR WEB
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Table 3-10. Sizing Data -- Spar No. 2 (WS 633), B-9U Wing
ss Ac wo tc Wu tu wd ta
507 2.35 3.80 0. 153 2.50 0. 093 4. 04 0. 041
447 4, 05 4. 37 0. 232 2.61 0. 103 4. 29 0. 067
387 5. 92 4.82 0. 307 3.15 0. 129 4.54 0. 095
327 7.45 5. 10 0. 365 3.5 0. 144 4. 73 0. 109
267 8.78 5.32 0. 411 3.81 0. 158 4. 90 0. 122
207 9.44 5.42 0. 437 5.05 0, 210 5. 03 0. 129
163 9.62 4.32 0. 555 4.13 0. 147 4.20 0. 056
120 9.75 4.33 0° 562 4.40 0. 145 4. 07 0. 038
60 9.86 5.26 0. 467 3.64 0. 107 4. 52 0. 019
0 9.87 5.26 0. 467 3.00 0. 075 4.37 0. 016
Table 3-11. Sizing Data -- Spar No. 3 (WS 751), B-9U Wing
SS A c
627 2. 54
567 3.64
507 5. 09
447 6. 83
387 8. 48
327 9. 92
267 11. O2
2O7 1L 68
163 11. 8O
120 12. 07
6O 12. 17
0 12. 22
W c t c W u tu W d t d t w R tf
3.92 o. 162 1.9s 0.085 4.07 o. 124
4.42 0. 206 2.82 0. 125 4.24 0. 118
4.80 0. 264 4. 27 0. 187 4.42 0. 101 0. 095 3.18 0. 238
0. 106 3.50 0.25
0. 115 3.76 0.25
0. 12 3.98 0.25
0. 124 4. 16 0.255. 69 0. 485 4. 46 0. 194 5. 19 0. 172
5. 78 0. 505 5.85 0. 254 5.33 0. 177
4. 59 0. 643 4. 77 0. 177 4.51 0. 077
4.61 0. 654 5. i 0.177 4.38 0. 052 0. 040 2.78 0.10
0. 032 2.45 0.08
0. 020 2.00 0.05
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Table 3-12. Sizing Data - Spar No. 4 (WS 941), B-9U Wing
ss Ac We tc Wu tu Wd td tw R tz
861 0. 12 1. 05 0. 029 1 0. 025 1 0. 025
801 0.22 1.61 0. 034 1. 5 0. 062 3.01 0. 029
762 1.41 3.01 0. 117 1.9 0. 049 3.12 0. 064
731 1. 82 2.42 0. 188 2.08 0. 096 2. 17 0. 085
687 2.30 3.54 O.163 2.21 O. 113 3.32 O. 133
627 3.50 4.36 0. 200 2.53 0. 117 4.07 0. 124
567 3.66 4.41 0.205 2.81 0.124 4.24 0.116
507 4.26 4.55 0. 234 2.43 0. 090 4.42 0. 101
447 5. 17
387 6. 02
327 6.79
267 7.49 5.07 0.37 3.41 0. 137 4.72 0. 096
207 7. 86 5. 13 0. 383 4.40 0. 176 4. 81 0. 098
163 8.27 4.13 0. 50 3.72 0. 127 4.0 0. 045
120 8.89 4.21 0.52 4.12 0.133 3.95 0.033
60 9.86
0 10. 96
0.080 2.82 0.199
0.080 2.90 0.200
0.081 3.00 0.203
0.082 3.09 0.205
0.084 3.21 0.211
0.032 2.31 0.080
0. 025 2. 12 0.062
0.020 1.95 0.050
Table 3-13. Sizing Data - Spar No. 5 (WS 1042), B-9U Wing
SS Ac Wc tc Wu tu Wd td
861 0. 16 1.14 0.034 1 0.025 1 0.025
801 0. 16 1.42 0. 029 1 0. 050 2. 96 0.016
762 0.82 2.51 0.082 1.25 0.050 3.01 0.026
731 I. 00 2.00 0.125 1.36 0. 056 1.96 0.035
687 1.30 2.93 0.110 1.42 0.061 3.11 0.051
627 1.90 3.57 0.134 1.59 0.064 3.81 0.046
567 2.04 3.63 0.139 1.78 0.069 3.91 0.044
507 2.07 3.77 0.15 2.42 0.090 4.02 0.039
447 2.87 3.95 0. 181 2.50 0.095 4. 08 0. 040
387 3.50 4.11 0.21 2.50 0.10 4.15 0.043
327 4.13 4.27 0.24 2.50 0.10 4.23 0.045
267 4.65 4.39 0.265 2.50 0.10 4.30 0.047
207 4.72 4.40 9.268 3.09 0.11 4.34 0.045
163 4.99 3.55 0.36 2.60 0.081 3.45 0.021
120 5. 29 3.60 0. 37 2.87 0. 084 3.45 0. 020
60 5. 72 4.47 0. 319 2.50 0. 066 4.05 0. 020
0 6.20 4.58 0. 338 2. 16 0. 051 4. 01 0. 020
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3.5. 2 WING BOX WEIGHT SENSITIVITY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY PERTURBATIONS.
The weight sensitivity of the B-9U wing box to perturbations of factor of safety is pre-
sented in Figures 3-22 and 3-23 for all of the critical wing loading conditions. The
critical wing loading conditions are shown in Figure 2-20. The curve of Figure 3-22
labeled ULTIMATE DESIGN is based on a structure critical for ultimate design loads
at the plotted FSu, whereas the cutoffs for yield design are based on a structure criti-
cal for yield loads at the indicated FSy. Weights were determined by use of the same
computer program used for the baseline analysis. The baseline weight of the wing box
is 43,104 pounds.
In Figure 3-23 the weight sensitivity of the wing box to factor of safety perturbations
for the launch vehicle type conditions, maximum _q (W1) and maximum g recovery
(W2), while holding the aircraft condition, subsonic gust (W3), at the baseline FSu =
1. 5 is plotted along with the sensitivity to perturbations for the aircraft condition only
while holding the launch vehicle conditions at the baseline of FS u = 1. 4. The curve for
perturbations for all load conditions simultaneously is shown for comparison purposes.
Inspection of the curves reveals that the aircraft loading condition has little effect on
the wing box weight. The figure shows that the wing box weight is highly sensitive to
the FS u on launch vehicle type loading conditions, and that the weight can be signifi-
cantly changed by varying FS u for these conditions.
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Figure 3-22. Wing Box Weight Sensitivity
to Factor of Safety Perturba-
tions for All Critical
Conditions
" "1
ALL CRITICAL
CONDITIONS _
,/^mCRAFT common __s]--
i /
LAUNCH
/ NOTES:1. FSu = 1.5 FOR AIRCRAFT CONDITION
ON THE LAUNCH VEHICLE CONDIT|ON
CURVE.
2. FS u = 1.4 FOR LAUNCH VEHICLE
CONDITIONS ON THE AIIqCRAFT
CONDITION CURVE.
1
I.I 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY, FS u
Figure 3-23. Wing Box Weight Sensitivity
to Factor of Safety Pertur-
batior_ for Various Critical
Load Conditions
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3.6 VERTICAL TAIL BOX
3.6. 1 VERTICAL TAIL BOX STRUCTURAL SIZING. The vertical tail structural box
is constructed of 6A1-4V titanium alloy and has a three-spar arrangement with the front
spar on the 10% chord line, the rear spar on the 60% chord line, and the mid spar on the
37% chord line as shown in Figure 3-24. Spars and ribs are of corrugated construction.
Welding is used to attach spar and rib caps to the corrugated webs. Surface coverings
are of integrally stiffened extruded "planks," welded together. The rear spar and mid
spar transfer the bending moments and shear into the body bulkheads through fittings.
R.S. 0.
M.S. 0.37C
F.S. 0.
STRINGERS (TYP)
BETWEEN EACH
RIBS
0.
-*-71.5--- _,----75---_
/
556.1
533.8
15 °
e_
AFT THRUST BHD
Figure 3-24. Vertical Tail Configuration
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The vertical tail was simulated and analyzedby means of a Convair computer proce-
dure that used the stiffness approach to obtain an internal load distribution. The
spanwise bending moment distribution used for member sizing is shown in Figure 2-22,
Another computer program was used to optimize the skin-stiffener configuration. The
skins of the fin box are fully effective from the tip to the canted rib.
The section choseu for the fatigue calculations of the present study is at the canted rib,
Section (_ - (_ of Figure 3-24. The spar cap sizing calculations for this section
are shown below. The load distribution coefficients used were determined by computer.
Section A - A of Figure 3-24
105 IN.
FS RS
h = 42.4 IN. h = 62.4 IN. h = 58.8 IN.
V = 352,800 lb (ultimate)
M = 74.234x 106 in-lb
T = 9.58 X 106 in-lb
0. 0176(352,800) 6209
= -- = 146 lb/inqFS = 42. 4 42.4
0. 123(352,800) _ 43,394
= 695 lb/inqCS = 62.4 62.4
0. 442 (352,800) _ 155,938
= 2652 lb/inqRS = 58.8 58.8
Remainder of shear is carried in covers and caps, which are tapered.
Spar Cap Loads
0. 013 (74. 234) 106
Forward Pcap = 42.4 = 22,760
0. 032(74. 234)(106)
Center Pcap = 62.4 = 38,069
0. 068(74. 234) 106
Aft Pcap = 58. 8 = 8'_' 849
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CapAreas, choosing f = 34 ksi
22,760
Forward A ---
34,000
- 0.670 in 2
38,069
Center A =
34,000
- I.12 in2
Rear A - 85,849 _ 2.52in 2
34,000
Covers
0.89 (74,234,000) = 66,068,260 in-lb
66,068,260 = 1,201,240 lb
PX = 55 in.
1,201,241 _ 5725 lb/in
Nx = 210 in.
'--2.00-_._
0.157
For the configuration with t = 0. 180 we have Ucr = 32,450 psi.
This compares with _eff =
5725 lb/in
0. 180 in. = 31,805 psi
3.6.2 VERTICAL TAIL BOX WEIGHT SENSITIVITY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY PER-
TURBATIONS. The weight sensitivity of the B-9U vertical stabilizer box to FS u per-
turbations is presented in Figures 3-25 and 3-26 for all of the critical vertical tail
loading conditions. The curve of Figure 3-25 labeled ULTIMATE DESIGN is based on
a structure critical for ultimate design loads at the plotted FS u. Due to the low design
ultimate stresses that remain within the elastic range of the material, yield design is
not a consideration. FSu was perturbated concurrently for all critical conditions.
The critical loading conditions for the vertical tail box are maximum _q (T1), sub-
sonic gust (T2), and maximum rudder hinge moment (T3).
In Figure 3-26 FS u was perturbated for the launch vehicle condition only (condition T1)
while holding the aircraft conditions (conditions T2 and T3) at the baseline FS u = 1.5.
FS u was also perturbed for the aircraft conditions only while holding the launch vehicle
condition at the baseline FS u = 1.4. This was done to determine the relative sensitivity
of the vertical tail box weight to the two types of conditions. The results are shown in
Figure 3-25 with the curve for all conditions for comparison.
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O9,000
M
N
_8,500
N
_g,000--
! j J i
NOTE:
DUE TO LOW DESIGN ULTIMATE STRESSES
THAT REMAIN WITHIN THE ELASTIC RANGE
OF THE MATERIAL. YIELD DESIGN IS NOT
A,CO_D_A_ON. //
/
ULTIMATE
D "F_SIGN
/
7,00C
1.1 1.2 1,3 1.4 1.5
ULTIMATE FACTORY OF SAFETY. FS u
Figure 3-25. Vertical Stabilizer Box
1.6
Weight Sensitivity to Factor
of Safety Perturbations for
All Critical Load Conditions
10,00C
i
AIRCRAFT CONDITION
vEHIC,E //
--LAUNCH ---- -
//
ALL CRITICAL
CONDITIONS
_ _LAUNCH
-- -VEHICLE --
CONDITIO_
"BASE I/NE
. 1
 ALL 1c  oALCO ITIONS
// OTES: I
2_--I. FSu = 1.5 FOR AIRCRAFT CONDITIONS
ON THE LAUNCH VEHICLE CONDITION
C UI:tVE.
2. FS u = 1.4 FOR LAUNCH VEIIICLE
CONDITION ON THE AIRCRAFT
CONDITION CURVE.
I • I I
1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY, FS u
Figure 3-26. Vertical Stabilizer Box
Weight Sensitivity to Factor of
Safety Perturbations for Vari-
ous Critical Load Conditions
Inspection of the curve reveals that the aircraft loading conditions T2 and T3 have
little effect on the vertical taft box weight. The figure shows that the vertical tail
box weight is highly sensitive to the FS u on the launch vehicle type loading condition,
maximum _q (T1), and that weight can be significantly changed by varying FS u for
this condition.
3.7 CREW MODULE
3. 7. 1 CREW MODULE STRUCTURAL SIZING. The crew module main structural
shell is designed to be fail-safe through the use of crack-stoppers and beefed-up skins
and frames. The aft ellipsoidal bulkhead of the crew module is one structural element
on which it is difficult to employ ordinary fail-safe design techniques such as crack-
stoppers. Therefore the same apparent factor of safety is used for the bulkhead as
for the cylindrical section skin, and it is stiffened with a rectangular waffle pattern
to provide crack arresting ability in both the circumferential and meridional directions.
The most critical loads applied to the crew module shell are those arising as a result
of internal pressurization. The Ap across the shell is presented in Figure 2-37 as a
function of time, t, from lfftoff. For the Ap curve, an internal cabin pressure of 15
psia was used, and it was assumed that no leakage occurred.
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An iterative analysis procedure shows that the longitudinal section through the skin wall
in the cylindrical section of the module shown in the sketch will provide fail-safe
capability for a longitudinal through-crack initiating from a frame rivet.
r = 58 IN.
module
90 ........
" 1 1 I Kcrit = 2 KIc
30 ---- --
0 5
HALF CRACK LENGTH, a (inches)
Using the method of Reference 11:
Percent stiffening = 20%
The stress intensity factor is
K=C¢; _/-_-_
Values of C were obtained from Figure 9
of Reference 11 for a crack initiating at
a frame rivet. The largest value of S/p
(frame spacing to rivet pitch ratio) was
used due to the large frame spacing.
The gross stress level, ff, is
(__ pr_ (15 psi)(58 in.)
t 0.058
Figure 3-27. Crew Module Stress Intensity
Factor Versus Crack Length
for Crack Initiating from
Frame Rivet
hole.
= 15.0ksi = _imit
Figure 3-27 presents the stress intensity
factor versus crack length for a longitud-
inal crack emanating from a frame rivet
The figure shows that fracture arrest is provided by both the first and the second
frames. The main structural shell is therefore fail-safe for internal pressure loads.
Fail-safe capability for the glazed areas is provided by use of double windows in the
doors, and laminated glass in the windshield. The crew module is fail-safe for longi-
tudinal loads by reason of the use of multiple stringers.
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83.7.2 APPARENT FACTORS OF SAFETY. When reduced limit design stresses are
required to meet yield, safe-life, or fail-safe criteria, the apparent factor of safety
is given by the expression:
F
m
FS (apparent) = Ll_imit
The skin of the crew module is designed by the fail-safe requirements. Therefore the
skin has an apparent factor of safety greater than the baseline. For 2219-T87 alumi-
num at room temperature:
Ftu = 63,000 psi, Fty = 51,000 psi
FS u (apparent) = 63,000 = 4. 20, FSy (apparent) =15,000
51,000
=3.40
15,000
I000
9_o!
900
850
Comparison of the actual and apparent ultimate safety factors, 2.0 and 4.2 respectively,
reveals that the fail-safe requirement imposes a significant weight penalty on the skin
over the weight required by static strength
800
/
BASELINE (REQUIRED FOR FAIL-SAFE)
/
/
f.--
/
/
750
/
/
/
700 /
/
- YIEL_ /
DESIGN /
! /
500 _-
_ 1, 3 ASSUMED l
5oo ,1 ] I ]
/
/
/
/
'X'_ U [_TIMATE
DESIGN
PROOF FACTOR
1.5 2,0 2.5 3,0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY, FS
u
Figure 3-28. Crew-Module Skin Frames,
and Bulkhead Sensitivity of
Weight to Factor of Safety
Perturbations for Maximum
Operating Pressure
for which ultimate design is critical.
The bulkhead employs the same apparent
safety factor for fail-safe purposes as the
skin, and is therefore also subject to a
large penalty over the weight required for
static strength.
3.7.3 CREW MODULE WEIGHT SENSI-
TIVITY TO FACTOR OF_AFETY PER-
T.URBATIONS. The weight sensitivity of
the crew module skin, frames, and bulk-
head for perturbations of ultimate and
yield factors of safety on the maximum
operating pressure is presented in Fig-
ure 3-28. The ultimate factor of safety I
was perturbed over the range of 1.3 to _
1.7. Inspection of Figure 3-28 reveals _
that the weight is determined by the fail _-
safe requirement for ultimate factors of
safety of less than 4. 2. The baseline
weight of the skin, frames, and aft bulk-
head is 882 pounds. The weight can go
lower only if the fail-safe requirement
is relaxed. Weight reductions to be ob-
tained by relaxation of fail-safe and
factor of safety criteria are further
limited by the 1.5 proof factor require-
ment, which requires a weight of 555
pounds.
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SECTION 4
FATIGUE ANALYSIS
On the following pages, a cumulative fatigue damage analysis is made for each of the
baseline components to determine the safe-life number of missions to initiation of
fatigue cracks, assuming initially flawless material. The service load spectra shown
in Figured 2-28 through 2-37 are used.
Material information used in classical fatigue analysis is usually in the form of S-N
curves, constant life diagrams, or some such presentation of stress versus cycles-
te-failure of test specimens. Although this information is in terms of complete failure
rather than fatigue crack initiation, S-N curves are being used as indicating crack
initiation for purposes of this study. This interpretation is justified by the fact that
the standard test specimen configuration used to generate S-N data has a small cross-
section compared to space shuttle booster structural members. The specimen is
therefore more sensitive to a given amount of fatigue damage, and progression of
fatigue damage to complete failure is rapid. The fatigue curves of Figures 4-1, 4-2,
and 4-3 provide S-N data for 2219-T87 aluminum alloy at room temperature, and
Ti6AI-4V annealed titanium alloy at room temperature and 650°F, respectively. The
sensitivity of fatigue life to factor of safety perturbations (i. e., stress level changes)
and to fatigue crack initiation scatter factor perturbations is also presented for each
of the baseline components.
5O
4O
3O
2O
w
10
10 2
\
I IIII11 I I I lllll [ I i11111 1 I II11111
3 5
10 ]0 4 10 10 6
1" I|llll
CYCLEs TO FAILURE (N)
Figure 4-1. Estimated Fatigue Curves for 2219-T87 Aluminum
Alloy at Room Temperature with Kt = 3.0
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100 ' -
_1060 80
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1I0 10 2 10 3 10 4 10 ° ]0 {i
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Figure 4-2. Fatigue Curves for Annealed Ti-6A1-4V
at Room Temperature with Kt = 3.0
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Figure 4-3. Fatigue Curves for Annealed Ti-6A1-4V
at 650°F with K t = 3.0
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4.1 LIQUID OXYGEN TANK
This section presents the fatigue damage analysis for the baseline liquid oxygen tank
and the sensitivity of its fatigue life to perturbations of factors of safety and fatigue
crack initiation scatter factor. Table 4-1 gives the fatigue damage analysis for inter-
nal pressure for the most critical area of the LO 2 tank, which is the skin at the for-
ward end of the tank cylindrical section. The calculated fatigue life for the LO 2 tank
is 2049 missions based on a scatter factor of 4. Figure 4-4 presents the sensitivity
of the LO2 tank fatigue life to factor of safety perturbations. The fatigue life of the
baseline tank is controlled by the proof design of the tank. Figure 4-5 presents the
sensitvity of the LO 2 tank fatigue life to fatigue crack initiation scatter factor perturb-
ations.
4.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK
This section presents the fatigue damage analysis for the baseline liquid hydrogen tank
and the sensitivity of its fatigue life to perturbations of factor of safety and fatigue
crack initiation scatter factor. Table 4-2 gives the fatigue damage analysis for internal
pressure for the most critical area of the LH 2 tank, which is the skin at the forward
end of the tank cylindrical section. The calculated fatigue life from this table is 2314
missions based on a scatter factor of 4. Table 4-3 presents the fatigue damage analysis
at the fuselage Station 2600 bottom centerUne for longitudinal loading due to flight and
internal pressure. This table indicates a fatigue life of 6410 missions based on a scatter
factor of 4. Therefore, the fatigue life of the LH 2 tank is critical for fatigue due circum-
ferential loading from internal pressure as indicated by the 2314 mission fatigue life
calculated in Table 4-2. Figure 4-6 presents the sensitivity of the LH 2 tank fatigue life
to factor of safety perturbations. The fatigue life of the baseline tank is controlled by
the proof design of the tank. Figure 4-7 presents the sensitivity of the LH 2 tank fatigue
life, as calculated in Table 4-2, to fatigue crack initiation factor perturbations.
4.3 AFT ORBITER SUPPORT FRAME
This section presents the fatigue damage analysis for the baseline aft orbiter support
frame at Station 2666, and the sensitivity of its fatigue life to perturbations of factor
of safety and fatigue crack initiation scatter factor. Table 4-4 presents the fatigue
damage analysis for the frame. The critical member of the frame is Bar 6 of Figure
3-15 and Table 3-3. The calculated fatigue life from this analysis 4630 missions based
on a scatter factor of 4. Figure 4-8 presents the sensitivity of the Station 2666 orbiter
support frame fatigue life to perturbations of the factor of safety. The reduced fatigue
life at low safety factors is due to the resulting higher limit operating stresses. The
curve shows that even for a low ultimate factor of safety, the fatigue life of the bulkhead
well exceeds the required 100 missions design life. Figure 4-9 presents the sensitivity
of the orbiter support frame fatigue life to perturbations of the fatigue crack initiation
scatter factor.
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Table 4-3. Fuselage Damage Analysis - Station 2600 Bottom Centerline
Mission l_hase T _x N }" Crmean _alt Kt n N
mean Xalt
(" F) (Ib/in) (Ib/in) (inch) (ksl) (ksi) (cycles) (cycles)
n/N
Maximum Thrust RT
Ascent
I I
Ascent I
Entry I
Cruise/inding (1)
Cruise/Landing (1)
Taxi (1)
Ta! (1)
GAG (1)
RT
RT
4971 2761
5036 361
I 625
885
1149
5036 1413
1955 104
2011 160
2198 347
2354 503
1091 158
I 231
3O4
378
1091 451
477 118
I 162
207
252
477 300
0.188 3.0
0.188
26.4 14.7
26.8 1.9
I 3.3
4.7
6.1
26.8 7.5
10.4 0.5
10.7 0.9
11.7 1.8
12.5 2.7
5.8 0.8
I 1.2
1.6
2.0
5.8 2.4
2.5 0.6
I 0.9
1.1
1,3
2.5 1.6
4.1 4.1
3.0
3.0
Mission Phase
Maximum Thrust
Ascent
Entry
Cruise/Landing
Taxi
GAG
Z (n/N)
!o.o038
,0.0001
0
0
0
0
0.0039
Fatigue -
I00 100
SoF. (Z n/rN) 4 (0.0039)
NOTES:
(1) To provide for one ferry flight per mission, the number oi cycles
for cruise/landing and taxi phases has been increased by a factor
of 2.0, and two GAG cycles per mission added, using a minimum
stress from the taxi phase and a maximum stress from the cruise/
landing phase.
(2) Material: 2219-T87 plate.
I00 2.6 x 104
90, 000
9,000 ®
900 ®
90 7 x 105
9 2.5 × 105
90,000
9,000
9O0
99
180,000
18, 000
I,800
180
18
180,000
18,000
1,800
180
18 =
200
= 6410 missions, based on
a scatter factor of 4
0.0038
0
0
0
O. 0001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 4-4. Aft Orbiter Support Frame Load Spectrum and Damage Analysis, Contd
NOT ES:
le
2.
.
.
Critical member judged to be Bar 6 (see Figure 3-15 and Table 3-3).
Percent of design values, from spectrum curves, Figure 2-32.
%A
Z
Design value of A = 775 kips. A = -- (775)
z z 100
%A
Design value of A = 341 kips. A = ----Y (341)
y y 100
5. ForaunitA ofl000kips, _ in Bar6 =24.7ksi
Z Z
6. ForaunitA of l000 kips, a in Bar 6=68.0ksi
Y Y
u
8.
9.
Cycles to failure (crack initiation) from Figure 4-1.
Material is 2219-T87 aluminum alloy.
Operating temperature for above conditions assumed to be RT.
Fatigue Life Computation:
r
n
_ = 0.0054 for 100 missions
Fatigue Life
100 100
= S.F. x Z (n/N) = __)--0.00-': = 4630 missions
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4.4 THRUST STRUCTURE
This section presents the fatigue damage analysis for the baseline thrust structure and
the sensitivity of its fatigue life to perturbations of factor safety and fatigue crack
initiation scatter factor. Table 4-5 presents the fatigue damage analysis of the critical
tension element of the thrust structure, which is the thrust beam cap. The analysis
was made using the load spectrum of Figure 2-34, and based on a scatter factor of 4,
gives a fatigue life of 877 missions,which is well in excess of the 100 mission baseline
life requirement. Figure 4-10 gives the sensitivity of the thrust beam cap fatigue life
to perturbations of the factor of safety. The reduced fatigue life at low safety factors
is due the higher limit operating stresses resulting from these lower safety factors.
The curve shows that for all safety factors investigated, the thrust structure has a fa-
tigue life well in excess of the 100 mission requirement. Figure 4-11 presents the
variation of the fatigue life as a function of the fatigue crack initiation scatter factor.
4.5 WING BOX
This section presents the fatigue damage analysis for the baseline wing box and the
sensitivity of it s fatigue life to perturbations of factor of safety and fatigue crack initia-
tion scatter factor. Table 4-6 presents the fatigue damage analysis for the wing spar
caps, which are the most critical elements of the wing box. The analysis gives a base-
line fatigue life of 182 missions whereas the design service life is 100 missions. This
is the lowest fatigue life of any major structural assembly investigated and indicates
the load spectrum for the wing to be severe. Figure 4-12 presents the sensitivity of
the wing spar caps fatigue life to perturbation of the ultimate factor of safety. The re-
duced fatigue life at low safety factors is due to the resulting higher limit operating
stresses. The curve shows that for the baseline fatigue crack initiation scatter factor
of 4, a FS u of 1.26 is needed to meet the requirement for a design service life of 100
missions. The curve also shows a fatigue life of only 65 missions for tension structure
designed by the yield factor of safety, FSy = 1.1. Although this is less than the design
service life requirement of 100 missions, it is not critical unless FSu is reduced to the
point where yield design becomes critical. This cannot happen, however, because FSu
cannot be reduced below 1.26 without violating the 100 mission requirement.
Figure 4-13 presents the sensitivity of the wing box spar caps fatigue life to perturba-
tions of the fatigue crack initiation scatter factor.
4.6 VERTICAL TAIL BOX
This section presents the fatigue damage analysis for the baseline vertical tail box and
the sensitivity of its fatigue life to perturbations of factor of safety and fatigue crack
initiation scatter factor. Table 4-7 present_ the fatigue damage analysis and gives the
very large fatigue life of 125, 000 missions based on a scatter factor of 4. Fatigue
therefore is not critical for the vertical tail box. Figure 4-14 presents the sensitivity
4-12
1 |I
Table 4-5. Thrust Beam Cap Fatigue Damage Analysis
Design
_limit
(ksi)
T K t T T • _ _v n n _ Nin a m a e a
(°F) (%) (%) (ksi) (ksi) (cycles) (cycles) (ksi) (cycles)
(I) (2) (2)
n/N
92.9
92.9
92.9
92.9
92.9
92.9
92.9
RT 3.0 96.8 0.05 89.9 0.05 15, 000
5, 000 0.195
RT 3.0 96.8 0.37 89.9 0.34 10, 000
9,000 0.67
RT 3.0 96.8 1.08 89.9 1.00 1,000
900 1.33
RT 3.0 96.8 1.79 89.9 1.66 100
90 1.99
RT 3.0 96.8 2.50 89.9 2.32 l0
9 2.64
RT 3.0 96.8 3.20 89.9 2.97 1
RT 3.0 50 50 46.4 46.4 1 1 47.4
w
3.5 × 103
0
0
0
0
0
0.000285
NOTES:
n : 0.000285 for one flight
r. (-_-)thrust beam cap
1
Fatigue life : 877 missions
4(0. 000285)
(1) Alternating thrust in percent of design thrust from Figure 2-34.
(2) Cycles for one flight.
(3) Material: Ti-6AI-4V annealed.
of the vertical tail box fatigue life to perturbation of the ultimate factor of safety. The
reduced fatigue life at low safety factors is due to the resulting higher limit operating
stresses. The curve shows that even for a low ultimate factor of safety, the fatigue
life of the box far exceeds the required 100 mission design life, Figure 4-15 presents
the variation of the vertical tail box fatigue life as a function of the fatigue initiation
scatter factor.
4.7 CREW MODULE
This section presents the fatigue damage analysis for the crew module and the sensiti-
vity of its fatigue life to perturbations of factor of safety and fatigue crack initiation
scatter factor. Table 4-8 presents the fatigue damage analysis for the baseline fail-
safe crew module. The analysis indicates a fatigue life of 2, 500,000 missions, which
is very high and indicates that fatigue is not critical for the module. Figure 4-16 pre-
sents the sensitivity of the crew module fatigue life to factor of safety perturbations.
The reduced fatigue life at lower safety factors is due to the resulting higher limit
operating stresses. The ultimate factor of safety was perturbed over the range of 1.5
to 5.0, while the yield factor of safety was perturbed over the range of 1.3 to 1.7. The
safe fatigue life is determined by the fail-safe requirement for ultimate factors of safety
of less than 4.2. Lower fatigue lives result only ff the fail-safe requirement is relaxed.
Fatigue lives that result for lower safety factors, when fail-safe isn't required, are
4-13
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shown in the inset of Figure 4-16. If fail-safe is not required and safety factors are
reduced far enough, the reduction in fatigue life is limited by the 1.5 proof factor re-
quirement. The figure shows that the crew module has far more than the required 100
missions service life for all factors of safety investigated. Figure 4-17 shows the
variation of fatigue life as a function of the fatigue crack initiation scatter factor.
NOTES:
1. FATIGUE CRACK INITIATION
SCATTER FACTOR = 4 "
2. DESIGN SER_CE LIFE
IS 100 MISSIONS
"U LTIM ATE
"_ _BAS
FSy - 1.2
FSy = 1.1
YIELD DESIGN
2 2
Figure 4-10.
I,i 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY, FS u
Thrust Beam Cap Sensitivity of Fatigue
Life to Factor of Safety Perturbations
4-14
3500
3000
i 2000 ........
go= 1_oo k
1000
500
0
1 2 .1
Figure 4-11.
NOTE: STRUCTURE DESIGNED FOR BASELINE
LOAD CONDITIONS & CRITERIA
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Thrust Beam Cap Fatigue Life (for Crack
Initiation) Versus Scatter Factor
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Table 4-6. B-9U Wing Spar Caps Fatigue Damage Analysis
Mission Phase
Ascent
Ascent RT
Entry 650
r
Entry 650
• Cruise/Landing (2) RT
I '|
Cruise/Landing (2) RT
Taxi (2) RT
t
Taxi (2) RT
GAG (2) RT
T tVlimit
_°F) (ksi)
RT 91.2
1.2
91.2
91.2
91.2
91.2
91.2
Cv megYt _
i_ean
_limit _limit
(1) (1) (ksi) (ksi)
0 0.015 0 1.37
0 0.025 0 2.28
0 0.035 0 3.19
0 0. 045 0 4. I0
0 0.055 0 5.01
0.15 0.035 13.7 3.2
0.15 0.05 13.7 4.6
0.15 0.065 13.7 5.9
0.15 0.08 13.7 7.3
0.15 0.09 13.7 8.2
0 0.055 0 5.0
0 0.09 0 8.2
0 0.125 0 11.4
0 0.155 0 14.1
0 0.185 0 16.9
0.40 0.08 36.5 7.3
0.40 0.145 36.5 13.2
0.40 0.21 36.5 19.2
0.40 0.27 36.5 24.6
0.40 0.33 36.5 30.1
0.10 0.105 9.1 9.6
0.10 0.185 9.1 16.9
0.10 0.30 9.1 27.4
0.10 0.45 9.1 41.0
0.i0 0.605 9.1 55.1
0.15 0.135 13.7 12.3
0.15 0.20 13.7 18.2
0.15 0.37 13.7 33.7
0.15 0.61 13.7 55.6
0.15 0.80 13.7 72.9
0.075 0.075 6.8 6.8
0.135 0.135 12.3 12.3
0.185 0.185 16.9 16.9
0.23 0.23 21.0 21.0
0.37 0.37 33.7 33.7
0.47 0.47 42.9 42.9
0.50 0.50 45.6 45.6
0.20 0.07 18.2 6.3
I 0.17 I 15.3
0.27 23.9
0.36 32.8
0.20 0.43 18.2 39.6
-0.021 0.040 -1.9 3.6
I 0.060 I 5.5
0.080 7.3
0.095 8.7
-0.021 0.110 -1.9 10.0
0.255 0.385 23.2 35.1
alt Kt N
3.0
3.0
¢m
¢B
500,000
90,000
30,000
170, O00
20,000
5, 500
4 x 106
50,000
5, 000
1,900
cD
1 x 106
8×io4
8 x 103
3 x 103
2.5 x 103
co
2.2 x 105
3.8 x 104
1.6x I04
¢o
2 x 104
90,000
9,000
900
90
9
90,000
9,000
900
90
9
90,000
9,000
9O0
90
9
90,000
9,000
900
9O
9
90,000
9,000
9OO
9O
9
90,000
9,000
900
9O
9
90,000
9,000
5O0
250
150
100
1
180,000
18,000
1,800
180
18
180,000
18,000
1,800
180
18
20O
n
N
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.0018
0.0010
0.0003
0
0
0.0052
0.0045
0.0616
0
0.0022
0.0180
0.0180
0.0047
0
0
0.0005
0.0031
0.0188
0.0333
0.0004
0
0
0.0082
0.0O47
0.00131
0
0
0
0
0
0.0100
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Table 4-6. B-9U Wing Spar Caps Fatigue DamageAnalysis, Contd
Mission Phase
n-N/ Fatigue life- I00
4 (0.1374}
Ascent 0. 0573
182 missions, based on a
scatter factor of 4.
Entry 0. 0561 NOTES:
Cruise/Landing
Taxi
GAG
0.0140
0
0.0100
_. (n/N) 0.1374
(1) To provide for one ferry flight per mission,
the number of cycles for the cruise/landing
and taxi phases has been increased by a factor
of 2.0, and two GAG cycles per mission added,
using a minimum stress from the taxi phase
and a maximum stress from the cruise/landing
phase.
(2) Material: Ti6A1-4V annealed.
700 -- --
1100 .......
_ 4011 .....
_ 200
0
_ 100 ....
STRUCTURE DESIGNED FOR BASELINE
LOAD CONDITIONS & CRITERIA
__u__1
ASELINE
0
1 z 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FATIGUE CRACK INITIATION SCATTEB FACTOR
Figure 4-13. Wing Spar Caps Fatigue Life (for Crack
Initiation) Versus Scatter Factor
4-17
Table 4-7. B-9U Vertical Tail Fatigue
Mission Phase
scent - Segment (1)
- Segment (2)
Ascent - Segment (3)
- Segment (4)
- Segment (5)
- Segment (6)
Ascent - Segment (7)
IT
RT
RT
RT
RT
R_
R_
lmtt I nea_...n_n[_--- 1 _ean
ksi imit m-R ksi)
34 0 .041 0
34 0 .076 0
34 0 .110 0
34 0 .145 0
34 0 .180 0
34 0 .113 0
34 0 .220 0
34 0 .326 O
34 0 .435 0
34 0 .545 0
34 0 .190 0
34 0 .371 0
34 O .550 0
34 0 .'/30 0
34 0 .910 0
34 0 .138 0
34 O .262 0
34 O .388 0
34 0 .511 0
34 0 .639 O
34 0 .091 (
34 0 .184 (
34 0 .27( (
34 0 .361 (
34 0 .45_ q
34 0 .051
34 0 .11,
34 0 .16
34 0 .21
34 0 .27
34 C .02
34 C .03
34 ( .0-_
34 ( .0(
34 ( .07
Damage Analysis
It
+i) :t I N
4 ,0 [
I6 ,0
7
9
.1
,8
,5
,1
• 5 107
.5
o6 _c
.7 107
.8 6 x 105
_.9 1.8 x 105
t.7 ,c
3.9 '_
3.2 ,c
7.4 .o
t.7 1.9 x 106
3.1
6.3
9.4
2.4
5.. _
2.1
3J,
5. q
7.:
9.
O.
1.
1.
2.
2o
90,000
9,000
9OO
9O
9
90,000
9,000
9OO
90
9
90,000
9,000
9O0
90
9
90,000
9,000
90O
90
9
90,000
9,000
900
9O
9
90,000
9,000
900
90
9
90,000
9,000
9O0
90
9
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Table 4-7. B-9U Vertical Tail Fatigue DamageAnalysis, Contd
Mission Phase
Crutse/Landg
T
{'F)
RT
Ulimit amean _ @mean _alt
0mi) °limit alimit (ksi) (ksi) K t
34 0 .210 0 7.1 3.0
34 0 .267 0 9.1 3.0
34 0 .322 0 tl,0 3.0
34 0 .380 0 L2.9 3.0
34 0 .436 0 L4.8 3.0
Summary
Mission Phase n/N
Ascent .0002
Cruise/Landg 0
Z (n/N) . .0002
100 100 125,000 missions,
=
Fatiguelife = S.F. x_fn/N) = 4(.0002) baeedonascatter
factor of 4.
NOT ES:
1)
_)
N n
180,000
18,000
1,800
180
I
18
To provide for one ferry flight per mission, the number of cycles for the cruise/landing phase has
been Increased to a factor of 2.
Material is Ti-6AI - 4V annealed.
a/N
0
0
0
0
0
Table 4-8. Crew Module Fatigue Damage Analysis
Design
Phase °limit
(ksi)
Proof
= 1.5 15.0
Flight 15.0
Ferry @ 15. 0
20, 000 ft.
T
Deg. F
RT
RT
RT
K t APma x
(psi)
3.0 22.5
3.0 15
3.0 8.5
APmi n
(psi)
0
0
0
¢max Omin Crmean aal t u
(ksi) (ksi) _.ksi). (ksi}
zz.5 o ll.Z_ 11.25 i
15.0 0 7.5 7.5 100
8.5 0 4.25 4.25 100
N n
N
I.I x 102 8,9x I0 "b
1.0x 107 10x 10-6
0
/-\
I _-) : o.oooois9forxlifetimeofloomissions,
0, 0000100 = damage due to flightfor 100 missions.
1-0.0000189 =
Safe fatigue-life
0. 9999811 = available damage after 1 lifetime.
: I0____0(1, 0.9999811_ = 2.50x 106 missions.
4 \ o. ooooloo/
i
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Figure 4-16. Sensitivity of Fatigue Life to
Factor of Safety Perturbations
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Figure 4-17. Crew Module Fatigue Life (for Crack
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SE CTION 5
SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS
This section presents the results of crack growth studies when the structural compo-
nents are assumed to contain crack-like flaws. Flights to failure are calculated for
all components.
The crack growth analyses are based on a Convair crack growth computer program
called CRACKPROP, which calculates crack growth for both cyclic and sustained
loads. Initial flaws are assumed to be elliptical surface flaws or through-cracks for
the LO 2 and LH 2 propellant tank walls and the vertical stabilizer skin. Corner cracks
emanating from flange edges are assumed for the thrust structure, orbiter support
bulkhead, and wing spar caps. An analysis is also made assuming a crack initiating
at a fastener hole in those components where mechanical fasteners may be used,
i.e., the wing structure, thrust structure, and the orbiter aft support bulkhead.
For the IX) 2 and LH 2 propellant tanks the initial flaw size is assumed to be that flaw
screened by proof test using a plane strain fracture toughness (Kic) value. When the
calculated elliptical surface flaw screened by the proof test is greater than the tank
wall thickness, an equivalent through-crack of an area equal to the area of a surface
flaw on the verge of leakage is assumed.
Minimum fracture toughness values were used for all calculations of initial and criti-
cal flaw sizes. Because of this, the safe-lives calculated for the tanks should be
treated with caution. However, where the initial flaw size was not dependent on
material toughness the use of the minimum toughness in determining the critical flaw
size does give the shortest life.
In addition to the basic safe-life analysis of the major structural components selected
for study, this section also presents proof factor, apparent factors of safety, and
weight sensitivity to flaw growth scatter factor for structure designed by proof pres-
sure. In addition, the sensitivity of safe-life to factor of safety and flaw growth scatter
factor is presented for all components.
5.1 CYCLIC AND SUSTAINED FLAW GROWTH RATE CURVES
Figures 5-1 through 5-6 present crack growth rate curves of da/dn versus A K I and
da/dt versus A K I, which are used in this section in the safe-life analysis of structural
components containing flaws.
The cyclic growth rate curves (da/dn versus A KI) for the 2219-T87 aluminum base
metal at room temperature and at -320°F were derived from data found in Reference
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Figure 5-2. Sustained Flaw Growth Rate
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Figure 5-5. Cyclic Flaw Growth Rate for
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Titanium Alloy at Room
Temperature
Figure 5-6. Sustained Flaw Growth Rate
for Ti-6A1-4V (ELI) Annealed
Titanium Alloy at Room
Temperature
14. The sustained growth rate curves (da/dt versus AKI) for the 2219-T87 aluminum
base metal at room temperature and at -320°F were derived from data found in Refer-
ence 15.
The cyclic growth rate curve (da/dn versus AKI) for the Ti-6A1--4V annealed titanium
base metal at room temperature was derived from data found in Reference 16. The
sustained growth rate curve for the same material and temperature was derived from
data found in References 16 and 17.
5.2 LIQUID OXYGEN TANK
5.2.1 I,.O2 TANK SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS. The LO 2 propellant tank is assumed to
contain two distinct types of flaws. These are an elliptical surface flaw and a through
crack, for which the initial size of each is developed in this section. These flaws are
propagated to a specified failure criterion under the influence of the applied pressure
spectrum loading. The critical crack lengths for both types of flaws are also develop-
ed here.
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The applied pressure spectrum loading for the LO2 tank was developed from the
curve of Figure 2-36. Only those portions of the total loading spectrum that could
contribute to the growth of the flaws were included in the spectrum for the tank. It
should be noted here that it was necessary to tak_ average pressures over a given
time span to approximate the curve. The pressures used in developing the
final spectrum are as follows:
LO 2 Tank Upper Dome Equator Pressures
Pressure
(psi)
17.5
12.0
19.5
Time at Pressure
(minutes)
4.0
6.0
4.0
Description
Nominal ullage pressure
Vent after staging pressure
Pressure regulator malfunction stress
{assumed to occur once every 20 flights)
The tensile stresses in the LO 2 tank at the upper dome equator were developed from
the pressures in the preceding list through the use of the following formula.
pR p (198)
t 0.090
I
p = internal pressure (psi)
R ---198 inches = tank radius
= 0.090 inch = tank wall thickness at the upper dome equator
The results of this calculation and the final form of the pressure loading spectrum are
as follows:
Minimum
Stress
(ksi)
O. 000
O. 000
O. 000
LO 2 Tank Pressure Loading Spectrum
Maximum
Stress
(ksi)
38.8*
38.8*
26.4
Cycles
per
Flight
1
Time per
Flight
(minutes)
4.0
6.0
'*Once every 20 flights,this nominal ullage pressure stress is replaced with the
pressure regulator malfunction stress of 42.8 ksi.
5-4
illli
The elliptical surface flaw is assumed to have two different initial aspect ratios,
a/2c (see sketch below). These two aspect ratios are a/2c = 0.1 and a/2c = 0.4.
LO 2
TANK
WALL
i_ 2c _ I
Itl0.090IN.
The initial flaw size, which is calculated here for both the 0.1 and 0.4 aspect ratios,
is the maximum flaw size that would be screened by a proof test of the tank, using a
minimum value for the material toughness parameter, Kic,tO be consistent with the
value used in the crack growth analysis, and using the yield stress for the maximum
stress developed in the tank wall during a proof test.
The equation for the maximum stress intensity factor for the elliptical surface flaw,
which is used to calculate the maximum flaw size screened by a proof test, is as
follows:
K I
1.1a_]_ _]a (M K)
/¢2 2
_/ - O. 212 (cr/ay)
(Reference 10, Equation IX-8)
where
cr = applied stress (ksi)
tensile yield stress (ksi)
flaw size (inch)
¢2 = a function depending upon the value of a/2c
fora/2c= 0.1, ¢2= 1.10355
fora/2c= 0.4, _2= 2.01096
ME:-- deep flaw correction factor, is a function of a/t and a/2c, from
Reference 18, Page 135.
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The LO2 tank is proof tested at room temperature so that the value of Kic used in
the following calculations will be the minimum value of KI at room temperature.
This value is Kr = 32.0 ksi _ (Reference 6, Figure 5_, lower curve).
Substituting thisCalue of Kic into the equation for the stress intensity factor and
using Cry = 51.0 ksi (2219-T87 aluminum base metal at room temperature) as the
proof test stress, we can arrive at a value of 'a' from the following equation:
1.1 (51.0) ,]_ ,J_ (MK)
32.0 =
¢2 _ 0.212 (51.0/51.0) 2
Note in the above equation that the variable M K is a function of the flaw size, tat, and
that a trial and error solution is necessary to find the correct value of raf. The
results of this solution for both aspect ratios of 0.1 and 0.4 are shown below.
For a/2c = 0.1, the maximum flaw size that would be screened by a proof test is:
a i = 0.05464 inch
For a/2c = 0.4, the maximum flaw size that would be screened by a proof test re-
sulted in a flaw size, 'a 1, which was larger than the thickness of the tank wall, t =
0. 090 inch.
Since the 0.4 aspect ratio results in an initial flaw size greater than the thickness, an
equivalent through crack, with an area equal to the area of a surface flaw of aspect
ratio a/2c = 0.4 on the verge of leakage, is calculated here.
TANK
WALL
2c
a/2c =0.4
t = 0._90
IN.
Cross-sectional area of flaw = A
C
A = 7r(a) (c) = 0.01590in 2
c 2
5-6
For a through crack, the area would be calcuated by
A
C
A = (2c) × tor (2c) =
c t
Therefore the equivalent through crack would have a (2c)idimension of
A
c 0. 01590
""(2c_i t 0.090 = 0.17671inch
The elliptical surface flaw of initial size a i = 0.05464 inch and the through crack of
initial size (2c)i = 0. 17671 inch are propagated to failure. The run to failure is made
using material properties and growth rate curves for 2219-T87 aluminum base metal
at -320°F. The -320°F temperature is used because growth rates at this temperature
are more critical than those at room temperature, and the LO 2 tank at the upper dome
equator is assumed to be prechilled to -320°F. The critical flaw sizes must there-
fore be calculated from the properties of the material at -320°F.
The minimum value of Kic is used to calculate critical flaw sizes, and for the -320°F
temperature this value is 35.5 ksi _ {Reference 6, Figure 52, lower curve at
-320°F). The tensile yield at this temperature is taken to be cry = 61.0 ksi. The
maximum stress in the spectrum, on which the critical flaw sizes must be based, is
cr = 44.0 ksi.
For the elliptical flaw of aspect ratio a/2c = 0.1, the critical flaw size, acr, is
calculated from the equation
35.5 =
1.1 (44.0) _/_ ,facr (MK)
_/1. 10355 - 0.212 {44.0/61.0) 2
which results in a value of a = 0. 07091 inch.
cr
For the through crack the equation for the stress intensityfactor is
m
_/2 - (_/_y)2
{Reference 18, Page 28)
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Substituting the critical values into this equation results in
44.0 x_ (_cr
35.5 =
_2 - (44.0/61.0) 2
or (2C)cr _ 0.30660 inch.
Results of flaw growth calculations:
Carrying out the analysis described above by use of a computer program, the follow-
ing results were obtained.
Elliptical Surface Flaw, a/2c = 0.1 (See Figure 5-7)
Starting with an initial flaw size of a i -- 0. 05464 inch, it took 294 flights for the flaw
to grow to the critical size of acr = 0. 07091 inch (see sketch below). Note that a
scatter factor of 1.5 was used on the number of flights to failure.
0,07
0.06
r_
0.05
1
NOTE: T=-320°F
a
/ J,
' !
0 901• I
I
acr = 0. 07091 INCH
/ FOR MAXIMUM _L IN
_SI_ECTRUM = 42.8 KSI ]
\AN ,h --
I J
INITIAL FLAW SIZE
a I = 0. 05464 INCH
,,
NOTE: SCATTER FACTOR OF 1.5
ON LIFE INCLUDED
I I I I Ill[ I I I I [ II
10 100
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
SAFE LIFE:
294 FLIGHTS
I I I [ 1111
Figure 5-7. Crack Grow_ in LO^ Tank for Pressure Load
Spectrum (Surface _aw, a/2c = 0.1)
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TANK
WALL
v ac - 0.07091 IN.r
Through Crack (See Figure 5-8)
Starting with an initial flaw size of (2c) i = 0.17671 inch, it took 867 flights for the
flaw to grow to the critical size of (2C)cr = 0.30660 inch. Again a scatter factor of
1.5 was used on the flights to failure.
0.35
0.30
0.25
tq
2_
0.15
0.10
EQUIVALENT
2c! = 0.17671
I [. I I
THROUGH-CRACK --
t
]_ _ UIVALENT I_HROUGH-CRACK (2C)cr = 0. 30660 .
. _ 0.09INCH I
" \SURFACE FLAW i
a/2c = 0.4, ABOUT
TO LEAK
s67 I
FLIGHTS TO LEAK = 1
F LTS.
TO
FAILURE
I I t I I I I I [ I t I I I I ] t I i t
10 100 800
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
Figure 5-8. Crack Growth in LO 2 Tank for Pressure Load Spectrum
(Surface Flaw, a/2c = 0.4 and Equivalent Through Crack)
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5.2.2 LO 2 TANK PROOF FACTOR AND APPARENT FACTORS OF SAFETY. For
final verification of the structural integrity of the main Space Shuttle booster LO 2
tank, primary reliance is placed in a pressure proof test prior to assembly into the
booster vehicle.
The proof test logic is explained in detail in Reference 19, Fracture Control of Metallic
Pressure Vessels, NASA SP8040. The proof test consists of loading the tanks to a
stress level greater than the maxtmum stress level expected in service. In addition,
the proof test should be conducted at a temperature consistent with the operating tem-
perature. If the proof test is completed successfully, the proof test provides assur-
ance that all existing flaws or defects are less than the critical size required for frac-
ture at the proof stress level. In addition, the safe-life of the tank at the operating
stress level can be determined by fracture mechanics analysis where the safe-life en-
sured by the proof test is the time required to grow the smaller "proof stress flaw"
to the larger critical size associated with the maximum service operating stress. The
task consists of developing a ___K;i/KI versus number of flights curve by integrating the
combined cyclic and sustained load f_aw growth over arbitrarily selected flight incre-
ments using the flight pressure load spectrum and the flaw growth data. The final
curve for the LO 2 is presented in Figure 5-9.
o
1.0 i
0.9
I1¢j
0.8
Figure 5-9.
I I
(DEEP FLAW MAGNIFICATION INCLUDED)
SUSTAINED FLAW GROWTH DURING 150 FLIGHTS
PRESSURE REGULA'_
i0 i00 I000
FLIGHTS TO FAILURE
LO 2 Tank Stress Intensity Ratio Versus Flights to Failure
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The method for obtaining the proof factor, cx, from this plot is to read KIi/KI¢ for
the desired number of flights to failure. In this case, for the baseline, the flights to
failure were 150; that is, the scatter factor of 1.5 multiplied by the design service
life of 100 flights*. Then,
KIi/KI c
1
- 1.23
- 0".809
The LO 2 tank is proof tested as illustrated in Figure 2-19. For the LO 2 tank, a
three-stage proof test with LN 2 and air as the proof test medium is selected to mini-
mize the weight impact of the proof test. The proof test steps are:
a. Assemble lower dome (segment 1) to a manufacturing bulkhead, erect and support
vertically, and proof test with LN 2 and 49 psi ullage.
b. Assemble lower dome to lower LO 2 tank barrel (i.e., segment 2), assemble lower
dome and barrel assembly to a manufacturing bulkhead, erect and support verti-
cally, and proof test with LN 2 and 32.5 psi ullage.
c. Assemble lower dome and barrel assembly (i.e., segments 1 and 2) to a upper
dome and barrel assembly {i.e., segment 3), erect and support horizontally, fill
tank with void reducing plastic balls, and proof test with room temperature dry
air at 21 psi pressure.
Due to the reduced limit design stresses required by the proof test for the safe-life of
the tank, there is an apparent ultimate factor of safety that results, and it is given by
the expression;
Fult
i'Comparison of the number of flights to failure computed in Section 5.2.1 reveals a
difference between the actual computed value of safe-life, 294 flights, and the number
of flights to failure used to determine the proof factor above. The primary reasons
for the difference in the lives calculated are the differences in assumptions and data
used to generate the KIi/KI c versus flights to failure curve, Figure 5-9, and the LO 2
tank safe-life analysis of Section 5.2.1. Although deep flaw magnification for both
analyses was used, they assume different skin thicknesses and load spectra, and they
also utilize different flaw growth data. Therefore, close consistency between the cal-
culated safe-life and the 150 missions used to determine the proof factor should not
be expected.
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The apparent ultimate factors of safety for the various LO 2 tank elements are comput-
ed below.
Upper Dome. Since the upper dome is designed by proof pressure, the apparent ulti-
mate factor of safety is calculated to compare to the nominal ultimate safety factor of
1.4.
Ftu = 63,000 psi (2219-T87 at RT)
F
f (limit operating) = _ = 52,000 = 42,100psi
a 1.23
63,000
FS(apparent) - = 1.495
u- " 42 100
Lower Dome. The lower dome is also designed by proof pressures; the nominal ulti-
mate safety factor is 1.4.
Ftu = 75,000 psi (2219-T87 at -297°F)
f (limit operating)
FRY-- 62,000
= -- = = 50,400 psi
o_ 1.23
75,000
FS (apparent)
u 50,400
- 1.49
Skins. The nominal ultimate factor of safety for the skins is 1.4, and they are de-
signed by proof pressure, See Section 3.1.1.2 for determination of the skin thickness.
Forward of Tank Station 310
Ftu = 63,000 psi (2219-TS7 at RT)
f (limit operating) -
pR 1.75
t 0.09
198
X _±_.^--"-_= 38,750 psi
63,000
FS (apparent) - = 1.625
u 38,750
Aft of Tank Station 310
Just aft of Station 310:
Ftu = 75,000 psi (2219-T87 at -297°F)
$-12
11!
f(limit operating) = = 17.5 198) = 33,200 psi
t 0.105
75,000
FS (apparent) - = 2.26
u 33,200
Just forward of the intersection with the lower dome:
f(limit operating) = p--R-R= 31 (198)t 0.126 = 48,750
75,000
FS (apparent) = _- = 1.54
u 48,750
It will be noted that for all the cases checked, the apparent FS u is greater than the
nominal baseline FS u of 1.4.
5.2.3 L_O2 TANK WEIGHT SENSITIVITY TO FLAW GROWTH SCATTER FACTOR
PERTURBATIONS. Since the LO 2 tank end domes and skin are designed by proof
pressure and the curve of KIi/KI_ versus flightsto failure is given in Figure 5-9, it
is possible to determine the weight sensitivityof these items to perturbations of the
flaw growth scatter factor. The procedure followed is:
ae
b.
Enter Figure 5-9 for the scatter factor of interest multiplied by the service life,
(e.g., 2.0 scatter factor x 100 mission life = 200 missions).
Obtain the new 1/_ from the curve of Figure 5-9, (e.g., for 200 missions,
1/c_ = 0.798, _ = 1.255).
c. Calculate the new element weight for:
Proof pressure = _ x maximum operating pressure.
The weight sensitivity of the upper dome, lower dome, skin, and combined skin and
domes to flaw growth scatter factor perturbations, using this procedure, is presented
Figure 5-10 through 5-13 respectively.
5.2.4 L__O2 TANK SAFE-LIFE SENSITIVITY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY AND FLAW
GROWTH SCATTER FACTOR. Figure 5-14 presents the effects of ultimate and yield
factor of safety on the propellant tank safe-life with a yield factor of safety during
proof test maintained at a constant value of 1.0, (i.e., FSv = 1.0 during proof test).
These curves were developed from the stress intensity ratio versus number of flight
curves (see Figure 5-9) for the LO 2 tank. These curves were generated assuming a
semi-elliptical surface flaw in the tank walls and that the flaws propagated to failure
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Figure 5-13. LO 2 Tank Skin and Domes
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Figure 5-14. LO 2 Tank Safe-Life Versus Factor of Safety
under the influence of the applied pressure loading spectrum. The LO 2 tank wall was
assumed to be at -320°F and to have the following material properties.
Property/Te mperature -32 0 ° F
Ftu (ksi) 78.0
Fty _s_) 61. o
KI 35.5
C
The curves of stress intensity ratio versus flights to failure were converted to appar-
ent ultimate and yield factors of safety through the following relationships:
=
Fllmi t = Ftylct (based on FS = I. 0 during proof test)Y
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FS(apparent)= =
u m_imit
(FtulF_)
1
FSy(apparent) = Fty/flimit - (KIIIKIc)
o
==
O
The sensitivity of the safe-life of the baseline LO 2 tank to flaw growth variations is
presented in Figure 5-15. The figure reveals that the safe-life decreases very rapidly
as the scatter factor is increased above the baseline value of 1.5.
500 I I I I I 1
NOTE: STRUCTL_IE DESIGNED FOR
BASELINE LOAD CONDITIONS
& CRITERIA
C
1 2 4
\
6 8 l0 12 14 16 18 20
FLAW GROWTH SCATTER FACTOR
Figure 5-15. LO 2 Tank Safe-Life (Flaw
Growth to Failure) Versus
Scatter Factor
5.3 LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK
5.3.1 LH 2 TANK SAFE-LIFE ANALY-
SIS. The LH 2 propellant tank is assum-
ed to contain two distinct types of flaws.
These are an elliptical surface flaw and
a through crack, for which the initial
size of each is developed in this section.
These flaws are propagated to a speci-
fied failure criterion under the influence
of the applied pressure spectrum load-
ing. The critical crack lengths for both
types of flaws are also developed here.
The applied pressure loading spectrum
for the LH 2 tank was developed from the
curve of Figure 2-35. Only those per-
tions of the complete loading spectrum
that could contribute to the growth of
the flaws were included in the spectrum
for the tank. The pressures used in
developing the final spectrum are:
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LH 2 Tank Upper Dome Equator Pressures
Pressure
{psi)
15.0
22.3
16.0
23.8
Time at Pressure
<minutes)
2.5
3.5
6.0
3.5
De scription
Tank lockup pressure
Nomina, rullage pressure
Vent after staging pressure
Pressure regulator
Malfunction pressure -- assumed to
occur once every 20 flights
Stresses in the tank at the upper dome equator were developed from these pressures
through the use of the formula
= pR = p(198 
t 0.116
whe re
p = pressure {psi)
R = 198 inches = tank radius
t = 0.116 inch = tank thickness at the upper dome equator
The calculated stresses and the final form of the pressure loading spectrum is shown
below.
Minimum
Stress
(ksi)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Maximum
Stress
(ksi)
25.6
38.1"
38.1"
27.3
Cycles per
Flight
Time per
Flight
(minutes)
2.5
3",5
6.0
*Every 20 flights, this stress is replaced with the pressure regulator malfunction
stress, which is 40.6 ksi.
The elliptical surface flaw is assumed to initially have aspect ratios, a/2c, of 0.1
and 0.4 (see sketch below).
- 2c
TANK
t
t = 0. 116
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The initial flaw size for each of these aspect ratios fs calculated here, basedon the
maximum flaw size that would be screened by the proof test, using a minimum value for
the material toughness parameter Kic for consistency with the crack growth analysis.
For 2219-T87 aluminum base metal at room temperature the minimum value of the
material toughness parameter, Kic, is 32.0 ksi _ (Reference 6, Figure 52, lower
curve'). Using this value of KIc in the equation for the stress intensity factor, and
substituting cr = cry for the proof test stress, the equation becomes
32.0 ffi
1.1 (51.0) qf_-q_" (MK)
_¢2 _ 0. 212 (51.0/51.0) 2
This equation can now be solved for 'a y, which is the maximum flaw size that would
be screened by a proof test. It should be noted that MK is dependent upon the value
of 'a t so that a trial and error solution is necessary. This equation was solved for
both aspect ratios of 0.1 and 0.4, and the results follow,
For a/2c = 0.1, the flaw screened by a proof test, a = 0. 06195 inch. This value be-
comes the initial flaw size, a i, for the flaw propagation studies.
For a/2e = 0.4, the flaw that would be screened by a proof test turned out to be greater
than the thickness of the tank wall, t = 0. 116 inch. An equivalent through crack with
an area equal to the area of a surface flaw of aspect ratio, a/2c = 0.4 on the verge of
leakage is calculated here.
,o =L
a/2c -- 0° 4
l
t = 0.116
1
_rac
Area of flaw = a = 0. 116 inch
2
Area = 0. 02642 in 2
The equation for the stress intensity factor K I, for the elliptical surface flaw,
follows:
K I --
V 0.212
(Reference 10, Equation IX-8)
is as
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¢r = applied stress (ksi)
_y = tensile yield stress = 51 ksi
a = flaw size (inch)
¢2 = is a function which depends on the value of a/2c
For
a/2c = 0.1, ¢2 = 1.10355
a/2c = 0.4, ¢2 = 2.01096
M K is a function which depends on both the value of a/2c and a/t and is obtained from
Reference 18, Page 135.
An equivalent through crack would have an area of (2c) x t
(2c) × t = 0.02642 in 2 2c = 0.2278 inch
This value becomes the initial size of the through crack in the flaw propagation studies.
The critical flaw size of the elliptical surface flaw of aspect ratio a/2c = 0.1 is
calculated in a manner similar to that in which the initial flaw size was calculated.
Obtaining the minimum value of the material toughness parameter, KI^ , from the min-
imum curve of Figure 52 of Reference 14, Kic=32.0ksi _ and th_ applied stress
becomes the maximum stress from the applied pressure loads spectrum (or = 40.6
ksi). The stress intensity factor equation then becomes
32.0 =
1.1 (40. 112) _-_-_ (MK)
V ¢2 _ 0.212 (40. 112/51.0) 2
Solving for acr, we find acr = 0. 08053 inch. The critical flaw size for the through
flaw is found by using the same minimum Kic value of 32.0 ksi _ and the same
applied stress of 40.6 ksi. However, the equation for the through crack now
becomes
or
32.0 =
40.6 _- (2_cr
V2 - (40.6/51.0) 2
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Solving this equation for (2C)c r, we find (2C)c r = 0.2798 inch.
Results of flaw growth calculations:
Elliptical Surface Flaw, a/2c = 0.1 (see Figure 5-16).
Starting with a i = 0.06195 inch, it took 626 flights for the flaw to grow to acr --
0. 08053 inch (scatter factor of 1.5 used on flights) as shown in Figure 5-16.
Through Flaw (see Figure 5-17).
Starting with 2c i = 0. 2278 inch, it took 160 flights for the flaw to grow to (2C)c r =
0.2798 inch (scatter factor of 1. 5 used on flights).
0.08
- 0.07
N
0.0_
1
NOTE: T =70°F
I b---2c
J
0. 116
INITIAL FLAW SIZE
aI = 0.06195 INCH
I I I illll
10
acr = 0.08053 INCH
I
a
FOR MAXIMUM _L TM
SPECTRUM =40.112 KSI |
AND KIc = 32.0 KSI _/
NOTE: SCATTER FACTOR OF 1.5 /
__ON LIFE INCLiD /
I I I IIIII [
100
SAFE LIFE :
626 FLIGHT_
1 I IIIJl
NUMBER OF FUGHTS
Figure 5-16. Crack Growth in LH 2 Tank for Pressure Load
Spectrum (Surface Flaw, a/2c = 0.1)
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Figure 5-17. Crack Growth in LH 2 Tank for Pressure
Load Spectrum (Surface Flaw, a/2c = 0.4
and Equivalent Through Crack)
5.3.2 L__H2 TANK PROOF FACTOR AND APPARENT FACTORS OF SAFETY. For final
verificationof the structural integrityof the main Space Shuttle booster LH 2 tank, pri-
mary reliance is placed in a pressure proof test of each tank prior to assembly intothe
booster vehicle.
The proof test logic is explaned in detail in Reference 19, Fracture Control of Metallic
Pressure Vessels, NASA SP8040. The proof test consists of loading the tanks to a
stress level greater than the maximum stress level expected in service. In addition
the proof test should be conducted at a temperature consistent with the operating tempera-
ture. If the proof test is completed successfully, the proof test provides assurance that
all existing flaws or defects are less than the critical size required for fracture at the
proof stress level. In addition, the safe-life of the tank at the operating stress level can
be determined by fracture mechanics analysis where the safe-life ensured by the proof
test is the time required to grow the smaller "proof stress flaw" to the larger critical
size associated with the maximum service operating stress. The task consists of de-
veloping a KIi/KI c versus number of flight curve by integrating the combined cyclic and
sustained load flaw growth over arbitrarily selected flight increments using the flight
pressure load spectrum and the flaw growth data. The final curve for the LH 2 tank is
presented in Figure 5-18.
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Figure 5-18. LH 2 Tank Stress IntensityRatio Versus Flights to Failure
The method for obtaining a from this plot is to read KIi/KI c for the desired number of
flights to failure. In this case, for the baseline, the flights to failure were 150; that is,
the scatter factor of 1.5 multiplied by the design service life of 100 flights*. Then,
1 1
w
KI/KI 0.Ss2
1 C
- 1.13
*Comparison of the number of flights to failure computed in Section 5.3.1 reveals a
difference between the actual computed value of safe-life, 160 flights, and the number
of flights to failure used to determine the proof factor above. The primary reasons for
the difference in the lives calculated are the differences in assumptions and data used
to generate the Kii/KIc versus flights to failure curve in Figure 5-18, and the LH 2 tank
safe-life analysis of Section 5.3.1. Although deep flaw magnification for both analysis
was used, each analysis assumes different skin thicknesses and load spectra, and also
utilizes different flaw growth data. Therefore close consistency between the results of
the safe-life analysis and the 100 missions used to determine the proof factor should
not be expected.
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The LH 2 tank is proof tested as illustrated in Figure 2-18. For the LH 2 tank, a one-
stage proof test using void reducing plastic balls and room temperature dry air at 29.8
psi pressure is selected. Due to other design conditions, the one-stage proof test re-
sults in a small but accptable weight penality in the forward portion of the tank where
the proof pressure exceeds that required.
Due to the reduced limit design stresses required by the proof test for the safe-life of
the tank, there is an apparent ultimate factor of safety that results, and it is given by
the expression:
Fult
FSu(apparent) = flimit
The apparent ultimate factors of safety for the LH 2 tank areas designed by proof pres-
sure are:
Upper Dome. Since the upper dome is designed by proof pressure, the apparent ulti-
mate factor of safety is calculated to compare to the nominal ultimate safety factor of
1.4.
Ftu = 63,000 psi (2219-T87 at RT)
f (limiting operating) = 39,900 psi
63,000
FS (apparent)
u 39,900
- 1.58
Skins. At the forward end of file cylindrical section of the tank near the bottom center-
line, the skin thickness is designed by proof pressure. In this area,
Ftu = 63,000 psi (2219-T87 at RT)
f (limit operating) _- _ = 22.3(198) = 38,200 psi
t 0.116
63,000
FS (apparent) = = 1.65
u 38,200
In both cases the apparent FS is greater than the nominal baseline FS u of 1.4.
5.3.3 LH 2 TANK WEIGHT SENSITIVITY TO FLAW GROWTH SCATTER FACTOR
PERTURBATIONS. The forward LH 2 tank dome is designed by proof pressure, and
its weight is therefore sensitive to perturbations of the flaw growth scatter factor. The
procedure for determining the weight of the dome for the various scatter factors is
presented in Section 5.2.2. Although the lower LH 2 dome is not designed by proof
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pressure for the baseline, the lower dome could become proof design critical if the
FS u were low enough. Therefore the weight sensitivity of both the LH 2 tank end domes
to flaw growth scatter factor perturbations is presented in Figure 5-19.
5.3.4 LI-I2 TANK SAFE-LIFE SENSITIVITY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY AND FLAW
GROWTH SCATTER FACTOR. Figure 5-20 presents the effect of ultimate and yield
factor of safety on the propellant tank safe-life with a yield factor of safety during proof
test maintained at a constant value of 1.0, (i.e., FSy = 1.0 during proof test). These
curves were developed from the stress intensity ratio versus number of flight curves
(see Figure 5-18) for the LH 2 tank. These curves were generated assuming a semi-
elliptical surface flaw in the tank walls and that the flaws propagated to failure under
the influence of the applied pressure loading spectrum. The LH 2 tank wall was assumed
to be at 70°F and to have the following material properties.
Property/Temperature
Ftu (ksi)
70"F
63.0
Fry (ksi) 51. o
KI (ksi ¢_.) 32.0
C
The curves of stress intensity ratio versus flights to failure were converted to apparent
ultimate and yield factors of safety through the following relationships:
K i/Kic =
Flimi t = Fty/a (based on FS = 1.0 during proof test)Y
FS (apparent)
U
(Ftu/Fty)
= Ftu/flimi t = (KIi/KIc)
1
FS (apparent) = Vty/flimi t - (KI/KI)Y
1 C
The sensitivity of the safe-life of the baseline LH 2 tank to flaw growth scatter factor
variations is presented in Figure 5-21. The figure _veals that the safe-life decreases
very rapidly as the scatter factor is increased above the baseline value 1.5.
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5.4 AFT ORBITER SUPPORT FRAME
5.4.1 AFT ORBITER SUPPORT FRAME
SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS. In the analysis
of the aft orbiter support frame, one of
the frame flanges was assumed to contain
a corner crack of an initial size of 0.1
inch, or a crack having a length of 0.1
inch emanating from a hole. This initial
size was chosen based on a judgment of
the capability of nondestructive evaluation.
6 $ I0 12 14 16 18 20
FLAW GBOWT|I SCATTER FACTOR
LH 2 Tank Safe-Life (Flaw
Growth to Failure) Versus
Scatter Factor
The aft orbiter attachment frame loading
spectrum experienced by this flaw config-
uration is essentially the same spectrum
that was used in the safe-life determina-
tion for fatigue crack initiation listed in
Table 4-4. The only change made was to
convert the spectrum, which is for 100
missions, to a spectrum for only one
mission. The results of this modification
and the final aft orbiter support frame
loading spectrum are listed in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1. Aft Orbiter Support Frame Loading Spectrum
Alternating Stress Cycles per Flight
(ksi) (Unless Otherwise Noted)
r
1. 000 900
2. 000 90
2. 000 9
4.000 1
6.000 1 cycle every 10 flights
3.000
5.000
9.000
14.000
20.000
900
90
9
1 cycle every 10 flights
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The crack growth studies were done on the aft orbiter support frame assuming the
structure was maintained at room temperature. Thus room temperature properties
were assumed and crack growth rate curves for 2219-T87 aluminum base metal at
room temperature were used in the flaw propagation computer program
5.4.1.1 Corner C rack
PORTION OF /
SUPPORT
F, AME h
FLANGE f (
-_-------a i : O. 100 IN.
[
a i =O. IOOIN.
The equation for the maximum stress intensity factor for a corner crack is
K I
0.705)
1 - 0.177 (a/ay) 2
(Reference 10, Equation VII-7 modified to
account for the plastic zone correction)
cr = applied stress
cr = tensile yield stress
Y
a = flaw size
The critical value of the material toughness parameter, Kin, used here for the 2219-
T87 aluminum base metal at room temperature was Kic = _2.0 ksi _ (Reference
14, Figure 52, lower curve). The tensile yield stress used was Cry = 51.0 ksi. The
maximum operating stress occurring in the support frame can be found from the spec-
trum to be _ = 32. 000 ksi.
Substituting all these values into the stress intensity factor equation results in
32.0 =
32.ooo a (0.705)
cr
J1 - 0.177 (32. 000/51. 000) 2
This equation can be solved for the critical value of 'a', which turns out to be a
cr
-- 0.5958 inch.
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, the initial flaw of size a = 0.100
inch grew only 0.00004 inch in 4000 flights. Consequently, the safe-life of this struc-
tural component can be considered to be extremely large.
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=5.4.1.2 Crack Emanating from Hole. The loading spectrum, material properties,
and maximum operating stress will be the same as those used in the crack growth
analysis of a corner crack, above. Substituting the appropriate values into the
equation for the stress intensity factor for a crack emanating from a hole results in
the following expression:
32.0 -
l (-18.42 acr )32.o
0.177(32.0/51.0)2 [1.0+2.oe
This expression is solved by a trial and error method for the critical value of 'a',
which turns out to be a = 0.29063 inch.
cr
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, the initial flaw (a t = 0.100 inch)
grew 0.01815 inch to a = 0.11815 inch in 2667 flights, using a scatter factor of 1.5 on
the number of flights to failure.
Since the initial flaw of size 0.100 inch grew only 0.01815 inch in 2667 flights, and
since the critical flaw size for this structural component has been shown to be acr
= 0.29063 inch, the safe-life of this structural component can be considered to be ex-
tremely large.
5.4.2 AFT ORBITER SUPPORT FRAME SAFE-LIFE SENSITIVITY TO FACTOR OF
SAFETY. The type of flaw assumed to be present in the structure for this analysis is
a through crack emanating from a hole. This situation is most critical due to the
stress concentration gradient in the vicinity of the hole. The equation for the stress
intensity factor for this type of flaw is
where
K I = (GKT)
- o.177 (_/Cry s
GKT = factor to account for the stress concentration in the vicinity of the
hole.
The initial flaw size is assumed to be 0. 100 inches. This is based upon an estimate
of NDE capability. The flaw is propagated to failure under the influence of the applied
loading spectrum for the aft orbiter support bulkhead. The loading spectrum, with a
maximum applied stress level of 32.0 ksi, is equivalent to a factor of safety of 1.4.
Factor of safety can be related to the maximum stress level in the spectrum accord-
ing to the equation
\ max
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Therefore by varying the maximum stress level in the applied loading spectrum, the
factor of safety can also be varied. Figure 5-22 is a plot of the applied stress level
versus the critical flaw size. The effect on the safe-life of the bulkhead of varying
the factor of safety is presented in Figure 5-23. The load spectrum for aft orbiter
support bulkhead for FS u = 1.4 is shown in Table 5-1.
b 30
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FLAW EMANATING FROM A HOLE
2219-T87 ALUMINUM AT ROOM TEMPERATURE
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CRITICAL FLAW LENGTH,a (inches)
Figure 5-22. Aft Orbiter Support Frame Critical Flaw Size Versus Applied Stress
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Figure 5-23. Aft Orbiter Support Frame Safe-Life Versus Factor of Safety
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5.5 WING BOX
5.5.1 WING SPAR CAPS SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS. In the analysis of the wing spar
caps, these members were assumed to contain two types of flaws- a corner crack of
an initial size of 0.1 inch (see sketch below), and a crack of 0.1 inch initial length
emanating from a fastener hole. The initial size of the cracks was chosen based on
judgment of the capabilities of nondestructive evaluation.
The wing loading spectrum experienced by the flaws described above is essentially
the same spectrum as was used in the wing fatigue analysis and found in Table 4-6.
Certain necessary modifications were made, however, to use this spectrum in the
crack growth study. These included the addition of some sustained load, which while
not necessary for fatigue analysis can be of great significance in crack growth analy-
sis, and the reduction of the spectrum, which is for 100 missions, to a spectrum for
only one mission. The results of these modifications and the final wing loading spec-
trum can be found in Table 5-2. This spectrum is a very severe loading spectrum,
much more so than experienced by any of the other components being analyzed in this
study.
The crack growth studies were done on the wing assuming the spar caps were main-
rained at room temperature. Thus room temperature properties were assumed and
crack growth rate curves for Ti-6AI-4V annealed titanium base metal at room tem-
perature were used in the flaw propagation computer program.
5.5.1.1 Corner Crack. The configuration of the corner crack assumed for the flaw
growth analysis was as shown in the sketch.
,
a i -- O. 100 IN.
l
The maximum stress intensity factor equation for a corner crack is
5 705)
- 0.177 ( /cry)2
where
cr = applied tensile stress
Cry = tensile yield stress
a = flaw size
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Table 5-2. Wing Spar Cap Loading Spectrum
Ascent
i
Ascent
Entry
J,
i
Entry
Cruise/
Landing
c_Ise/
Landing
Flight °_ean CrAlt Cycles per Flight
Phase (ksi) {kst) (Unless Otherwise Noted)
0. 000
0. 000
13. 680
13. 680
0. 000
ir
0. 000
36. 480
k
Ir
36.480
9. 120
,b
1'
9. 120
13. 680
_k
Ip
13. 680
6. 840
12. 312
16. 872
1. 368
2.280
3. 192
4. 104
5. 016
3. 192
4.560
5. 928
7. 296
8. 208
5. 016
8. 208
11. 400
14. 136
16. 872
7. 296
13. 224
19. 152
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The critical value of the material toughness parameter, KI ,, used here for the Ti-
6Al-4V annealed titanium base metal as room temperature Cwas Kic = 78.0 ksi _jinch
(Reference 16, Figure35, Page 89). The tensile yield stress used was _y = 120.0 ksi.
The maximum operating stress occurring in the spar cap can be found from the spec-
trum to be _ = 91.2 ksi. Substituting all these values into the stress intensity factor
equation results in
(91.2) v/r/ cr (o.7o5)
78.0 =
_/ 1 - 0. 177 (91.2/120.0) 2
This expression can be solved for the critical value of 'a', which turns out to be
acr = 0.42057 inch.
Results of flaw growth calculations:
lJnder the influence of the applied loading spectrum, it took 31 flights for the initial
flaw size of a i = 0. 100 inch to grow to the critical flaw acr = 0. 42057 inch. The reason
for the very small number of flights to failure is undoubtedly the very severe loading
spectrum experienced by the spar cap. It differs from the other components in this
study in that it experiences extreme loads during the entry and cruise/landing flight
phases as well as the ascent phase. The flaw growth is shown in Figure 5-24.
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Figure 5-24. Crack Growth in Titanium Wing Spar Caps
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5.5.1.2 Crack Emanating from Hole. The flaw configuration investigated in this
section is as shown in the sketch. The length of the flaw is specified by _a _, the diam-
eter of the hole is VDt, and the applied tensile stress is ,_T
The equation for the stress intensity factor at the tip of the crack is
KI =
O" _-
Y
a -
crVW'K" (GKT)
0. 177 (_/Oy)2
applied tensile stress (ksi)
tensile yield stress (ksi)
crack length (inches)
(Reference 10, Equation VII-10 modified to
account for the plastic zone correction)
The quantity GKT in the equation is a factor included to account for the stress gradient
due to the introduction of the hole into the uniform stress field. It can be thought of as
a stress concentration factor. The quantity GET has a maximum value (GMAX) at the
periphery of the hole and decays exponentially to a minimum value (GMIN) at some
specified distance (AREF) from the edge of the hole (see sketch on next page).
cP cK /
1
ff
1
5.-33
"GKT" CURVE
AREF
HOLE PERIPHE
The curve for GKT is defined by the equation
./
GKT = GMIN + (GMAX - GMIN)e
From the equation, it can be seen that AREF is actually the length at which 99% of the
difference between GMAX and GMIN is reached. In other words, if
a = AREF, thenGKT = GMIN+0.01 (GMAX-GMIN).
With GKT defined as shown, the equation for the stress intensity factor becomes
KI = cr,]-_ MIN + (GMAX - GMIN) e _- AR-_
_/J.-0.177(o15)2
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For this portion of'the study a value of 3.0 was used for GMAX, 1.0 was used for
GMIN, and AREF was taken to be 0.250 inch (one hole diameter). Figure 5-25 is a
plot of GKT versus a/AREF for GMAX = 3.0 and GMIN = 1.0. With the specified
values for GMAX, GMIN, and AREF, the equation for the stress intensity factor
becomes
1 (-18.42 a)lKI = _r,J-_ .0 + 2.0 e
_/I - O.177 (_/_y)2
This is the final form of the stress intensity factor used in this portion of the study.
By substituting values for the maximum operating stress in the spectrum (_), the
tensile yield stress (_y), and the critical value of KI (KI was used here), the criticalC
crack length (acr) can be found from this equation using a trial and error method.
The wing material is taken to be Ti-6AI-4V annealed titanium maintained at room
temperature. Therefore, the following material properties are used:
K I = 78.0 ksi _ (Reference 16, Figure 35, Page 89)
C
= 120.0 ksi
Again using the wing loading spectrum of Table 5-2, the maximum operating stress
is found from the applied loading spectrum to be _ = 91.2 ksi. Substituting this
stress and the appropriate material properties into the equation for the stress inten-
sity factor for a crack emanating from a hole results in the following expression:
78.0 =91"2_/-_a_cr [l.O+2.0e(-18.42acr )]Vi - 0.177 (91.2/120.0) 2
This expression is solved by a trial and error method for the critical value of 'a',
which turns out to be a = 0. 18308 inch.
cr
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, it took three flights for the ini-
tial flaw (a i = 0.100 inch) to grow to the critical flaw size (acr = 0.18308 inch), in-
cluding a scatter factor of 1.5 on the number of flights to failure.
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Figure 5-25. Stress Intensity Factor (AKI) Multiple for a
Crack Initiating at a Fastener Hole
The small number of flights to failure can be attributed to two things. First is the
fact that the loading spectrum experienced by the wing spar cap is an extremely
severe spectrum in that it incorporates high magnitude loads during the entry and
cruise/landing flight phases as well as the ascent phase. Secondly, the flaw configura-
tion being investigated here is a very critical configuration, especially since a stress
gradient multiplication factor is being used on the stress intensity factor to account
for the stress concentration around the hole. Consequently, the critical flaw size is
not much greater than the initial flaw size, meaning the flaw does not have to grow
very much to reach the critical size.
5.5.1.3 Determination of Acceptable Safe-Life Stress Level for Spar Caps. In the
analysis of the wing for a crack emanating from a hole, the results show that the
initial crack (a i = 0.100 inch) grows to the critical size (acr = 0. 18308 inch) in just
three flights. Due to the fact that the number of flights to failure is so small, a study
was undertaken to determine the allowable maximum limit stress level that would re-
sult in an acceptable safe-life of 100 missions.
The loading spectrum used in the initial analysis of a crac k emanating from a hole in
the wing spar cap is based on a maximum limit operating stress level of oMAX = 91.2
ksl (see Table 5-2). The procedure used here consists of reducing this maximum
limit stress level by some percentage, calculating a new critical flaw size based on
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the new maximum stress level, and then propagating an initial flaw size a i = 0.100
inch to failure using a reduced applied loading spectrum based on the reduced maximum
stress level. The critical flaw sizes (acr) were found using the following expression:
a¢_- _ [ (-18.42 acr)]cr 1.0 + 2.0 e78. 0
_/1 - 0.177 (a/120.0) 2
By substituting values of lhe stress level (a) into this equation, the critical flaw size i
(act) can be found for the stress level by using a trial and error method. Figure 5-26
=i
-- _ is a plot of stress level versus critical flaw size for a crack emanating from a hole in -
the wing spar cap.
_:: :: 1.0 _
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
CRITICAL CRACK LENGTH, a (inches)
cr
Figure 5-26. Stress Level Versus Critical Flaw Size for the Titanium Wing Spar Caps
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After determining the critical flaw size for various maximum stress levels_an initial
flaw of size a i = 0.100 inch was propagated to failure for the various levels and the
curve of Figure 5-27 was obtained. From this curve it can be seen that to obtain a
safe-life of 100 missions, the maximum allowable operating stress level must be re-
duced to 50% of the original maximum stress level. In other words, all load levels
in the applied loading spectrum must be reduced by 50% so that an initial crack of
size a i = 0.100 inch emanating from a hole will reach criticality in 100 missions,
using a scatter factor of 1.5 on the number of missions.
1.0
0.80
0.60
0.40 --
0.20 --
0
0
__OPERATING STRESS LEVEL IN THE LOADS SPECTRUM, _max = 91.2 KSI)
NOTE: SCATTER FACTOR OF i.5 USED ON NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
/ FORSAFELIFEOF_oo
- _ _ mssloNs, _I9_.2=0.50
OR aMA X 45 6KSI
!
f
|
|
Figure 5-27. Allowable Maximum Operating Stress Level Versus the Number of
Flights to Failure (Safe-Life) for the Titanium Wing Spar Caps
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5.5.2 WING SPAR CAPS SAFE-LIFE SENSITIVITY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY AND
FLAW GROWTH SCATTER FACTOR. The type of flaw assumed to be present in the
structure for this analysis is a through-crack emanating from a hole. This configura-
tion is most critical due to the stress concentration gradient in the vicinity of the hole.
The equation for the stress intensity factor for this type of flaw is
KI = (GKT)
- 0,17'/ (o"/o" YS)
where GKT, the factor to account the stress concentration in the vicinity of the hole,
is derived in Section 5.5.1.2. The initial flaw size (ai) is assumed to be 0.100 inch,
This is based on an estimate of NDE capability. The flaw is propagated to failure under
the influence of the applied loading spectrum for the wing. The loading spectrum,with
a maximum applied stress level of 91.2 ksi, is equivalent to a factor of safety of 1.4.
Factor of safety can be related to the maximum stress level in the spectrum accord-
ing to the equation
FSu = 1.4 1 91"2ffmax)
The effect on the safe-life of the wing of varying the factor of safety and the associated
maximum stress level is presented in Figure 5-28, The sensitivity of the safe-life of
the baseline wing spar caps to flaw growth scatter factor variations is presented in
Figure 5-29. The figure shows that the Safe-life of the baseline wing spar caps is in-
adequate regardless of the scatter factor.
5.6 THRUST STRUCTURE
5.6.1 THRUST BEAM CAP SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS. For the thrust structure beams,
as for the wing spar caps, a safe-life analysis was carried out using two types of ini-
tial flaws: a corner crack, and a crack emanating from a fastener hole.
The thrust structure loading spectrum used in the safe-life analysis is the same as
that used in the fatigue life determination and shown in Table 4-5.
5.6.1.1 Corner Crack. In the analysis of the thrust structure, one of the thrust
beam tension caps was assumed to contain a corner crack of an initial size of 0.1 inch
(see sketch on following page). This initial size was chosen based on a judgment of
the capability of nondestructive evaluation.
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PORTION OF .._
THRUST BEAM _
TENSION CAP"-
_ a I =0.100IN.
a i=O.lOOIN.
--f
The crack growth studies were done on the thrust structure assuming it was main-
talned at room temperature. Thus room temperature properties were assumed, and
crack growth rate curves for Tt-6AI-4V annealed titanium base metal at room tern-
•perature were used in the flaw propagation computer program.
The equation for the maximum stress intensity factor for a corner crack is
_"_a (0.705)
/ I - 0.177 (_/_ry)2
This is Equation VII-7 from Reference 10 modified to account for the plastic zone
correction.
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Figure 5-28. Wing Spar Caps Factor of Safety Versus Safe-Life
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The critical value of the material
toughness parameter, K I , used here
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for the Ti-6A1-4V annealed titanium
base metal at room temperature was
KI = 78.0 ksi ¢T_h (Reference 16,
Figure 35, Page 89). The tensile
yield stress used was ay = 120.0
ksi. The maximum operating stress
occurring in the thrust beam cap can
be found from the spectrum to be =
92.9 ksi. Substituting all these values
into the stress intensity factor equa-
tion results in
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Figure 5-29. Wing Spar Caps Safe-Life (Flaw
Growth to Failure) Versus
Scatter Factor
78.0 =
92.9 _cr (0.705)
41 - O.177 (92.9/120.0) 2
This equation can be solved for the
critical vaule of 'a,' which turns out
to be acr = 0.4036 inch.
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, it took 1555 flights for the initial
flaw of size a i = 0.100 inch to grow to the critical flaw size of acr = 0.4036 inch.
Figure 5-30 is a plot of flaw size versus flights. A scatter factor of 1.5 was used on
the number of flights to failure.
5.6.1.2 Crack Emanatint_ From Hole. The flaw configuration and method of analysis
for determining the growth of a crack emanating from a hole is the same as was used
in the wing spar cap safe-life analysis and shown in Section 5.5.1.2.
The maximum operating stress is found from the applied loading spectrum to be
= 92.9 ksi. Substituting this stress and the appropriate material properties into
the equation for the stress intensity factor for a crack emanating from a hole results
in the following expression:
78.0 = (92.9) ,f_ a_c r Ii.0
/1 - 0. 177 (92.9/120.0) 2
+ 2.0 e ('18" 42 acr) ]
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Figure 5-30. Crack Growth in the Titanium Thrust Beam
Caps (Flaw Configuration -- Corner Crack)
This expression is solved by a trial and error method for the critical value of 'a,'
which turns out to be a = 0.1694 inch.
cr
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, it _ok 101 flights for the initia !
flaw (a i = 0.100 inch) to grow to the critical flaw size (acr = 0.1694 inch). Note here
that a scatter factor of 1.5 was used on the number of flights to failure. Figure 5-31
is a plot of flaw size versus flights.
5.6.2 THRUST BEAM CAP SAFE-UFE SENSITIVITY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY AND
FLAW GROWTH SCATTER FACTOR. The type of flaw assumed to be present in the
structure for this analysis is a through-crack emanating from a hole. This configura-
tion is most critical due to the stress concentration gradient in the vicinity of the hole.
The method of analysis for this configuration was presented in Section 5.5. The initial
flaw size is assumed to be 0. i0 inch based on a judgment of NDE capability. The :
factor of safety can be related to the maximum stress level in the spectrum according
to the equation
FS = 1.4(91"2l-
u \ max/
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Figure 5-31. Crack Growth in the Titanium Thrust Beam Caps (Flaw
Configuration -- Crack Emanating from a Hole)
Therefore, by varying the maximum stress level in the applied loading spectrum the
factor of safety can also be varied. The effect of varying the factor of safety and cor-
responding stress levels on the critical flaw size and the number of flights to failure
can be found in Figures 5-32 and 5-33 respectively.
The sensitivity of the safe-life of the baseline thrust beam caps to flaw growth scatter
factor variations is presented in Figure 5-34. The figure shows that any increase of
the scatter factor above the baseline value of 1.5 will reduce the safe-life of the thrust
beam caps below the acceptable level of 100 missions.
5.7 VERTICAL TAIL
5.7.1 VERTICAL TAIL SAFE-LIFE ANALYSIS. The flaw growth analysis of the ver-
tical tail was done assuming that therewas an initial through crack in the skin of
length (2c)i = 1.00 inch (see sketch below). This initial size was chosen based on a
judgment of the capability of nondestructive evaluation.
/ C--_---'----_-'--_ _ sVKE_TICALTAIL
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Figure 5-33. Thrust Structure Factor of Safety Versus Safe-Life
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The vertical tail loading spectrum experi-
enced by the flaw configuration shown in the
sketch is essentially the same spectrum that
was used in the fatigue life determination.
The crack growth studies were done on the
vertical tail assuming the structure was
maintained at room temperature. Thus
room temperature properties were assum-
ed and crack growth rate curves for Ti-
6A1-4V annealed titanium base metal at
room temperature were used in the flaw
propagation computer program.
The equation for the maximum stress inten-
sity factor for a through crack of length 2c
is:
_-_ 2_ (Reference 18,
KI =_ 2 - (c_/_ry)2 Page 28)
Figure 5-34. Thrust Beam Caps Safe- where
Life (Flaw Growth to
Failure) Versus Scatter t_
Factor a
Y
= applied stress
= tensile yield stress
The critical value of the material toughness parameter, Kic , used here for the Ti-
6AI-4V annealed titanium base metal at room temperature was Kic -- 78.0 ksi x/-_.
(Reference 16, Figure 35, Page 89). The tensile yield stress was _y = 120.0 ksi.
The maximum operating stress in the vertical tail can be found from the spectrum to
be _ = 30.940 ksi. Substituting all these values into the stress intensity factor equa-
tion results in:
78.0 =
30. 940 _-_ (_
cr
V2 - (30. 940/120.0) 2
This equation can be solved for the critical value of 2c, which turns out to be (2C)c r
= 3.9115 inches.
Under the influence of the applied loading spectrum, it took 534 flights for the initial
flaw of size (2c)i = 1.00 inch to grow to the critical flaw size of (2C)c r = 3.9115 inch-
es. Note here that a scatter factor of 1.5 has been used on the number of flights to
failure. A plot of flaw size versus flights to failure can be found in Figure 5-35.
5-45
4.0
_3.0
O
¢q
_q
2.0
1.0
I
(2C)c r = 3.9115 INCH FOR
MAX STRESS IN SPECTRUM
I (7 = 30.940 KSI AND _
. )TAIL SKIN
"   CTOROF" /
ASSUMED TH 1.5 INCLUDED ON _l
FUGHTS _l
SAF-E LIFE =
534 FLIGHTS
1 10 100 1000
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
Figure 5-35. Crack Growth in the Vertical Tail Skin
5.7.2 VERTICAL TAIL SAFE-LIFE SENSITIVITY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY AND
FLAW GROWTH SCATTER FACTOR. The type of flaw assumed to be present in the
structure for this analysis is a through-crack of 1.00 inch length, based on an estimate
of NDE capability. The equation for the stress intensity factor for this type of flaw is
where
2c = flaw size
The basic applied loading spectrum for the vertical tail is shown in Table 4-7. The
stresses in this spectrum correspond to an ultimate factor of safety of 1.4. Figure
5-36 is a plot of applied stress versus flaw size for a through,crack under the influ-
ence of the basic applied load spectrum. The ultimate factor of safety can be related
to the limit stress level in the spectrum according to the equation
FS = 1.4 [ 34__.0 )u \ _ limit
Therefore by varying the limit stress, the factor of safety can also be varied. The
effect of varying the factor of safety and corresponding stress levels on the number of
flights to failure is presented in Figure 5-37.
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Figure 5-36. Applied Stress Versus Critical Crack Length for a Through-Crack
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Figure 5-37. Vertical Tail Ultimate Factor of Safety Versus Safe-Life
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Growth to Failure) Versus
Scatter Factor
The sensitivity of the safe-life of the
baseline verical tail to flaw growth
scatter factor variations is presented
in Figure 5-38. The figure shows that
although safe -life drops rapidly for
increases of the scatter factor from
the baseline value of 1.5, the safe-
life of the vertical tail remains at an
adequate level for scatter factors as
high as 8.
5.8 CREW MODULE
This section presents the safe-life
analysis of the crew module. Since
the critical flaw size is greater than
the thickness of the crew module skin,
the type of flaw assumed to be present
in the structure for this analysis is a
through-crack. Various size initial
cracks were assumed.
The basic applied loading spectrum for the crew module is
min ff max Cycles per Time per Flight
(ksi) (ksi) Flight (minutes)
_ 0 15.0 1 10
0 8.5 1 90
The stresses tn this spectrum correspond to an apparent ultimate factor of safety of _!:
4.2. The high apparent factor of safety was dictated by the requirement that the Crew
module be fail-safe. Figure 5-39 is a plot of applied stress versus critical crack
length for a through-crack under the influence of the applied load spectrum. The ulti-
mate factor of safety can be related to the maximum stress level in the spectrum
according to the equation
FSu = 4.2 \(a15"0>max
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Figure 5-39. Crew Module Applied Stress for a Through-
Crack Versus Critical Crack Length
Therefore by varying the maximum stress, the factor of safety can also be varied.
The effect of varying the ultimate factor of safety and corresponding stress levels on
the number of flights to failure for various initial crack lengths is shown in Figure
5-40. Investigation of the curves reveals that for an initial crack length of 2.00 inches
and the baseline apparent factor of safety of 4.2 the safe-life is 1928 missions, which
far exceeds the design service of 100 missions. Similarly for an initial flaw size of
1.00 inch and the required 100 mission life, a factor of safety of 2.98 is required.
This indicates that the fail-safe design of the crew module gives that structure a safe-
life well in excess of what would have been necessary had the safe-life design philosophy
been applied. Figure 5-41 presents the sensitivity of the baseline crew module safe-
life to flaw growth scatter factor for various initial crack lengths. The figure shows
that the crew module has adequate safe-life except for large initial crack sizes and
large scatter factors.
It should be noted that for the crew module, safe-life is only the period to the initiation
of rapid flaw growth. Arrest of this rapid flaw growth occurs due to the fail-safe
capability of the module.
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SECTION 6
FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS
The damage tolerance of each of the selected components is analytically determined
below, as a measure of its fail-safe capability. Two criteria are used in judging ade-
quacy of fail-safe design:
ao
b,
In structure composed of a number of discrete elements (e.g., the wing box), a
crack can proceed to the point of complete failure of one principal member. The
remaining structure must possess a residual strength capability of carrying
critical limit design load without failure.
In monolithic structures (e. g., the integrally stiffened vertical tail box and pro-
pellant tanks with crack stoppers), fail-safe can be provided by fracture arrest
of a rapidly propogating crack at crack stoppers such as stiffeners, straps, and
doublers. The crack stoppers must be of sufficient size to arrest the crack under
critical limit load conditions, and the arrested crack must be sufficient size to
make detection certain prior to the next flight by normal preflight inspections.
Monolithic structures are also considered fail-safe when the critical crack size
for onset of rapid fracture is so large as to ensure detection prior to reaching
critical size.
The baseline aft orbiter support frame does not prossess fail-safe capability because
of its monolithic construction. Therefore, it does not appear in this section of the
report.
Since the baseline crew module is designed to be fail-safe, the fail-safe analysis of
the crew module is presented in Section 3.7, which gives the baseline analysis of the
component.
6.1 LIQUID OXYGEN TANK
6. i. 1 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS -- L O2 TANK SKIN UNDER INTERNAL PRESSURE. A
longitudinal section through the tank skin was taken at the upper centerline just aft of
the forward dome equator, for analysis of fail-safe capability.
2.5t = 0.225
Ir
........................ ,,. ................ , .....
!_ 121 _1
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An initial flaw was assumed in the form of a through crack in the center of the panel.
Since the weld and frame lands are so widely spaced, the tank skin panel was assumed
to be of infinite width. Other assumptions were:
a. Material ls 2219-T87.
b. Temperature is room temperature.
c. Gross hoop stress is 42.8 ksi, resulting from maximum relief valve pressure
(see Table 4-1).
Determination of Critical Hoop Stress for the Onset of Crack Instability:
O"
C
K
C
7ra +-- +C
o
(Equation IX-14 of Reference 10)
where
a = initial crack half length
o
Kc = critical stress intensity factor, assumed as 2 KIc = 64 ksi _/inch
C = bulge correction, shown as 9.5 for 2024-T3 in Table XVI of Refer-
ence 10. This value is used here for 2219-T87.
R = radius of curvature = 198 inches
qyB = material yield strength in a 2:1 biaxial stress field, assumed to be
1.25 Fty or .64 ksl
Solution of the equation for a range of values of a o gives values of _c that are plotted
as _ versus 2a tn Figure 6-1. They indicate a critical initial crack length of slightly
less than one tnch at a hoop stress of 42.8 kst.
! i
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Figure 6-1.
_ LIMIT HOOP STRESS = 42.8 KSI CRITICAL HOOP STRESS FOR FRACTURE
HOOP STRESS
10
[-,
VERSUS INITIAL CRACK LENGTH
(WITHOUT STRAPS)
10 15 20 25 30 35
STRAP SPACING (W) OR CRACK LENGTH, 2a (inches)
LO 2 Tank Crack Arrest Effectiveness of Graphite/Epoxy Tear Straps
In an effort to increase the critical crack length at this gross stress and to evaluate
fail-saf_ tank concepts, crack arresters in the form of graphite/epoxy straps were
tried. The straps were assumed to have a 0.50 by 3.00-inch section of HT-S/X904
unidirectional graphite/epoxy with the following properties:
Ftu = 168 ksi
E = 20ksi×103
Section at Strap:
"_'------ 3.00 _
0.50
0. 090 (= B) 2.5B
= 0. 225
_ GRAPHITE/E POXY STRAP
INTEGRAL STRINGER
_TANK WALL
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Determination of the effectiveness of the Graphite/Epoxy tear straps to arrest un-
stable crack is evaluated bythe following method for various strap spacings and hoop
stress levels. The method is:
a. The applied stress intensity for a centrally located crack of variable length be-
tween the straps is determined by the method of Reference 18 which accounts for
the presence of straps where:
K:C_
C = stress intensity correction factor
A typical plot of applied stress intensity versus crack size is presented in Fig-
ure 6-2.
b. It is hypothesized that the stress level or strap spacing which causes the applied
stress intensity curve to faU below the critical stress intensity factor (Kc) of the
skin panel (i.e., fracture toughness) will cause dynamic fracture arrest and a
fail-safe structural arrangement, This condition is illustrated in Figure 6-2.
The values of strap spacings and stress levels which satisfy this fracture arrest
hypothbsis are plotted in Figure 6-1.
Also plotted in Figure 6-1 is the total weight of straps on the LO 2 tank for the
strap spacings shown. The curve shows that the weight penalty required to pro-
vide fracture arrest at a hoop design stress of 42.8 ksi is 3300 pounds. Since
this is an 18%weight penaity on the LO 2 tank, it is considered impractical to use
these crack arrest straps.
6.1.2 SENSITIVITY OF LO2 TANK FAIL-SAFE CAPABILITY TO FACTOR OF SAFETY
PERTURBATIONS. An initial crack in the longitudinal direction in the form of a through-
crack in the center of a panel was assumed. The crack is loaded transversely by hoop
tension due to internal tank pressure. The crack location is on the upper centerline
Just aft of the forward dome equator. The material is 2219-T87 aluminum at room
temperature. For the baseline,the gross limit hoop stress is 42.8 ksi. Figure 6-3
presents the critical initial flaw size, 2ao, versus the ultimate factor of safety for
the liquid oxygen tank. To obtain the critical initial flaw size, 2a o, for a particular
factor of safety, the following procedure was used. The limit stress for a factor of
safety was determined by use of the equations
1.4 (42.8) 511 .
Crlimit- FS or _ltmit =
u y
depending on whether ultimate factor of safety or yield factor of safety is critical.
Then taking (Ylimit = _c' the equation.
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0 5 10 15 2O 25 30 35
HALF CRACK LENGTH,a (inches)
Figure 6-2. LO 2 Tank Crack Arrest Effectiveness of Graphite/
Epoxy Tear Straps, 36-Inch Strap Spacing
O
o
, I
"' ' 1.5
_ ____,..S_''/_'
/
/
/
/
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.4
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY, FS u
Figure 6-3. LO 2 Tank Critical Initial Crack Length Versus Ultimate Factor of Safety
6-5
iff
C
C
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K
C
1/2
is solved for ao.
The LO 2 tank, practically speaking, has no fail-safe capability for internal pressure
loads. Decreases in factor of safety decrease what little residual strength a flawed
tank has. Even large increases in the factor of safety don't appreciably increase the
fall-safe capability of the tank. The figure shows that for all factors of safety investi-
gated, the critical initial crack length is much less than the frame spacing, and thus
fail-safe capability can be obtained only by use of intermediate crack stoppers between
the frames. This solution, however, imposes an inordinate weight penalty, and there-
fore fail-safe capability is not practical even for increased safety factors.
6.2 LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK
6.2.1 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS -- LH 2 TANK SKIN UNDER INTERNAL PRESSURE.
The general constructional features of the LH 2 tank are similar to those of the LO 2
tank. The assumptions for the fail-safe analysis were the same except for the gross
hoop stress, which is 40.6 psi per Table 4-2, and the skin thickness, which is 0.116
inch with 0.290 inch land thickness.
For _ tank without tear straps, the critical hoop stress is the same as for the LO 2
tank for a given initial crack lengh_. If tear straps were added similar to those shown
for the LO 2 tank, the results would be similar to the LO 2 tank. A check was there-
fore made on increasing the size of the straps from 1/2 by 3 inches to 1 by 3 inches.
The critical hoop stresses for dynamic fracture arrest for various tear strap spacings
were calculated using the same method as for the LO 2 tank, and the resulting curve of
crack arrest effectiveness of the 1 by 3 inch graphite/epoxy straps is shown in Figure
6-4. A plot of strap weight versus spacing is also shown. It can be seen by compary
lug the upper curve of Figure 6-1 for the LO 2 tank with the equivalent curve of Figure
6-4 that file effectiveness of the graphite/epoxy tear straps was not significantly en_
hanced by a doubling of the cross-sectional area of the straps. It can also be seen
from the strap weight curve that the straps are extremely heavy; at the strap spacing
required for the limit stress of 40.6 ksi, the weight penalty _uld be over 20,000
pounds.
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--VERSUS STRAP SPACING
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Figure 6-4. LH 2 Tank Crack Arrest Effectiveness of Graphite/Epoxy Tear Straps
6.2.2 FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS -- LH 2 TANK SKIN UNDER LONGITUDINAL LOADS.
Taking a transverse section through the integrally stiffened tank skin in the region of
the bottom centerline at Station 2600, the following configuration is obtained.
tsk = O. 122
t
3.00
1,
1.25--_
|
"S : 4.00 _ !
!
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Using the method given in Reference 20:
Percent stiffening =
100
Ask
1+_
Ast r
100
= = 35.1%
0.488
1+_
0.264
Values of the stress intensity factor, K, are computed by use of the formula
K = C¢
whe re
C = stress intensity correction factor
¢ = gross stress level
a = crack half length
and C is from Reference 20. The resulting values of K are plotted versus crack
length in Figure 6-5. For this curve it is assumed that the stringer is not completely
severed until the crack tip in the sheet has advanced a distance equal to the height of
the stringer past the centerline of the stringer. Between the edge of the stringer and
the point at which the stringer is assumed to be completely severed, K is assumed
to increase linearly with the crack length, a, as shown.
Figure 6-5 shows that once rapid fracture has begun for a transverse crack under
longitudinal loading the stress intensity doesn't go below the critical value, Kc, again.
Therefore, once rapid fracture begins, it progresses to complete failure and the LH 2
tank therefore has no fail-safe capability for transverse cracks under longitudinal }
loads.
6.2.3 LH 2 TANK UNDER INTERNAL PRESSURE -- FACTOR OF SAFETY PER- ,_
?
TURBATIONS FOR FAIL-SAFE. The method of analysis for the LH 2 tank under in-_
ternal pressure is the same as for the LO 2 tank as presented in Section 6.1.2 except
that the baseline gross limit hoop stress is 40.6 ksi. Figure 6-6 presents the critical
initial flaw size, 2a o, versus the ultimate factor of safety, FS u. For the range of
safety factors investigated, the LH 2 tank has no fail-safe capability for internal pres-
sure. Decreases in factor of safety decrease what little residual strength a flawed
tank has. Even large increases in the factor of safety don't appreciably increase the
fail-safe capability of the tank. The figure shows that for all factors of safety investi-
gated, the critical initial crack length is much less than the frame spacing, and there-
fore fail-safe can be obtained only by use of intermediate crack stoppers between the
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Figure 6-5. LH 2 Crack Arrestment by Integral
Stringers for Longitudinal Loading
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Figure 6-6.
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ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETYp FS u
LH 2 Tank Critical Initial Crack Length Versus Ultimate
Factor of Safety for Internal Pressure
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frames. This solution, however, imposes an inordinate weight penalty and therefore
fail-safe is practical for internal pressure loading eve_ for increased safety factors.
6.2.4 LH 2 TANK UNDER LONGITUDINAL LOADS -- FACTOR OF SAFETY PER-
TURBATIONS FOR FAIL-SAFE. An initial crack in the transverse direction and
centrally located between stringers is assumed at Station 2600 bottom centerline.
The stringers are integral with the skin, and the skin-stringer combination is ma-
chined from three-inch-thick 2219-T87 aluminum plate. The crack is loaded trans-
versely due to body bending and axial loads. Analysis for the stress intensity factor
was performed by the method of Reference 20. The stress intensity factor is com-
puted by use of the formula
K = Ca/ a
where
K = stress intensity factor
C = stress intensity correction factor from Figure 9, Reference 20
a = gross stress level
a = half crack length
A gross limit axial stress of 41.1 ksi for the baseline ultimate factor of safety of
1.4 was used for the calculations. Limit stresses for other ultimate safety factors
were determined by the same means as for the liquid oxygen tank. The values of K
for various ultimate factors of safety and crack lengths are plotted in Figure 6-7.
The curves assume that the stringer is not completely severed until the crack tip in
the sheet has advanced a distance equal to the height of the stringer past the center-
line of the stringer. Between the edge of the stringer and the point at which the
stringer is assumed to be completely severed, K is assumed to increase linearly
with the crack length, a. This is represented by the straight sections of the curves.
Inspection of Figure 6-7 reveals that once rapid flaw growth has begun, there is no
crack arrest except for a very short distance before the first stringer for FS u = 1.6.
The LH 2 tank therefore has virtually no fail-safe capability for longitudinal loads
even at high ultimate factors of safety: :
6.3 WING BOX
6.3.1 WING BOX FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS, Fail-safe strength of the B-9U wing was
evaluated analytically with the aid of a finite element computer program. The ideal-
ized structural model used in the fail-safe analysis is the same as that used in the
sizing calculations and shown in Figure 3-21. Major tension or tension/shear mem-
bers of the model were analytically "failed," one at a time, and limit design loads
were applied to the weakened structure. Considerable beef-up was required to make
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Figure 6-7. LH 2 Tank Longitudinal Loading Crack Arrestment by
Integral Stringers for Various Factors of Safety
the structure adequate for design limit load. Total added weight was 534 pounds or
2.16% of the total ultimate strength model weight of 24,660 pounds. This corresponds
to a 932-pound penalty of the actual wing box, which weighs 43,104 pounds.
The ascent loading condition W-1 (maximum 0_q with headwiuds) that produces maximum
tension in the lower surface was used for the fail-safe analysis.
Structural members "failed," one at a time, were: 1) spar lower cap between Stations
207 and 267 of Spares 2, 3, 4 and 5; 2) the spar she_r diagonal between Stations 207
and 267 of Spar 3; 3) the spar lower cap and web between Stations 267 and 327 of Spars
3 and 4; and 4) the spar lower cap and web of Spar 4 between Stations 447 and 507. In
the engine area, where spar shear is carried by webs welded to upper and lower caps,
a lower cap/web failure was treated as a single failure with a weld crack assumed to
propagate in two directions (i .e., through the tension cap and through the shear web).
Note that this type failure appeared only slightly more critical than a simple lower cap
failure inboard of the engine area.
Results of the fail-safe analysis are listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2. Table 6-1 compares
wing internal load distribution for ultimate load with the load distribution for limit load
with a major tension member failed. The comparison is confined to that part of the
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ITable 6-1. Wing Box Ultimate and Fail-Safe Internal Loads
Member
63-73
]
73-87 _ _par 2
87-99 1 Jpper
99-109 _ap
109-119
64-74
74-88 Spar 2
88-100 I Lower
100-110 Cap
110-120
63-74
73-88 Spa 2
87-100 Trl _s
99-110 Di_ 's
109-120
43-55
55-65
65-75
75-89
89-101
101-111
111-121
44-56
56-66
66-76
76-90 C_
Sp: " 3
Up er
Ca
Failed
Element(1)
Ultimate 102-112
(Ib) (Ib)
-354,199 -281,238
-497,417 -413,813
-628,314 -524,138
-774,735 -580,767
-769,428 -562,900
344,726 382,984
473,172 557,997
580,829 734,527
680,139 893__780
746,986
77,987 104,763
98,715 130,333
110,340 127,462
162,279 62,027
50,668 21,085
-528,592 -370,866
-641,513 -465,418
-842,087 -587,695
-1,046,631 -682,779
-1,256,888 -765,161
-1,590,023 -995,483
-1,537,001 -993,688
i
488,278 276,724
683,280 318,7_6
731,348 249,463
817,553 165,112
(1) Lower spar cap.
(2) Lower spar cap and web.
Member Loads
Failed
Element(1)
104-114
0b)
-273,932
-376,286
-476,391
-594,141
-588,978
279,594
386,942
494,338
564,O03
612,343
43,457
59,082
63,901
125,919
40,882
-417,546
-497,600
-674,859
-865,611
-1,050,835
-1,275,347
-1,210,439
450,650
655,159
713,915
812,416
Fail-Safe
Failed
Elements (2)
90-102 &
89-90-
102-101
(Ib)
Failed
Elements (2)
92-104 &
91-92-
104-103
0b)
-278,766
-416,028
-544,319
-603,342
-579,983
599,488
766,134
849,089
765,105
112,634
86,582
22,966
-381,026
-482,734
-609,472
-698,986
-750,035
-944,438
-953,750
280,787
316,922
233,734
122,890
-271,280
-373,735
-478,988
-588,782
-584,184
283,011
390,504
481,679
554,615
601,494
44,223
61,161
69,903
111,255
40,799
-418,886
-496,145
-665,296
-842,755
-1,026,506
-1,279,230
-1,215,727
466,883
675,788
733,795
835,242
Failed
Elements (2)
58-68
& 57-
58-68-67
(lb)
-276,710
-380,104
-467,626
-562,813
-556,712
266,205
360,845
434,472
501,286
544,571
61,353
72,975
78,130
108,811
36,594
-399,785
-495,060
-643,451
-764,095
-887,269
-1,096,750
-1,061,835
417,658
603,218
637,414
677,512
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Table 6-1. Wing Box Ultimate and Fail-Safe Internal Loads, Contd
Member
Ultimate
0b)
90-102 Spar 3
102-112 Lower
112-122 Cap
43-56~ Diag
55-56-66-65 ]6 -6 -7 -7 Spar
75-76-90-89 I Web
89-90-102-101_
101-112 [ Truss111-122 Diag
45-57 i
57 -67
67-77 Spar 4
77-91 Upper
91-103 Cap
103-113
113-123
46-58
58-68
68-78 Spar 4
78-92 _ Lower
l
92-104 Cap
104.-114 i
114-124,
913,936
984,374
1,179,282
173,274
3,199( 1 )
3,471 (1)
3,540(1)
3, 62 5(1)
338,957
66,842
-546,210
-615,093
-750,268
-904,096
-1,083,289
-1,375,423
-1,365,959
247,467
399,349
687,190
993,679
1,318,270
1,457,074
1,487,248
Member Loads
Failed
Element
102 -112
0b)
63,198
0
212.045
Failed
Element
104-114
(Ib)
903,960
1.087,060
Fail-Safe
Failed
Elements
90-102 &
89-90-
102-101
0b)
0
39,481
323,493
Failed
Elements
92-104 &
91-92-
104-103
(lb)
950,683
965,102
1,004,734
90,455
1,414( 1 )
1,122(1)
814( 1 )
996( 1 )
259,118
73,865
-383,012
-420,090
-519,456
-642,663
-789,176
-1,003,112
-981,314
225,522
365,110
576,154
808,765
1,056,206
1,177,657
1.186.034
167,025
3,267( 1 )
3,816( 1)
4,003( 1 )
3,769( 1 )
224,912
35,034
-376,980
-446,691
-515,431
-562,341
-593,802
-812,022
-851,983
6,333
-28,338
53,305
85,586
84,617
0
159,092
89,083
1,329( 1)
907( 1)
328( 1 )
o(I)
227,263
71,509
-376,685
-409,497
-502,112
-623,832
-790,184
-1,030,636
-1,005,879
217,837
353,887
569,783
816,134
1.096.882
1.188.325
1,161,699
167,676
3,240 (1)
3,772 (1)
3,953 (1)
3,847 (1)
257,611
38,038
-386,762
-464,523
-529,526
-557,866
-587,508
-802,961
-840.493
-33,114
-99.125
-45,874
-44. 716
0
164.581
450,694
Failed
Elements
58-68
& 57-
58-68-67
ab)
725,665
761,635
869,468
143,874
2,866 (1)
2,108(1)
2,002 (1)
2,132(1)
214,704
45,605
-366,689
-386,686
-449,000
-578,471
-723,816
-947,346
-939,664
-16,146
0
200,502
474,391
752,421
889,401
956,022
(I) Designated values are shear flows in pounds per inch.
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Table 6-1. Wing Box Ultimate and Fail-Safe Internal Loads, Contd
Member Member Loads
45-58 ~ Diag
57-58-68-67 ]6 -6 -7 -7 Spar!
77-78-92-91 'Web
91-92-104-103.
103-114 } Truss
113-124 Diag's
69-79 i
I
79-93 Spar 5
93-105 _ Upper
105-115 i Cap
115-125.
70-80
80-94 Spar 5
94-106 , Lower
106-116 Cap
116-126
69-80
79-94 I Spar 5
93-106 Truss
105-116 Diagts
115-126 J
Ultimate
Ob)
87,227
2,327( 1 )
2,536( 1 )
2,743(1)
3,093(1)
232,114
69,298
-367,143
-467,591
-548,177
-659,747
-498,804
287,356
320,662
354,609
417,071
570,641
199,153
204,001
189,357
255,098
-120,755
Failed
Element
102-112
(Ib)
80,842
2, o61(1)
2,448( 1 )
2,752(1) !
2,906( 1 )
162,798
29,374
-270,251
-333,448
-383,219
-460,291
-336,421
223,990
269,254
314,838
361,265
483,167
130,920
133,985
126,113
185,261
-93,957
Failed
Element
104-114
(lb)
-2,533
284( 1 )
211(I)
572( 1 )
134(I)
225,701
-157,854
-264,572
-401,533
-412,639
-244,786
326,206
451,116
644,392
904,873
212,179
255,727
1!8,626
-_52,446
Fall-Safe
Failed
Elements
90-102 &
89-90-
102-101
ab)
75,425
I, 980(1)
2,438( 1)
2__93s(i)
a._____634(1)
176,894
30,741
-268,718
-336,875
-394,563
-472,492
-346,210
218,433
260,559
305,804
364,091
489,670
136,625
138,656
125,014
179,028
-95,340
Failed
Elements
92-104 &
91-92-
104-103
(lb)
-14,733
31(1)
587(1)
1,032(1)
0
198,845
67,574
-183,944
-332,019
-413,497
-408,899
-259,481
396,204
558,924
735,727
758,517
698,942
251,173
301,802
212,948
120,140
-120,351
Failed
Elements
58-68
& 57-
58-68-67
(lb)
4,458
0
1,972 (1)
2,388(1)
2,562(1)
181,784
50,663
-238,428
289,319
345,348
435,002
326,626
334, O84
301,793
288,105
307,480
418,741
118,345
125,575
126,414
184,415
-84,573
(1) Designated values are shear flows in pounds per inch.
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Table 6-1. Wing Box Ultimate and Fail-Safe Internal Loads, Contd
Member Member Loads
Skins
73-87-89-75
74-88-90-76
87-99-101-89
88-100-102-90
99-109-111-101
100-110-112-102
75-89-91-77
110-120-122-112
89-101-103-91
101-111-113-103
102-112-114-104
65-75-77-67
112-122-124-114
77-91-93-79
78-92-94-80
91-103-105-93
92-104-106-94
103-113-115-105
104-114-116-106
Ultimate
(lb/ln)
1,659
2,029
1,481
2,095
1,148
1,017
1,347
24
1,257
1,091
1,700
1,348
570
1,260
2,320
1,154
2,071
1,897
917
Failed
Element
102-112
(lb/in)
1,008
2,370
978
533
1,457
1,576
1,318
983
912
1,435
1,094
885
1,128
848
1,009
1,494
824
Failed
Element
104-114
(lb/in)
1,518
2,315
1,428
2,567
981
494
559
659
456
516
2,138
630
733
992
57
1,726
317
Fail-Safe
Failed
Elements
90-102 &
89-90-
102-101
(Ib/in)
817
679
1,782
327
836
1,371
1,237
1,093
2,165
989
827
1,258
623
1,017
1,529
412
Failed
Elements
92-104 &
91-92 -
104-103
(Ib/in)
1,546
2,171
1,987
924
I,I00
392
368
651
460
294
460
965
1,570
751
1,438
1,690
1,822
3,174
Failed
Elements
58-68
& 57-
58-68-67
(lb/in)
1,159
1,309
1,001
1,303
734
651
996
55
914
758
953
1,027
239
839
2,080
701
1,731
1,217
977
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Table 6-1. Wing Box Ultimate and Fail-Safe Internal Loads, Contd
Member Member Loads
Skins
55-65-67-57
114-124-126-116
43-55-57-45
44-56-58-46
67-77-79-69
68-78-80-70
57-67-69-59
58-68-70-60
59-69 Spar 5
60-70 Caps
59-70 _ Diag
47-59 [ Spar 5
r
48-60 i Caps
Ultimate
(Ib)
1,393 (I)
755(I)
1,995 (I)
2,775 (I)
I,0o3(I)
2,059(I)
1,135 (1)
2,149 (1)
-263,923
260,917
181,866
-207,683
223,745
Failed
Element
102-112
Ob)
1,390 (I)
675(1)
I, 590 (1)
1,499 (1)
690 (1)
I, 001 (1)
758(1)
i,141(I)
-203,747
186,214
120,609
-164,768
150,512
Failed
Element
104-114
(Ib)
745 (1)
2,027 (1)
I, 432 (1)
2,852 (1)
1,731 (1)
1,068 (1)
I, 738 (1)
i, 433 (1)
-85,067
258,689
167,789
-67,596
204,146
Fail-Safe
Failed
Elements
90-102 &
89-90-
102-101
(Ib)
l_LA_4s9(I)
497 (1)
I, 666 (1)
i,531(I)
714 (1)
I, 129 (I)
815(D
1,257 (1)
-199,860
184,229
125,253
-160,649
151,286
Failed
Elements
92-104 &
91-92-
104-103
(lb)
637 (1)
1,392 (1)
I, 400 (I)
2,989 (1)
1,794 (1)
904 (1)
19_b_90sos(1)
1,330(1)
-85,133
191,049
-58,932
227,955
Failed
Elements
58-68
& 57-
58-68-67
(Ib)
1, lO3(1)
340 (1)
1,485 (1)
2 p623 (I)
904 (1)
2,191 (i)
1,218 (1)
2,156(1)
-203,680
296,265
199,963
-131,085
240,001
Member
99-110 Truss
103-114 Dlag
78-92-94-80 } Sk_
92-104-106-94
Ultimate
(Ib)
162,279
232,114
2,320(I)
2,071(I)
Member Loads
Failed
Element (3)
I00-II0
(Ib)
Not
Critical
Fail-Safe
Failed
Element (3)
106-116
_b)
2,46i(i)
2..._d_2463(I)
Failed
Element (4)
101-112
(Ib)
246,200
Notes:
(I) Designated values are shear flows in pounds per inch.
(2) Underlined values are maximum fail safe load of all cases considered.
(3) Lower spar cap.
(4) Diagonal.
6-16
Table 6-2. Margins of Safety for Baseline Structure, and Area
Increases for Fail-Safe Design, Wing Box Area
Member
64-74
74-88
88-100
100-110
110-120
90-102
102-112
48-60
60-70
70-80
80-94
94-106
106-116
116-126
63-74
73-88
87-100
111-122
113-124
59-70
69-80
79-94
93-106
115-126
55-56-66-65
65-66-76-75
75-76-90-89
89-90-102-101
77-78-92-91
91-92-104-103
74-88-90-76
87-99-101-89
88-100-102-90
100-110-112-102
75-89-91-77
110-120-122-112
89-101-103-91
102-112-114-104
65-75-77-67
112-122-124-114
55-65-67-57
44-56-58-46
57-67-69-59
58-68-76-60
67-77-79-69
68-78-80-70
77-91-93-79
91-103-105-93
104-114-116-106
114-124-126-116
78-92-94-80
92-104-106-94
99-110
103-114
Spar Caps
Add(
Are_
M.S. (in 2 (Ib)
-0.1_ 0.5: 5.19
-0.21 1.0, _ 10.67
-0.24 1.5_ 15.74
-0.24 1.7_ 18.22
-0.13 0.9_ 6.40
-0,04 0.3] 3.15
-0.01 0.3( 3.07
-0.07 0.1_ 1.30
-0.13 0.3_ 3.30
-O. 17 O. 90 9.00
-0.43 1.98 19.80
-0.52 3.18 31.80
-0.53 3.83 38.60
-0.35 2.62 18.29
Z Weight ;4.53
Spar Diagonals
Are_
M.S. (in 2
-0.31 0.29
-0.35 0.45
-0.37 0.55
-0. O7 0. O4
-0.14 0.09
-0.04 0.07
-0.17 0.35
-0.29 0.73
-0.26 0.58
-0.17 0.21
{).34 .70
_.06 .13
i
M.E
-0.01
-0.09
-0.11
-0.05
-0,08
-0.16
Total added weight for fail-safe = 2 (184.53 + 55.19 + 16.88 + 10.60) = 534 Ib/booster.
Spar Webs
-Add_
Thick-
ness Weight
(inch) (ib)
0.001
0.004
0.005
0,003
0,003
0.007
0.68
2.96
3.95
2.50
1.98
4.81
M.S
-0.40
1.26
0.28
1.72
1.20
0.14
1.57
0.56
1.20
0.07
1.28
0.13
0,78
_.57
_.89
).55
).97
L.36
).07
).37
).38
).38
Skins
' Add(
Thic]
nes=
(inet
0
0
0
0
0
.003
0
0
0
• 001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
• 008
0
0
Added
Weight
0b)
O
O
0
0
0
2.98
0
0
0
0.76
0
0
0
0
)
)
)
L86
)
)
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wing where the redistribution of limit load due to a single member failure results in
loads higher than those experienced by ultimate load on an intact wing. Table 6-2 lists:
1) margins of safety due to fail-safe redistribution of limit load on a structure sized for
ultimate load. 2) required increase of bar area (or plate thickness) for zero margins
of safety on members under fail-safe limit load redistribution, and 3) weight increases
associated with the added material.
Table 6--2 shows a total weight increase of 534 pounds for the requirements that the wing
carry limit design load with any reasonable in-service structural failure. Of the 534
pounds, 69% is in spar caps, 21% in slur diagonals, 6% in spar webs, and 4% in skins.
All skins requiring beef-up (three per side} were originally 0.016 gage for ultimate re-
quirements. This gage is probably unrealistically thin when handling, sonic fatigue,
and thermal stress requirements are considered. Maximum gage increase was 0.009
for a total gage of 0.016 + 0.009 = 0.025 inch; therefore, it is doubtful that any skin
beef-up would be needed for fail-safe primary loading requirements.
6.3.2 WING BOX FACTOR OF SAFETY PERTURBATIONS FOR FAIL-SAFE. The
method of fail-safe weight analysis for the wing box is described in the previous section.
In order to extend that analysis to other factors of safety, the following procedure was
used. First a new ultimate member load was calculated by use of the formula
FS u (Pult)
ult 1,4
wher_
p i = ultimate member load at FS
ult u
P = baseline ultimate member load for FS = 1.4
ult u
Then a new weight penalty was calculated using
whe re
_P
WT = ---_. p_
AP = Pfail-safe - P_ P_ > PIult' xail-safe ult
p = 0.16 lb/in 3 for annealaed Ti-6A1-4V
= length of member
F = allowable stress
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Figure 6-8 gives the weight penalty for fail-safe design over design for static strength
for various ultimate factors of safety in both pounds and percent. It should be noted
that the penalties plotted are the penalties that fail-safe design imposes above the weight
required for static strength design for a given ultimate factor of safety. Weight penal-
ties are not therefore related directly to the baseline wing box weight. The total wing
box weight penalty is also broken down into separate curves for the lower spar caps and
other wing box structure in the same figure. Inspection of Figure 6-8 reveals that a
wing box designed for static strength at an FS u of 1.4 requires local beef-up of 932
pounds to give the box full fail-safe capability for 100% of limit load. To obtain a fail-
safe capability of 100% of limit load simply by raising FS u for the whole wing box struc-
ture, it would be necessary to increase FS u to 2.95 and therefore impose a weight
penalty of many thousands of pounds. Thus the only efficient way to obtain fail-safe
capability for the wing is by judicious local beef-up. The baseline wing box designed
for static strength with FS u = 1.4 has a fail-safe capability of 47% limit-load for the
initial failures assumed in Section 6.3.1.
6.4 THRUST STRUCTURE
6.4.1 _THRUST STRUCTURE FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS. Fail-safe strength of the thrust
structure was evaluated analytically with the aid of a finite element computer program.
The idealized structural model used for the fail-safe analysis is the same as that de-
scribed in Figure 3-17. Tow major tension members of the model were analytically
"failed," one at a time, and limit design loads were applied to the weakened structure.
Five members required some beef-up because of the redistribution of loads. Total
added weight was 76 pounds or 0.34% of the total weight of 22,450-pound computer model.
This is equivalent of 85 pounds for the actual 25,067-pound weight of the structure.
Loading conditions considered were: one hour ground sidewinds, maximum alpha q
headwinds, and 3g maximum thrust.
Two major tension members were "failed," one at a time. The members were truss
elements from one of the four thrust beams (Figure 3-17) and were selected, first, be-
cause they were tension members, and second, because they carried very large loads
in the unfailed configuration. Engineering judgment indicated that these were the criti-
cal members to be considered in fail-safe amlysis.
Results of the fail-safe analysis are listed in Table 6-3. Note that, although the analy-
sis was run for a 360-degree model with a single failed member, the results listed
refer to the 45-degree model shown in Figure 3-18. The results are, therefore, maxima
for the entire structure. Table 6-3 shows that one element (eight on the complete struc-
ture) of the aft thrust bulkhead and four elements of the forward thrust bulkhead have
negative margins of safety if fail-safe loading is assumed equal to design limit loading.
Four elements are truss members; one is a web stiffener.
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200_
150C
100C
50C
5
1.1
_ TOTAL '
WING BOX
PERCENT
PENALT i
_'>..
LOWER SPAR
POUNDS /
I I i I
NOTE: WEIGHT PENALTY IS FOR LOCAL
BEEF-UP OF WING BOX TO FAIL-SAFE
CONFIGURATION FOR A WING DESIGNED
FOR STATIC STRENGTH AT THE PARTICULAR FSu,
I I 1 I
/BASELINE FS u
TOTAL
WING BOX
POUNDS
PENALTY
--4
WING BOX OTHER
THAN LOWER SPAR _
CAPS, POUNDS
i I I
1.2 1,3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1,7 1.8 1.9 2.0
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY. FS u
_U
0
0
Figure 6-8. Wing Box Weight Penalty for Fail-Safe
Versus Ultimate Factor of Safety
Margins of safety vary from a low of -4% on the aft bulkhead to a -37% on the forward
bulkhead. It is doubtful that any rational fail-safe criterion could eliminate beef-up
of the forward bulkhead with the existing geometric configuration. A slightly different
geometry might be less critical for fail-safe loading.
6.4.2 THRUST STRUCTURE FACTOR OF SAFETY PERTURBATIONS FOR FAIL-
SAFE. The method of fail-safe weight analysis for/he thrust structu_ is described
in Section 6.4.1. The procedure used to analyze the thrust structure for other factors
of safety is the same as that used for the wing box and previously described in Section
6.3.2. Figure 6-9 gives the weight penalty for fail-safe design over design for static
strength for various ultimate factors of safety in both pounds and percent. Once again
it should be noted that penalities are at a particular safety factor and are not directly
related to the baseline thrust structure weight. Inspection of Figure 6-9 reveals that
a thrust structure designed for static strength at an FS u of 1.4 requires local beef-up
of 85 pounds to give the structure full fail-safe capability for 100% of limit load. To
obtain a fail-safe capability of 100% of limit load simply by raising FS u for the whole
thrust structure, it would be necessary to increase FS u to 2.22 and therefore impose a
weight penalty of several thousand pounds. Thus, the only efficient way to obtain fail-
safe capability for the wing is by judicious local beef-up. The baseline thrust structure
designed for static strength with FS u = 1.4 has a fail-safe capability of 63% of limit
load for the initial failures assumed in Section 6.4.1.
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800
i- POUNDS PENALTY
< 400
200 ' / BASELINE FS u
_ _ ,,,
_ 0
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
ULTIMATE FACTOR OF SAFETY, FS u
0
1.6
Figure 6-9. Thrust Structure Sensitivity of Weight to
Ultimate Factor of Safety for Fail-Safe
6.5 VERTICAL TAIL BOX
6.5.1 VERTICAL TAIL FAIL-SAFE ANALYSIS. At Section (_) - (_) (Figure 3-24),
the plate-stringer configuration is as shown below.
0.157_
1.27
= S = 2.00 •
O. 080
1
T'
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The material is annealed titanium alloy Ti-6A1-4V, having an ultimate tensile strength
of 130 ksi. As in previous examples, Kc will be taken as 2 Kic, or 156 ksi ,]T_ch.
Using Poe's method (Reference 20)
Percent stiffening -
100 100
m
Ask 1 + 2.00(0.080)
1 +_ 1.27 (0.157)A
str
= 55.5
Stress intensity K = C a
Values of K are calculated by the substitution in this expression of values of the
stress intensity correction factor C from Reference 20, and the design limit stress
level of 34 ksi from Table 4-7. _ The resulting values of K are plotted versus
crack length in Figure 6-10, which shows that over the range of crack lengths
considered {up to eight inches}, K for the integrally stiffened panel does not approach
the critical stress intensity level of 156 ksi _.
180
160
-_ 140
M 120
100
_ so
20
K Q, 156 KSI,
C
CRACK BRANCHES SIMULTANEOUSLY
THRU SKIN AND STRINGER
£
STRINGER
1
L
0.5 1.0
£
STRINGER
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
HALF CRACK LENGTH ,a (inches)
4.5
Figure 6-10. Vertical Box Stress Intensity Factor Versus Crack Length
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One conclusion to be drawn is that the vertical tail box possesses a high degree of fail-
safe capability, even though of monolithic construction. The principal reason is that
the stiffened covers of the box are designed for compression, which results in low ten-
sile stresses.
6.5.2 VERTICAL FAIL FACTOR OF SAFETY PERTURBATIONS FOR FAIL-SAFE.
The method of analysis used is the same as that used previously for the liquid hydrogen
tank under longitudinal loads in Section 6.2.4.
Figure 6-11 presents the applied stress intensity factor, K, versus the half crack
length, a, for ultimate factors of safety ranging from 1.1 to 1.6. It will be noted that
even for the low ultimate factor of safety of 1.1 rapid flaw growth does not commence
until a total flaw length, 2a, of 7.6 inches is reached. Even so, fracture arrest will
occur somewhere before the third stringer from the crack center, and slow flaw growth
will continue until sometime after the fracture of the third stringer. Thus flaw growth
is slow for cracks exceeding 10 inches in length even for low factors of safety. There-
fore, the vertical tail has a good degree of fail-safe capability since a crack of con-
siderably smaller size than 10 inches can easily be detected by visual inspection
techniques.
180
_. 160 -- -- Kc
;Z 140
B
i 12{}
100
80 /
4(]
sof I
FS u' = I.I\
:::
FS u = 1,4 _,___
:::
CRACK BRANCHES SIMULTANEOUSLY
THROUGH SKIN AND STRINGER
i
C
/
/
STRINGER STRINGER
o I I
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3,5 4.0 4.5
HALF CRACK LENGTH, a (inches)
Figure 6-11. Vertical Tail Box Stress Intensity Factor Versus
Crack Length for Various Ultimate Factors of Safety
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SECTION 7
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
The traditional static strength analysis compares an applied stress with an allowable
strength by means of a factor of safety. If the factor of safety multiplied by the ap-
plied stress does not exceed the allowable strength, then the object under analysis is
considered to be structurally adequate. In actuality, however, loads and strengths
are probabilistic in nature. The structural reliability analysis, therefore, quanti-
tatively analyzes the relationship of the statistical distribution of loads to the statisti-
cal distribution of strength to determine the survival probability of a loaded part.
The static strength analysis deals with load and strength magnitudes only, whereas
the reliability analysis deals with the two basic parameters of both load and strength,
which are the arithmetic mean, (i. e., a measure of magnitude) and the standard
deviation (i. e., a measure of variation). Reliability is dependent on the degree to
which the mean strength is greater than the mean load and the respective variances.
Quantitatively
R = P (S> L)
The general relationship between the factor of safety and structural reliability when
the strength and load distribution curves are superimposed as in Figure 1-3 is dis-
cussed in Section 1.2.3. The detailed derivation of the method for relating structural
reliability and factor of safety is presented in Section 7. 1, and the sensitivites of
structural reliability to factor of safety perturbations for the B-9U components se-
lected for study are presented in Section 7.2.
The structural reliability requirements selected for the baseline vehicle are 0.999 for
yield and 0. 9999 for ultimate.
7.1 METHOD OF ANALYSIS
In practice, applied loads and material strengths can be considered to be values ran-
domly taken from the respective probability distributions of loads and strengths appro-
priate to the missions and materials. Structural reliability is defined as the probability
that, during a specified mission, the structural strength exceeds the maximum applied
load.
To determine structural reliability, distributions of loads and component strengths
must be developed. It is customary to use normal distributions for this type of analy-
sis. Experience has shown that structural loads have normal distributions to a good
approximation. In generating tables of material strengths in terms of ultimate or
yield stresses at some probability, normal distributions of material strengths are
usually assumed. Tables of A and B values of strength for various materials, given
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in Reference 9, are examples. If the normal is not a good approximation of the true
distributions, the accuracy of values of structural reliability will be significantly
affected. Insufficient evidence is available to assure the validity of the normal dis-
tribution of material strengths, particularly in the region of the lower tail. However,
the results of structural reliability analysis based on the assumption of normal distri-
butions are useful for evaluating relative adequacy of reliability and sensitivities.
A factor of safety is applied in structural design to ensure that structural strength will
exceed applied loads. Regardless of how large this factor is made, there is always
an overlap of distribution of loads and strengths; that is, there is some slight proba-
bility of failure. That probability depends on the difference between the means, or
other predetermined distribution points, of the distributions of loads and strengths
and their respective scatters, as usually measured by their variances.
Where L and S are variables in their respective normal distributions with _2 and s 2
as the respective variances, the difference D = S - L is also a random variable with
normal distribution. The mean of this distribution is D = S - L and the variance is
d2 = s 2 + £2. This distribution of the differences is a consequence of the reproduc-
tive property of the normal distribution. Letting L = applied load and S = component
strength, when their difference D is negative, structural failure occurs. Therefore,
structural reliability can be expressed:
R=P(D_0) -=P(SaL)
The density function for D is the normal density
i 2
f(D)= e
The reliability can be found as
R=P(D_0) =d 2/_i fo
e C{D
This expression can be simplified by setting
J
D-D D
and
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Then
1 / e(-I/2Z)2 dZR --
-Z
R is evaluated by the usual means from a normal probability table, using the computed
value of z, the number of standard deviations, as the argument. Conversely,
5 §-L
Z _
d _s 2 + _2
can be found from the tables for particular values of reliability. In this manner the
required strength parameter values can be determined.
Before the expression given for reliability can be used, it is necessary to have a means
of determining L, $2 §, and §. L and $2 will be determined from the range of critical
loads developed for the structural component for a typical mission. This range is
taken as L +3 _, so that the L, L, and L2 are readily found. The maximum or design
load, L + 3 L,is the value to which the critical (ultimate or yield) safety factor, FS, is
applied to determine the allowable strength. Allowable strength is related to applied
load as follows:
-z s = FS(L+3_)
P
where Zp is the number of standard deviations, with s corresponding to the given prob-
ability that the component will withstand the established ultimate or yield stress. Some
common Zp values are:
Zp = 2.326 for probability of 0.99
= 2. 576 for probability of 0.995
If s is known, § can be readily found from the previously stated relationship between
stress and strength. More commonly, the 0.99 and 0. 995 probable material strengths
are given in ksi. For example, many of the tables of stresses for various materials
in Reference 9 are given for both probabilities at a confidence of 0.95, Mean material
strength in ksi and the standard deviation can be found by solving the two simultaneous
equations:
-K I_=F A, x-K 2a = FB
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where _ and _ are mean and standard deviation for material strength. FA and F B are
values of ultimate or yield stress, as applicable, at two different probabilities from
•sources such as columns A and B of Reference 9. If point values are stated for F A
and F B, K is merely the z- values corresponding to the given probabilities. If F A
and F B are tolerance limits for a given confidence level,
z +_Zp - ab
K = p
a
where
a=l
2
b = Zp
2
Z
Y
2 (n - 1)
2
Z
n
zy = z- value for given confidence level = 1. 645 for 95% confidence, and n = test
sample size. Using F A and F B tolerance limits, limiting values for x and g can be
determined at one end by setting K = Zp and at the other by using the expression for
K with n = 100, the usual minimum test sample size. Values of _ and a in ksi can
be converted to _ and s in kips by using the ratio:
FS(L+3_)/F A or FS(L+3_)/F B
depending on which probability is used for the allowable strength.
In summary, structural reliability was found by multiplying the design load by the
safety factor, finding _ and _ for the material, converting those parameters to §
and s, and determining the probability that S, L was non-negative. Conversely, a
given value of reliability was used to derive the corresponding factor of safety.
Values of _ and a for the material were computed to determine a ratio
ff s
The value of z for the given R was defined to be:
From above, s = r S. 7-4
'l ]l
Therefore, z 2 (r 2 _2 + _2) = (_ _ _)2 which is solved for S, using the quadratic
for mula:
= _+z Jr2V - z2z2r 2+¢
1 - z2 r2
The plus sign is used for the radical because of the constraint § > L. Now s is found,
so that allowable strength can be determined and the factor of safety established.
7.2 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AND SENSITIVITY TO FACTORS OF SAFETY
7.2.1 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF WING SPAR CAPS. This section presents the
results of structural reliability analysis of the wing lower spar caps, critical in the
tension failure mode. Reliability factors, R, are calculated by the method of Section
7.1 for the load variability that occurs during ascent and entry load conditions and the
material strength variability exhibited by several structural materials, including Ren_
41 and 7075-T6 aluminum in addition to the baseline Ti-6A1-4V material.
Load variability on the wing structure is presented schematically in Figure 7-1 and is
based on engineering experience and judgement only. The distribution of entry condi-
tion loads was developed considering the combined effects of sensors, control system,
aerodynamic load distribution, and avionics. The distribution on ascent load distribu-
tion considered the additional effects of winds, turbulence, and guidance system. As
can be seen, the entry condition has low load variability while the ascent condition has
high load variability.
 00;
0.
ASCENT CONDITION_ _ /'t ./ENTRY CONDITION
VLIMI T = 706K _ ,! W| rVLIMIT = 700K']
(VMEAN =620K / / _ ' ' ]VMEAN=669K I
/
/ 1_ _ _.-_ ENTRY CONDITION/ ,,'y,I
> / i \ i
_ /I,/ _IMIT DESIGN LOAD
_I I I I J I
500 550 600 650 700 750 800
WING LOAD PER SIDE, V (kips)
Figure 7-1. Estimate of B-9U Wing Load Distribution
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|Data on material strength variability were obtained from References 7, 8, and 9 and
are presented in Figures 7-2 and 7-3. The Zp value used in the following structural
reliability analysis is 2. 326. This value is the ninety-ninth percentile corresponding
to the tabulated A values of Ftu and Fry, the design allowable ultimate and yield stresses,
respectively. Since no allowance is made for the sample size used to obtain the A values,
the value used for Zp provides an upper limit for s, resulting in conservative values for
reliability as a function of factor of safety.
A preliminary stress analysis for the wing during ascent and entry provides a coeffi-
cient of variability of stress, CVL, of 0. 0462 for ascent and 0. 0165 for entry. CVL
is the ratio of standard deviation to the mean of the distribution of possible stresses
applied during the mission, computed for the time at which the stress is maximum.
The design limit stress is established from the design allowable stress and safety
factor and is the mean stress plus three standard deviations, assuming a normal dis-
tribution of stresses.
A comparison is shown in Figures 7-4 and 7-5 between the reliability of wing spar caps
made from aluminum 7075-T6 and annealed Ti-6AI-4V over the indicated range of
factor of safety. These values of reliability are based on the maximum stress condi-
tions during ascent at or near room temperature. Ascent is the critical phase for
these members. The data for the aluminum alloy is computed from Reference 7,
using a hole-out factor of 1.05, while that for the titanium alloy is similarly computed
from Reference 8. CVS is the coefficient of variability of strength similar to CVL
for stress.
If a reliability of 0. 999 is considered adequate for yield, a yield factor of safety of 0. 97
would be adequate for both materials. The design limit stress is then
and
62.9/0.97 = 64. 8 ksi for 7075-T6 aluminum
120/0. 97 = 123.7 ksi for Ti-6A1-4V annealed
References 7 and 8 give values of Ftu and corresponding CVS for 7075-T6 and Ti-6A1 _
4V, respectively, to which the hole-out factor was applied. Ftu for 7075-T6 is 73.3
ksi, with CVS of 0.04, and for Ti-6A1-4V is 127.6, with CVS of 0.0216. Thus, the
ultimate factors of safety corresponding to a yield reliability of 0. 999 are
73.3/64. 8 = 1. 13 for 7075-T6 aluminum
and
127.6/123.7 = 1.03 for Ti-6A1-4V annealed
These factors of safety result in ultimate structural reliability of 0. 999999995 for the
aluminum and 0.9999954 for the titanium,
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For wing elements subjected to high temperatures, entry phase is critical because of
aerodynamic heating and resultant loss of tensile strength. Reference 9 gives curves
showing the reduction in Ftu and Fty due to temperature, for various materials. In
Reference 7 is a similar curve for 7075-T6 aluminum, along with a curve showing the
increase in CVS with temperature. It does not appear that this material would be a
good candidate assuming heating during reentry to 650"F. Ti-6A1-4V and Rend 41
appear to be more suitable. Since curves of CVS versus temperature are not readily
available, they were constructed, assuming the same variation of CVS with allowable
tensile strength as for the aluminum. The curves show CVS for Ti-6A1-4V, yield
and ultimate in Figure 7-2 and CVS for Rend 41, yield and ultimate, in Figure 7-3.
The coefficient of variation for Rend 41 does not vary appreciably over the range
shown, if the assumption of behavior similar to that of aluminum is valid. The values
of CVS were obtained from Reference 8. The Ftu and Fty for Rend 41 were computed
from the Reference 9 A values. Figures 7-6 and 7-7 are plots of reliability versus
factor of safety for titanium and Rend 41. Again, the greater variability of Rend 41
is reflected in the shallower curve.
If the yield criterion is again a reliability in excess of 0. 999, Figure 7-6 indicates a
yield safety factor of 0. 99 for Ti-6A1-4V and 1. 02 for Ren_ 41. The ultimate factors
of safety corresponding to a yield reliability of 0. 999 are
and
147.3/94.9 = 1. 55 for Rene' 41
93. 8/80. 6 = 1. 16 for Ti-6A1-4V
These factors of safety produce structural reliability of virtually 1. 0 for both materials
in ultimate tensile strength.
As a result of this study, it can be concluded for the wing that the selection of a yield
factor of safety that fulfills the 0. 999 structural reliability requirement establishes an
ultimate factor of safety that produces a structural reliability that far exceeds the
0.9999 reliability requirement for ultimate strength.
7.2.2 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF OTHER B-9U COMPONENTS. Curves of struc-
tural reliability Versus factor of safety (Figures 7-8 and 7-9) have been computed and
drawn for the following components: i
4. Crew module.
b. Liquid hydrogen tank.
c. Liquid oxygen tank.
Thrust structure.
Aft orbiter support frame.
Vertical tail.
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The computations utilized data giving load variability furnished by analysis of vehicle
flight dynamics and strength and variability of strength data from Reference 9. This
data is listed in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1. Component Materials
Component
!LH 2 Tank
LO2 Tank
Crew Module
Aft Orbiter
Support Frame
Thrust
Structure
Vertical Tail
Material
2219-T87
2219-T87
2219-T87
2219-T87
Ti-6A1-4V
Ti-6AI-4V
Temper-
ature*
(°F)
RT
-297
RT
RT
RT
RT
Strength Values, and Coefficients of Variation
Ultimate Strength
Ftu**
(ksi)
61
73
61
61
130
130
* RT indicates room temperature.
** Mechanical properties listed as "A" basis.
CVS CVL
0.0158 0.0200
0.01581 0.0125
0.0158 0.0240
0.0158
0.0216 0.0143
0.0216
Yield
Fty**
(ksi)
49
57
49
49
120
120
Strength
CVS CVL
0.0195
0.0195
0.0195
0.0195
0.0298
0. 0298
0.0200
0.0125
0.0240
0.0143
For each of the listed components, a pair of curves is shown. One curve for each
component is plotted for yield tensile strength, the other for ultimate. For yield
strength, reliability signifies the probability of no gross yielding, while for ultimate
it means the probability of no static failure. It is assumed that all critical flight
stresses are tensile.
The curves for items a through d are based on calculations as described in Sections
7.1 and 7.2. L In these cases the value of the critical stress during the mission
varies about a non-zero mean value. Also, it is seen that, with assumed component
reliability requirements of 0. 999 and 0.9999 for yield and ultimate, respectively, the
yield requirement is critical. However, items e and f represent cases in which the
critical stress can be applied in either direction on a symmetrically designed struc-
ture. The distribution of stresses is assumed to be symmetrical about zero. In other
words, mean wind and mean dynamic loading are assumed to be along the vehicle's
longitudinal axis. At a given time in flight, when _q is maximum, in the cases of
items e and f, the distribution of stresses is approximately normal, with mean of
zero and a large value of standard deviation. The design stress, on which factor of
safety is based, is established at the 3a (three times standard deviation) value.
However, the distribution described has a maximum likelihood value of stress equal
to zero, which is really not the critical value. At various times during the flight, the
applied tensile stress in one or both directions is bound to be non-zero. These stresses
7-15
are obviously more critical thanzero. It is reasonable to assume that the most critical
of these stresses will occur at a time near that at which _q is maximum. To deter-
mine structural reliability under these loading conditions, the distribution of these
critical stresses in each direction must be established. With the assumption of load
symmetry about zero load, the two distributions will have equal moments, and their
means will be located equally distant from and on either side of zero.
These distributions could be determined from a fairly exact flight simulation of the
Space Shuttle mission. This sort of analysis is beyond the scope of the present study.
However, by assuming finite duration stress maxima that are critical stresses that
occur in each direction during the maximum ]gq period, noise theory can be applied
to establish the required distribution. Since stress fluctuates in a completely random
manner, it has the property of noise. If the root-mean-square (rms) value of the
noise amplitude were constant over a given frequency spectrum and constant as a func-
tion of time, the noise maxima would be normally distributed. The mean would be
approximately 0.91 of the rms value and standard deviation about 0. 82 rms (Reference
27, Figure 2, p. 80). All of these assumptions are inexact representations of reality.
Therefore, the distribution described can only approximate the true situation, but this
distribution is the best obtainable within the scope of the present study.
The rms value of noise is, by definition, the standard deviation of instantaneous am-
plitude. The 3ff (equal to three times rms) point of the overall stress distribution
was used as the reference for factor of safety. However, the 3(_ point of noise max-
ima, assumed to be critical stresses, is 1. 122 times the value of the factor of safety
reference. Also, the variance of critical stresses is much greater than for items a
through d. Finally, in the case of symmetrical stress distributions due to side load-
ing of a symmetrically designed structure, the structure has to withstand critical
stresses in both directions. Two sets of supports or two tail skins, each having its
own random value of tensile strength drawn from common distributions, must each
withstand critical stress for mission success. Therefore, the reliability calculated
: =
for one support or skin must be squared to obtain component structural reliability,
assuming independence of strengths 0 f the two supports or skins.
The consequences of these considerations are a reduced rate of change of reliability
with respect to factor of safety and required higher factor of safety to achieve an
acceptable level of reliability. As a result, ultimate strength reliability becomes
more critical than yield as a design parameter under the previously stated assumed
component requirements of 0. 999 for yield and 0.9999 for ultimate.
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SECTION 8
SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS
The fundamental goal of system safety engineering is the elimination or lessening of
all hazards as a result of equipment operation. System safety engineering involves
a systematic application of analytical techniques, scientific data and derived criteria,
evaluation methods, experience retention devices, and management ability. Because
it emphasizes prevention rather than correction of problems, particular emphasis is
placed on early engineering design and procedural analysis. It is conceivable to take
into consideration all aspects of the planning, design, development, fabrication, test,
installation, maintenance, operation, and system evaluation of complex man-machine
systems. System safety analysis methods that can be used to ensure the attainment
of the appropriate design safety levels are the design review, the catastrophic failure
analysis, and the design hazard analysis.
8.1 RELIABILITY AND CREW SAFETY
In most cases the safety of the vehicles and crews is consistent with structural reli-
ability. Certainly any catastrophic structural failure after launch causing premature
termination of mission is likely to result also in loss of vehicle and crew. Therefore,
any measure taken to increase reliability will also increase crew safety. Conversely,
crew safety as influenced by the structure has little effect on probability of mission
success. Except for the very early mission phases for the orbiter, noncatastrophic
structural failures do not require abort to increase crew safety. Only leak failures
in orbiter components such as in propellant tanks or crew or passenger cabin would
require immediate mission termination that could be chargeable as a mission failure.
As previously stated, any catastrophic structural failure at any time during the
mission after launch would probably cause loss of vehicle and crew. The degree of
hazard of any lesser structural failure in the booster would depend on the failure mode,
to be discussed later, and the remaining mission time. No abort procedure for the
baseline booster has been found that would reduce the hazard of structural failure,
except for landing at the closest possible site. Meantime, the measures available to
the crew to control the effects of the failure are limited, so that the effects would tend
to be cumulative with time. The same is true of the orbiter, even though it has abort
capability. After the failure and initiation of abort, the orbiter flight is at least as
complex as that of the booster, if not more so.
8.2 SAFETY OF COMPONENTS
z
The following is a list of generalized failure modes of structural components, with
their causes.
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Mode Cause
Deformation
Tensile (compressive, shear)
failure
Fatigue
Brittle fracture
Leak
Stress exceeds yield strength
(inadequate factor of safety)
Stress exceeds ultimate strength
(inadequate factor of safety)
Insufficient fatigue life (design
deficiencies or stress level too high)
Insufficient safe-life (inadequate
proof test or poor choice of material
and processes)
Flaw growth through wall
For components stressed primarily by internal pressure (propellant tanks and crew
compartment) all the above modes apply. However, flaw growth leading to brittle
fracture is a more significant factor in pressure component failure than fatigue..
Also, in pressure components, most deformation tends to be local in nature, except
in cases of severe tank overpressure or flight overloads. The local yielding tends to
relieve local overstresses and is not failure from a safety point of view. The other
modes do represent either catastrophic events or safety hazards. Failures due to
both overstress conditions, either local or general, and brittle fractures occurring
within elastic limits usually lead to total rupture of the pressure component. This
kind of failure would prove catastrophic _ the crew because of the destructuve re-
lease of engergy, if a sizeable volume of gas iS inyolved, or loss of essential pro-
pellants or gases. A leak through a crew cabin wall could be fatal to the crew due to
cabin decompression. A propellant leak is not likely to be immediately eatastropic, but
would pose a potential hazard of fire or explosion.
Members that primarily bear flight loads, including aerodynamic surfaces, intertank
adapters,thrust structure,_dorbiter:b0oster a_chments, are subject to all the listed
structural failure modes except leaking. Partial or total deformation or failure of:any
structural member in these components results in a redistribution of loads, resulting
in increased stress in the remaining members. If this stress redistribution results in
exceeding ultimate or elastic limits or in rapidly accelerated crack growth, structural
failure of the component will ensue. It is readily apparent that such structural failure
would be catastrophic to the crew of one or both vehicles.
8.3 CREW SAFETY AND DESIGN CRITERIA
Design criteria affecting crew safety include factors of safety, proof factors, protec-
tive and warning devices, and ability of the crew to react to a possible impending
failure.
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The relationship of crew safety to factor of safety is similar to that between reliability
and factor of safety. In general, a higher factor of safety means greater crew safety
for a particular mission profile and a particular material. When considering different
materials, different temperatures, or different stress distributions, the distributions
of possible strengths at each of various temperatures and stresses for each of the dif-
ferent situations, along with factor of safety, affect probability of failure. Therefore,
these distributions also affect crew safety in a manner similar to the effects on reli-
ability (Section 7). A similar but somewhat more complex situation exists for the re-
lationship of crew safety with proof factor. Involved are the distributions of material
toughness, initial flaw size, loads inducing flaw growth, and the variability of the pres-
ence of influencing environments. The factor of safety or proofing factor, as applicable,
required for a given degree of crew safety depends on the variability in the relevant
material properties and mission conditions. For reasonable levels of safety the factor
must be increased if variability is greater.
With structures there are a few protective devices that can guard against the occurence
of unusually excessive loads or undetected significant material flaws. One device is
the provision of extra members to provide structural redundancy. In this way, if a
member should fail or if the structure should be subjected to excessive load, the re-
sulting load distribution remains within the strength of the structure. A device applied
to pressure vessels is a relief valve, to assure that the vessel remains within the
stress limits established. For greater safety these valves should be redundant, with
isolation provided in the event that one of the relief valves should fail open. Another
device that might be considered is a self-sealing liner inside a tank. This liner might
be used to prevent accumulation of an explosive mixture or to hold pressure. This
device has several disadvantages. A potential safety problem is the possibility that
the liner could conceal a flaw that could grow to critical size with catastrophic results.
If a leak of a fluid that is potentially flammable or explosive occurs in a confined area,
the hazard is usually better controlled by a device that dispenses a material displacing
the fluid through vents to prevent buildup of a explosive mixture.
Possible structural warring devices include strain gages, break wires, leak detectors,
and cabin pressure gages. The strain gages or break wires can detect excessive
strains or failures of individual members when placed at key locations. Leak detectors
are usually incorporated where there is danger of a leak causing an explosive mixture
of any sort to be formed. A cabin pressue gage and warning device will be used to moni-
tor the air-tight integrity of the crew compartment.
If the crew is aware of the development of a structural hazard, there may be certain
measures taken by the crew to eliminate or reduce the hazard. For example, a moder-
ate leak in the cabin bulkhead can be filled with a sealing material. If a leak or fire
detector indicates a leak from a tank, the crew can use manual backup controls as
necessary to assure that the proper material dispensing (i.e, foam} and vent devices
are activated. Excessive strains in members of components bearing flight loads can,
in most cases, be controlled by maneuvering to reduce the loadingon those members.
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For the crew to perform reliably under these circumstances, training will be required
for the crew members to know when and how to override automatic controls so as to
relieve affected members without inducing dangerous control disturbances.
8.4 DESIGN FOR CREW SAFETY
Consideration of crew safety requires that the design provides for reduction of prob-
ability of structural failure and to control the effects of failure where possible. De-
sign measures for providing increased crew safety include redundancy, leak-before-
rupture, allowance for thermal and other environmental effects, provisions for
inspection, protective and warning devices, and emergency override controls, in addi-
tion to the selection of safety and proof factors appropriate to the materials and stress
distributions. These measures should receive full consideration in design trade studies.
If a tank wall can be made sufficiently thin, considering the tank proof factor, the critical
flaw size can exceed the tank thickness. In this way, the tank will leak before it rup-
tures. Leaking is the preferable failure mode, since tank rupture is certain to be
catastrophic for the crew. The drawback to leak-before-rupture is that the proof test
does not automatically guarantee freedom from leak failures during tank life. It merely
assures that no flaw has an initial size that would result in growth to critical size. A
proper selection of tank thickness, proof pressure, and nondestructive inspection
might overcome this difficulty. The selection would provide assurance that critical
flaw size at proof pressure is not greater than the initial flaw size necessary for wall
penetration during vehicle life under operational use. If this is not feasible and it is
necessary to avoid leaks, then wall thickness greater than critical flaw size and greater
proof factors are required for an adequate safe-life.
Material strength and toughness characteristics are sensitive to elevated temperature.
Therefore, each structural part must be designed for the maximum temperature to
which it will be exposed. In other words, the factor of safety must be based on material
strength or fracture toughness at maximum operating temperature. Also, fracture
toughness is greatly influenced by aggressive environments such as salt air and mois-
ture. Pressure components potentially exposed to such environments must have flaw
growth rates calculated for those conditions, i
Access to normally hidden structural members should be provided, especially for
areas subject to stress corrosion, fatigue, flaw growth, or deformation. Turnaround
maintenance procedures should provide for inspection of such members, including '
nondestructive evaluation (NDE) in critical areas.
8.5 CREW SAFETY AND WEIGHT
Effects on vehicle weight of design measures to increase crew safety are listed on the
opposite page:
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Measure
Redundancy
Leak-before-rupture
or
Increased proof factor
Allowance for worst case
environment
Inspection provisions
Protective devices
Warning devices
Emergency manual overrides
Weight Effect
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
Negligible
Negligible to moderate increase
Negligible
Negligible
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SE CTION 9
OPTIMUM FACTORS OF SAFETY IDENTIFICATION
In the past, factors of safety for aerospace structures have been chosen arbitrarily,
and have been quite difficult to justify on a rational basis. Usually, justification for
their use was made on the basis that they led to successful structures. This method,
however, is risky because of increasingly complex environmental and loading condi-
tions and more advanced and complex materials. Factors now in use are based upon
successful use in aircraft and non-reusable spacecraft programs. The reusable space
shuttle system, however, represents a major advancement in structural technology.
The system embodies the characteristics of aircraft, spacecraft, and launch vehicles
with their associated severe environments and loads, long mission life, high reliability
requirement, and considerations for low cost and weight. Therefore, the arbitrary
selection of factors of safety, as has been practiced in the past, cannot be used with
as high a degree of confidence for the Space Shuttle, because of the unknown effects
of its environments and loads. It therefore becomes highly desirable to have a rational
method for determination of structural factors of safety for the Space Shuttle structure,
and, as an extension of this concept, this method or procedure should also be adaptable
to other types of aerospace vehicles.
9. 1 METHOD OF FACTOR OF SAFETY SELECTION AND ASSOCIATED WEIGHT
CHANGE
The primary objective of the information in the preceding sections of this report is to
provide the background material necessary to make rational selections of ultimate and
yield factors of safety for the seven primary B-9U booster structural components
selected for study. The following items (a thrcmgh e) present the method for selecting
the safety factors:
a. Determine the type of failure modes, design considerations, and design philosophy
(requirements or criteria) that are deemed to be critical to the vehicle design.
b. Determine the sensitivity curves of these criteria or requirements to factors of
safety.
c. Select numerical values for the design criteria or requirements and establish the
design philosophy that is to be applied to the particular vehicle or vehicle com-
ponent.
d. Determine the required factor of safety for each design criterion or requirement
from the sensitivity curves determined in step b.
e. The optimum factor of safety is then the maximum of the factors of safety deter-
mined for each of the design parameters in Item d.
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The procedure can be applied to an aerospace structure in any degree of detail desired.
It may be applied once for the whole vehicle and thus a single FS u and a single FSy
would be obtained, or, the procedure may be applied to every structural element of a
vehicle and an individual pair of FSu'S and FSy's may be obtained for a very large num-
ber of structural members. The optimum depth of analysis lies somewhere in between,
and it is a matter of judgement as to the extent to which the procedure should be ap-
plied. Strong influences in such a decision would be the availability of money, time,
manpower, and the necessary data to perform the required analyses.
Once the optimum factors have been determined, the weight change can be determined
from curves that have been developed to show the sensitivity of structural weight to the
factor of safety.
9.2 SAMPLE FACTOR OF SAFETY SELECTION AND WEIGHT CHANGE DETERMI-
NATION
This section presents an example of the application of the method used in determining
the factor of safety described in Section 9. 1. All of the sample analyses in this section
refer to Table 9-2, Fail-Safe Design Requirements.
9.2. 1 ESTABLISHMENT OF CRITICAL TYPES OF DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. The
following desig n criteria or requirements were deemed critical for the B-9U compo-
•nents selected for this study:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
The
Design philosophy
Service life (missions)
Safe inspection interval (missions)
Safe-life (scatter factor)
Fatigue (scatter factor)
Reliability
safe-life scatter factor is one that is applied to the desired vehicle service life
to obtain the number of missions (in this case, 1.5 x 100 = 150 missions) for which it
must be shown by fracture mechanics that a structure with an assumed initial flaw
wil not fall. The fatigue scatter factor is one that is applied to the desired service
life of the vehicle (in this case, 4. 0 × 100 =400 missions) for which it must be shown
by fatigue analysis that fatigue cracks will not initiate in an unflawed structure.
The previously mentioned criteria or requirements are the principal factors consid-
ered when selecting factors of safety for design purposes. It stands to reason that
whe_ calculations show excess life capability and excess reliabili_, the factors of
safety criteria can be reduced to a more optimum value. Conversely, when large
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service lives are required or loads and strength show large variability, larger factors
of safety criteria may be required.
The sensitivity of these design requirements to the factor of safety, as required by
Item b of Section 9. 1, were determined in the preceding sections of this report.
9.2.2 SELECTION OF CRITICAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT VALUES AND PHILOSO-
PHY. The baseline values of parameters that were used for the example in Table 9-2
are: 1) service life, 100 missions; 2) safe inspection intervals, 100 missions; and 3)
safe-life scatter factor of 1. 5 (not applicable for fail-safe components). The design
philosophies selected for the components are also baseline (i. e., crew module is fail-
safe, and the LO 2 tank, LH 2 tank, and aft orbiter support frame are safe-life designed)
with the exception of the thrust structure and wing box, which were selected to be fail-
safe for this example. In addition, reliability factors of 0. 9999 for ultimate strength
and 0. 999 for yield strnegth were selected for all components in the study.
9.2.3 DETERMINATION OF FACTORS OF SAFETY NECESSARY TO FULFILL DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS. In accordance with Item d of Section 9. 1, factors of safety necessary
to fulfill the design requirements determined in Sections 9.2.1 and 9. 2.2 are selected.
In Table 9-2, the example case, this involves the filling in of the four columns labeled
"Factors of Safety to Meet Requirements. " The factors of safety which must be deter-
mined are those necessary to fulfill fatigue, safe-life, reliability, and fail-safe re-
quirements.
9.2.3.1 Crew Module. First the required factor of safety to meet the fatigue require-
ment is determined. Fatigue life versus FS is presented in Figure 4-16. The fatigue
life of the crew module is so high due to its fail-safe design that the curve does not
present the FS u and FSy for a 100-mission life. Therefore, for fatigue FS u < 1.2 and
FSy < 1. 0, which are the minimum values shown in the graph, are entered in Table 9-2.
Factors of safety are not selected for the safe-life requirement since this requirement
is not applicable due to the fact that the fail-safe design philosophy was selected for the
crew module.
For reliability, the factors of safety are selected from Figures 7-8 and 7-9 for ultimate
strength and yield strength, respectively. From Figure 7-8, for an ultimate strength
reliability of 0. 9999, FSu=0.99 is required; from Figure 7-9, for a yield strength re-
liability of 0. 999, FSy = 0.98 is required.
For fail-safe, reference is made to the baseline analysis of Section 3.7.2 where it
was determined that the apparent factors of safety for fail-safe are FS u = 4. 2 and
FSy=3.4. These values are entered in Table 9-2.
9.2.3.2 Liquid Oxygen Tank. The procedure for the liquid oxygen tank is much the
same as for the crew module, except that the safe-life design philosophy is used in
this case instead of the fail-safe philosophy, which was used for the crew module.
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The factors of safety for fatigue are presented in Figure 4-4. FS u = 1. 1 and FSy = 1. 0
are the minimum FS plotted and both give a fatigue life larger than the 100-rnission
service life. Therefore, FS u < 1. 1 and FSy < 1.0 are entered in Table 9-2.
The factors of safety for safe-life are obtained from Figure 5-14. For the baseline of
100 missions with a scatter factor of 1.5, the required factors of safety are FSu= 1. 58
or FSy = 1. 23. It should be noted that use of both of these factors of safety is not re-
quired, but that the use of either one of them will give the limit operating stress nec-
essary to produce the desired safe-life.
Figure 7-8 and 7-9 are used for selection of the factors of safety required to insure
reliability. From Figure 7- 9 an FS u of 1.00 is required for 0. 9999 ultimate strength
reliability, and from Figure 7-9 an FSy of 0.99 is required for a yield strength reli-
ability of 0.999.
Since the safe-life design philosophy was used for this component, it is not necessary
to select factors of safety for fail-safe.
9.2.3.3 Liquid Hydrogen Tank. The procedure for selection of the factors of safety
to meet the requirement is the same for the LH 2 tank as for the LO 2 tank. For fatigue,
the FS are selected from Figure 4-6. For the 100-mission service life, the figure
gives FS u < 1.1 and FSy < 1.0. For safe-life, the FS are obtained from Figure 5-20.
This figure yields, for the 100-mission life and a scatter factor of 1.5, FS u = 1.40 or
FSy = 1.14. As for the LO 2 tank, either of these factors may be used, but the use of
both is not necessary to meet the safe-life requirement. The factors of safety for
reliability are determined from Figures 7-8 and 7-9. These figures give FS u = 1.00
and FSy = 0.98 for ultimate reliability of 0. 9999 and yield reliability of 0. 999, respec-
tively. Since the LH 2 tank is safe-life designed, it is not necessary to determine fac-
tors of safety for fail-safe.
9.2.3.4 Aft Orbiter Support Frame. The sensitivity of fatigue life to factor of safety
is presented in Figure 4-8. The figure reveals that the fatigue life of the frame far
exceeds the 100-mission requirement for all factors of safety investigated. Therefore,
FS u < 1. 1 and FSy < 1. 0 are entered in Table 9-2. The factors of safety required for
safe-life are given in Figure 5-23. For the required 100-mission service life and 1. 5
scatter factor, FS u = 1.1 and FSy < 1.0 since the curve for FSy goes below 1.0 at
slightly over 3000 flights. For reliability, the factors of safety are once again ob-
tained from Figures 7-8 and 7-9. These figures give FS u = 1.32 and FSy = 1. 15 for
ultimate reliability of 0. 9999 and yield reliability of 0. 999, respectively. No factors
of safety are determined for fail-safe since the frame is designed for safe-life.
9. 2.3.5 Thrust Structure. The sensitivity of fatigue life to factor of safety is pre-
sented in Figure 4-10. The fatigue life in that figure is greater than the 100-mtssion
requirement for all factors of safety investigated. Therefore, the entries in the table
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are FSu< 1.1 and FSy< 1.0. Entries are not made in the safe-life column of the table
since the fail-safe designphilosophy has been selected for this component. For re-
liability, the factors of safety are obtainedfrom Figures 7-8 and 7-9. They show that
FSu = 1.00 and FSy = 0.99 are required for 0. 9999 ultimate strength reliability and
0. 999 yield strength reliability, respectively. For a fail-safe capability of 100% of
limit load, FS u = 2.22 is required, as is stated in Section 6.4.2.
9.2.3.6 Wing Box. The sensitivity of wing box fatigue life to factors of safety is pre-
sented in Figure 4-12. From this figure, the 100-mission service indicates that FS u =
1. 26 or FSy = 1. 19 are required. It is not necessary to use both of these safety factors
simultaneously - they both give the same limit operating stress, the use of one of the
factors is sufficient. Factors of safety are not determined for safe-life for the wing
box since fail-safe design is employed. Figures 7-4 and 7-5 are used for selection of
factors of safety required for wing spar cap reliability. From Figure 7-4, FSy = 0. 97
for 0.999 yield strength reliability and FS u = 1.00 is required for 0.9999 ultimate
strength reliability. For a fail-safe capability of 100% of limit load, FS u = 2.95 is
required, as is stated in Section 6.3.2.
9.2.3.7 Vertical Tail Box. Yield design is not a consideration for the vertical tail
box due to low operating stresses from compression strength design and therefore
only ultimate factors of safety are given for the vertical tail. The sensitivity of the
vertical tail fatigue life to FS u is given in Figure 4-14. Since the fatigue life of the
vertical tail box far exceeds the 100-mission requirement for all FS u investigated,
FS u < 1.1 is entered in Table 9-2. FS u for safe-life is found in Figure 5-37 and is
required to be 1. 02 for the 100-mission life with a 1.5 scatter factor. For reliability,
FS u is obtained from Figure 7-8 and is required to 1.30 for 0. 9999 reliability. Sec-
tion 6.5.2 indicates that the vertical fail box has fail-safe capability for FS u < 1.1.
9.2.4 COMPONENT FACTOR OF SAFETY SELECTION. Optimum factors of safety
for the individual components are selected for the sample analysis of Table 9-2 on the
basis of Section 9.2.3 and the analysis of Sections 3 through 8. These selections
correspond to the column labeled "FS Apparent or Recommended" in Table 9-2.
9.2.4. 1 Crew Module. The factors of safety selected are FS u = 4.2 or FSy = 3.4,
which are the apparent factors of safety that fulfill the fail-safe requirement. The
use of either of these FS is sufficient to meet the fail-safe requirement, since either
one of the FS will, of necessity, restrict the limit operating stress to a level that
provides the required fail-safe capability.
9.2.4.2 Liquid Oxygen Tank. For the liquid oxygen tank skin and ellipsoidal end
domes, which are critical for tension, FS u = 1.58 or FSy = 1.23 are the apparent
factors of safety that fulfill the safe-life requirement of 100 missions with a scatter
factor of 1.5. The use of either of these FS is sufficient to meet the safe-life require-
ment, since either one of the FS will, of necessity, restrict the limit operating stress
to a level that provides the required safe-life.
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The compression critical stringers are not critical for safe-life and therefore the FS
for the tension structure are not appropriate. The stringers are designed by the lift-
off plus ground winds load conditions. Since the thrust loads at liftoff are deterministic
in nature, FS u = 1. 25 is recommended on the thrust portion of the loading. For the
more variable wind portion of the loading, FS u = 1.4 is recommended since the air-
craft type loading conditions (FS u = 1.5) are not critical for the stringers. FSy = 1. 0
is recommended for yield.
9.2. 4.3 Liquid Hydrogen Tank. For the liquid hydrogen tank skin and end domes which
are critical for tension, FS u = 1.40 or _Sy = 1.14 are the apparent factors of safety
that fulfill the safe-life requirement of 001 missions with a scatter factor of 1.5. The
use of either of these FS is sufficient to meet the safe-life requirement, since either
one of the FS will, of necessity, restrict the limit operating stress to a level that
provides the required safe-life.
The stringers and belt frames are critical for compression loads and therefore the FS
for the tension structure are not appropriate. Since the 3g maximum thrust loading
condition produces maximum compression in many areas of the tank, FS u = 1.25 and
FSy = 1. 00 are recommended for use on this condition because the loads are due to
thrust, which is deterministic in nature. For other load conditions, FS u = 1.4 is
recommended since the aircraft type loading conditions (FS u = 1.5) are not critical.
For yield, FSy = 1. 0 is recommended.
9.2.4.4 Aft Orbiter Support Frame. For the support frame, structural reliability
produces the required factors of safety. Yield strength reliability requires FSy = 1. 15.
The material strengths used for the aluminum frame were Ftu = 50 ksi and Fty = 40 ksL
These reduced values were used to account for the effect of strength reducers (i. e.,
fastener holes, welds, etc. ). The limit stress is then:
4O
imit 1.15 34.8ksi
Ftu 50
FSu= =
flimit 34. 8
_= 1.43
Thus, FS u = 1.43 is the ultimate factor of safety that produces the required yield
strength reliability of 0.999. Figure 7-8 shows that FS u = 1.43 gives an ultimate
strength reliability greater than the required value of 0.9999. The use of either FS u =
1.43 or FSy = 1. 15 is therefore sufficient to fulfill the reliability requirement.
9.2. 4. 5 Thrust Structure. Table 9-2 indicates that FS u = 2.22 is required for a fail-
safe capability of 100% of limit load. It is inefficient to design the whol e struc_re to
this FS u, however, when other criteria require low FSus and fail-safe can be obtained
at these lower FSus by judicious local beef-up. Since large portions of the thrust
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structure are designed by thrust loads that have high predictability, FS u = 1.25 is
recommended for loads along with local beef-up to obtain fail-safe capability. Since
design requirements all require an FSy < 1.0, and the use of such a low factor is not
considered to be an acceptable design practice, FSy = 1.0 is selected.
9.2.4.6 Wing Box. Table 9-2 shows that FS u = 2.95 is required to provide a fail-safe
capability of 100% limit load for the wing lower spar caps. Just as for the thrust struc-
ture, it is inefficient to obtain fail-safe capability by desigm'ng large amounts of struc-
ture to a high factor of safety when other criteria require lower FSus and fail-safe can
be obtained at these lower FSus by judicious local beef-up. Therefore, FS u = 1.26 or
FSy = 1.19, the factors which fulfill the fatigue requirement, are selected and the spar
caps are beefed up locally to obtain the fail-safe capability. Use of either one of these
factors of safety reduces the limit operating stress to a value low enough to meet the
fatigue requirements. For other wing box structure, the baseline values of FS u = 1. 4
and FSy = 1.1 for the launch vehicle type conditions are recommended since the air-
craft type loading conditions (FS u = 1.5) are not critical (see Figure 3-23). This
structure must also be evaluated for fail-safe.
9.2.4. 7 Vertical Tail Box. The structural reliability requirement for 0. 9999 ultimate
strength reliability controls the selection of the factor of safety. FS u = 1.30 is neces-
sary to meet this requirement. Since yield design is not critical for the vertical tail
box, FSy = 1. 0 is selected.
9.2. 5 COMPONENT WEIGHT CHANGE DETERMINATION. This section presents the
determination of the weight changes which result as a consequence of the new factors
of safety that were determined for the structural components in Section 9.2.4. Again,
the weights refer to the sample case of Table 9-2. The calculated weights refer in
particular to the column in that table labeled "AWt. "
9. 2. 5.1 Crew Module. The crew module weight does not change from the baseline.
However, if a change of requirements were to cause a factor of safety change, then the
new weight would be found in Figure 3-28.
9.2.5.2 Liquid Oxygen Tank. The weight changes for the liquid oxygen tank are deter-
mined from Figures 3-2 through 3-5. The weight changes are determined in the follow-
ing table:
New Weight Baseline Weight AWeight
Element New FS u (lb) (lb) (lb)
Upper Dome 1.58 1812 1715 +97
Skin 1.58 5616 5616 0
Lower Dome 1.58 3180 2998 +182
Stringer s 1.25 1275 1473 - 198
+81
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Since proof test pressures design the skin and end domes, itwould appear at firstthat
no weight changes should occur for the end domes. The reason there is a weight in-
crease for the domes is that the new FS u was determined by analysis of the skin. If
the domes were designed for their actual proof pressures, as could properly be done,
there would be no weight increase for the domes. Inspection of Figure 3-4, at first,
makes itappear that there could be a weight reduction for the skin due to FSu --1.58,
as determined by the proof test requirement. This would be true ifa perfect proof
test could be devised for which the proof pressure was exactly equal to the proof factor
multiplied by the maximum operating pressure at allpoints along the tank. In reality,
a three-stage proof test is the most practical and the minimum weight for the skin is
5616 pounds for the 100-mission service lifewith a scatter factor of 1.5.
9.2.5.3 Liquid Hydrogen Tank. The LH 2 tank weight changes are from the analysis
of Section 3.2.2 and are presented in the following table:
AWeight
Element New FSu (Ib)
J
|
Upper Dome 1.40* 0
Skin 1.40* 0
Lower Dome 1.40* 0
Stringers 1.25 3g thrust -168
Belt Frames 1.4 other -254
-422
* Unchanged from baseline
The weight of the domes and skin do not change because the factor of safety is deter-
mined by the baseline requirement for proof test with a proof factor of 1. 13. The
weight change for the belt frames was determined by the Curve 3 maximum thrust at
FS u = 1.25 in Figure 3-10. For FS u = 1.25, the frame weight is 3999 pounds, or a
168 pound decrease from the baseline weight of 4167 pounds. __The change in stringer
weight is determined from Figure 3-11, which gives the weight sensitivity of skin and
stringer to factor of safety. First, the weight change is determined from the 3g maxi-
mum curve at FS u = 1. 25 for the combined skin and stringer. This change gives a
decrease of 782 pounds from the baseline weight of 52,486 pounds to 51,704 pounds.
Since the stringers constitute 32.5% of the skin stringer weight, the weight change for
the stringers alone is 0.325 (782) or a decrease of 254 pounds.
9.2.5.4 Aft Orbiter Support Frame. For the support frame, the weight sensitivity
to factor of safety is given in Figure 3-16. For the new FS u of 1.43, the figure indi-
cates a weight increase 100 pounds over the baseline weight of 2400 pounds.
9. 2. 5.5 Thrust Structure. The weight sensitivity of the thrust structure to factor of
safety is given in Figure 3-19. For the new FS u of 1.25, the weight decreases from
the baseline of 25,067 pounds to 23,050 pounds, or a decrease of 2017 pounds. In
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order to make the structure fail-safe, Figure 6-9 shows that 217 pounds of local beef-
up is required at FS u = 1.25; thus, there is a net weight decrease in the thrust struc-
ture of 1800 pounds.
9.2.5.6 Wing Box. The factor of safety for the lower spar caps has been reduced to
FS u = 1.26. This produces an 11% increase in allowable spar cap stress level. The
baseline weight of the lower spar caps is 5685 pounds (reference Table 2-4). Thus,
the weight savings in the spar caps due to decrease in FS u is equal to (0. 11)(5685) or
625 pounds. From Figure 6-8, the local lower spar cap beef-up, which is necessary
to make them fail-safe at FS u = 1.26, is 858 pounds. The same figure shows that the
beef-up of other structure, which is designed to FS u = 1.4, requires 288 pounds of
material. The net increase for the wing box, therefore, is 521 pounds.
9.2.5.7 Vertical Tail Box. The weight sensitivity of the vertical tail box to FS u is
given in Figure 3-25. For FS u = 1.3, the weight decreases 420 pounds from the base-
line value of 8775 pounds to 8355 pounds.
9.3 OPTIMUM FACTORS OF SAFETY FOR VARIOUS SETS OF DESIGN REQUIRE-
MENTS
In this section, four basic sets of design requirements are analyzed to determine the
optimum factors of safety and the associated weight changes. These four basic sets
of requirements are analyzed in Tables 9-1 through 9-4. A sample of the analytical
procedure used to fill in these tables is presented in Section 9.2. The required data
to perform the four analyses are presented in Sections 3 through 8. The baseline set
of design requirements selected for analysis are presented in the following table.
These requirements are analyzed in Section 9.3. 1.
Baseline Design, Life and Reliability Requirements
Service Safe Inspection Safe-Life Fatigue
Design Life Interval Scatter Scatter Reliability
Component Philosophy (Missions) (Missions) Factor Factor Factor
Crew Module Fail-Safe 100 100 N/A 4.0
LO 2 Tank
LH2 Tank
Aft Orbiter
Support Frame
Thrust Structure
Wing Box
Vertical Tail
Box
Safe-Life 100 100 1.5 4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
Safe-Life 100 100 1.5
Safe-Life I00 I00 I. 5
Safe -Life 100 100 1.5
Safe-Life
Fail -Safe
Safe -Life
100 25 1.5
100 100 1.5
0.9999 ULT
O.999 YLD
0.9999 ULT
0.999 YLD
0.9999 ULT
0.999 YLD
0.9999 ULT
0.999 YLD
0.9999 ULT
O.999 YLD
0.9999 ULTi
O.999 YLD
0.999 ULT
O.999 YLD
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The three other sets of design requirements that were selected for analysis vary from
the baseline set in a logical manner and encompasswhat are thought to be possible de-
sign alternatives. The variations of these three sets of requirements from 1hebaseline
set presented in the preceding table are presented in the following table.
Component
Crew Module
LO 2 Tank
LH 2 Tank
Aft Orbiter Support Frame
Thrust Structure
Wing Box
Vertical Tail Box
Fail -Safe
Design Approach
Requirement Chan_ze_ from Baseline
Extended Service Life
and Inspection Interval, Missions Increased Safe-Life
Service Life Inspection Interval Scatter Factor
Fail -Safe*
Fail -Safe*
500 500
500 500
500 500
500 500
500
50O 50
500 500
4.0 Safe-Life Scatter Factor
4.0 Safe-Life Scatter Factor
4.0 Safe-Life Scatter Factor
4.0 Safe-Life Scatter Factor
4.0 Safe-Life Scatter Factor
4.0 Safe-Life Scatter Factor
*Inspection for gross failure every flight required; safe-life scatter factor not applicable.
The "Fail-Safe Design Approach" is analyzed in Section 9.3.2; the "Extended Service-
Life and Inspection Interval" is analyzed in Section 9.3.3; and the "Increased Safe-Life
Scatter Factor" is analyzed in Section 9. 3.4.
9.3. 1 BASELINE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS WITH SAFE-LIFE APPROACH.
The analysis of the baseline design requirements is presented in Table 9-1, with the
addition of the requirement of 0. 9999 structural reliability for ultimate strength and
0. 999 structural reliability for yield strength. The analysis results in structural com-
ponents with a weight increase of 1044 pounds over their baseline B-9U counterparts.
This increase is due primarily to the inadequacy of the baseline wing with respect to
safe-life requirements. Even with 1705 pounds of beef-up in the lower spar caps, an
inspection for flaw growth is required every 25 flights. To increase the inspection
interval to a full 100 missions, it would be necessary to decrease the limit to 50% of
the baseline value (reference Figure 5"27). Since this would impose an unacceptable
weight penalty, a reduction to 70% of the baseline operating stress level and the corre-
sponding 25-mission inspection interval was settled upon.
The remaining six components analyzed in this table are the same as in Table 9-2,
except for the thrust structure. Therefore, since Table 9-2 was used as the example
of the analysis procedure in Section 9.2, the analysis of those five components can be
found in detail there. The remaining component, the thrust structure, was found to
require no changes from the baseline.
9.3.2 FAIL-SAFE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS. The analysis of the seven
selected structural components for fail-safe design requirements is presented in
Table 9-2. The rationale behind this analysis was to use the fail-safe design philosophy
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Design, Life, and Reliability Requirements Type of Loading Factors of Safety to Meet Requirements 
. Safe 
' 
Table 9-1. Optimun1 Factor of Safety Identification - Baseline Desio·n Requirements (Safe-LifP Approach) 
Service Inspectior. Safe-Life Fati·gue ; FS FS Component and Design Life Interval Scatter Scatt0r Reliability Load Type of ~s FS FS FS. Apparent or Baseline Ll\Vci~ht Elements Philosophy (Missions) (Missions) Factor Factor Factor Source Stress Material Fa~igue Safe-Life Reliability Fail-Safe Recommended Criteria Remarks (lb) 
Crew Module - Fail-Safe 100 I 
. Factor of safety determined by fail-safe 0 I. 100 NA 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 221!l-T87 <; 1.12 Ult NA 0. 99 Ult 4. 2 Ult 4. 2 Ult 2. 0 Ult Skin, Frames and 0. 999 Yld Pressure Aluminum <l.OYl.-J 0. 98 Yld or or 1. 5 Yld requirement. Proof test, a= 1. 5, required. Ellipsoidal Dome 3, 4 Yld 3. 4 Yld3 (Bulkhead) 
II. L02 Tank Safe-Life 100 100 1.5 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 2219-T87 <1. 1 Ult 1. 58 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 1. 58 Ult or 1. •1 Ult Factor of Safety deterinined by safe-life +279 
Skin and Ellipsoidal 0. 999 Yld Pressure Aluminum· <1. ,o' Yld or 0. 99 Yld 1. 23 Yli 1. 1 Yld requirement. Proof test, a = 1. 23, required. .... 
Domes (Bulkheads) 1. 23 Yld 
b. Stringers Flight Compr 1. 25 Ult on 1. ·1 and Stringers are critical in compression; therefore, safe-life does not ._198 ,. 
' ' liftoff thrust 1. 5 Ult control FS, Since stringe:cs are designed by liftoff+ ground winds, ·, . I. the reduced FS = 1. 25 and FSy = 1. 0 (estimatedj are used on the + 1. 4 Ult 1. 1 Yld 
'. on winds thrust loads, w~ich are deterministic in nature. ·Aircraft-type load 
1. 0 Yld4 conditions (FSu = 1. 5 for baseline) are not critical. 
III. LH2 Tank Safe-Life 100 100 1.5 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 2219-T87 <1. 1 Ult 1. 40 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 1. 40 Ult or 1. 4 and Factor of safety tietermined by safe-life requirement. 0 
a. Ellipsoidal Domes 0. 999 Yld Pressure Aluminum <1. I) Yld or 0. 98 Yld 1. 13 Yld3 1. 5 Ult Proof test, a = 1. 13 required. Aircraft-type load conditions 
(Bulkheads) and Skin 1. 13 Yld 1. 1 Yld not critical. 
.. 
b. Stringers and Flight Compr 1. 25 Ult on 3g 1. 4 and Stringers are critical in compression; therefore, safe-life does not -<122 Belt Frames 
I· max thrust+ 1. 5 Ult control FS. 
Since 3g maximum tlu·ust produces maximum compression 
1. 4 Ult on 1. 1 Yld in many areas of the tank, FSu = 1. 25 and FS~, = 1. 0 (estimated) are used I other cond on the 3g thrust loads, which are dcterministlc in nature. Aircraft-type 
1. 0 Yld4 load conditions (FSu = 1. 5 for baseline) arc not critical. 
IV. Aft Orbiter Safe-Life 100 100 1. 5 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Flight Tension 2219-T87 <1. 1 Ult 1. 1 Ult 1. 32 Ult NA 1. 43 Ult or 1. 4 Ult Factor of safety determined by reliability requirement for yield. +100 Support Frame 0. 999 Yld Aluminum <1. 0 Yld <1. 0 Yld 1.15 Yld 1.15 Yld3 1. 1 Yld FSu = 1. 43 gives 0. 999 yield reliability and an ultimate reliabfl:ity Sta. 26f:!6 
of> 0. 9999 • 
.. 
v. Thrust Structure Safe-Life 100 100 1. 5 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-6Al-4V <1. 1 Ult 1. 40 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 1. 40·Ult or 1. •1 Ult Factor of safety determined by safe-life requirement. 0 0. 899 Yld I 1. 29 Yld3 1. 1 Yld 
., 
Annen.lcd <1. 0 Yld or 0. 99 Yld 
Titanium 1. 29 Yld . 
VI. Wing Box Safe-Life 100 25 1.5 4,0 o. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-GA1-<1V 1. 2~ Ult 2. 05 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 2. 05 Ult or 1. •1 and Factor of safety determined by safe-life (inspection interval). +1705 
a. Lower Spar Caps 0. 999 Yld Annealed or or o: 97 Yld 1. 93 Yld3 1. 5 Ult Aircraft conditions not critical. 
Titanium 1.19 Yld 1. 93 Yld 1. 1 Yld 
b. Other Structure Flight Shear & 1. 4 Ult 1.1 and Only tension critical structure is flaw growth critical. Therefore, 0 
Compr 1.1 Yld4 1. 5 Ult use the baseline factors of safety (estimated) due to the high ~vind 
.. 1. 1 Yld load variability of the critical max aq condition. 
VII. Vertical Tail Box Fail-Safe 100 100 1.5 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-6Al-•1V <1. 1 Ult 1. 02 Ult 1. 30 Ult <.1. 1 Ult 1. 30 Ult 1. •1 and Factor of safety determined by reliability requirement for ultimate. -·120 Safe-Life 0. 999 Yld Annen.lcd 1. 0 Yld3 1.5 Ult Yield design is not critical due to low design ult stresses which remain 
Titanium 1. 1 Yld within the alas tic range of the material. Aircraft· conditions are not 
critical. 
--
I ~(boW) +1044 
Notes. 1. FSu- x. xx or FSy- y. YY md10ates that the use of e1ther FSu or FSy 1s suff1c1ent co fulf1ll the des1gn requ1rement, but that the use of both 1s not necessary. 
2. NA = Not Applicable . 
3, Apparent Factor of Safety 
4. Recommended Factor of Safety 
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Table 9-2. Optilnum Factor of: Safety Identification - Fail-Safe Desion Requirements 0 
I· Design, Life, and Reliability Requirements Type of· Loading i: Factors of Safety to l\·Ieet Requirements Safe : ",'• 
Service Inspection Safe-Life Fatigue j FS FS 
Component and Design Life ·Interval Scatter Scatter Reliability Load Type of i FS FS FS FS Apparent or Baseline fl.Weight i . Elements Philosophy (Missions) (Missions) Factor Factor F;;tctor Source Strc::~s Material 
· i-fFatiguc Safe-Life Reliability Fail-Safe Rae om mended Criteria Remarks (lb) 
~.' -
I .. . Crew Module - Fail-Safe 100 100 NA 4. 0 o. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 2219-T87 f 1. 2 Ult Factor of safety determined by fail-safe - 0 NA 0. 99 Ult 4. 2 Ult 4, 2 Ult or 2. 0 Ult 
Skin, Frames and 0. 999 Yld Pl·essure Aluminum 
. fl. 0 Yld 0. 98 Yld 3. 4 Yld3 1. 5 Yld requirement. Proof test, a = 1. 5, required. . ' or 
Ellipsoidal Dome ; : 3. 4 Yld (~ulkhead) 
·-: ·: 
II. L02 Tank Safe-Life 100 100 1.5 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 2219-T87 . <1. 1 Ult 1. 58 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 1. 58 Ult or 1. 4 Ult Factor of safety determined by safe-life +279 
.. 0. 999 Yld Pressure Aluminum <1. 0 Yld 0. 99 Yld 1. 23 Yld3 1. 1 Yld requirement. Proof te<>t, 0! """ 1. 23, required. a. Skin and Ellipsoidal or 
Domes (Bulkheads) 1. 23 Yld 
b. Stringers Flight Compr 1. 25 Ult on 1. 4 and Stringers are cr.l.tical in compression; therefore, safe-life does not -198 
liftoff thrust 1. 5 Ult control FS. Since stringers are designed by liftoff + ground winds, I +1. 4 Ult 1. 1 Yld the reduced FSu = 1. 25 and FSy = 1. 0 (estimated) are used on the I on winds thrust loads, whicl:\, are deterministic in nature. Aircraft-type load 
1. 0 Yld4 conditions (FSu = 1. 5 for baseline) are not critical. 
III. LH2 Tank Safe-Life 100 100 1.5 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 2219-T87 <1. 1 Ult 1. 40 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 1. 40 Ult or 1. 4 and Factor of safety determined by safe-life requirement. 0 
a. Ellipsoidal Domef; 0. 999 Yld Pressure Aluminum <1. 0 Yld or 0. 98 Yld 1. 1:~ Yld3 1. 5 Ult Proof test, a = 1. 13 required. Aircraft-type load conditions 
(Bulkheads) and Skin 1.13 Yld I' 1.·1 Yld not critical. 
b. Stringers and Flight Compr 1. 25 Ult on 3g 1. 4 and Stringe.i:'s are critical in compression; therefore, safe-life does not -422 
Belt Frames max thrust+ 1. 5 .Ult control FS, Since 3g mnximum thrust produces ma.ximum compression 
1-.4 Ult on 1. 1 Yld ill many areas of th~ tank, FSu = 1. 25 and FSy = 1. 0 (estimated) arc' used 
other cond on the 3g thrust loads, which are deterministic in nature. Aircraft-type 
1. 0 Yld4 load conditions (FSu = 1. 5 for ba.seline) are not critical. 
I 
IV. Aft Orbiter Safe-Life 100 100 ' 1.5 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Flight Tens~ on 2219-T87 <1. 1 Ult 1. 1 Ult 1. 32 Ult NA 1. 43 Ult or 1. 4 Ult Factor of Rafety determined by reliability requirement for yield. +100 
Support Frame 0. 999 Yld Aluminum <1. 0 Yld <1. 0 Yld 1. 15 Yld 1.15 Yld3 1. 1 Yld FSu = 1. 43 gives 0. 999 yield reliability and an ultimate reliability 
Sta. 2666 I of >0. 9999. 
v. Thrust Structure Fail-Safe 100 Note 5 NA '4,0 o. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-6Al-4V <1. 1 Ult NA 1. 00 Ult 2. 22 Ult 1. 25 Ult4 1. 4 Ult It is inefficient to design the whole structure to FSu = 2. 22 for fail-safe -2017 . 
0. 999 Yld Annealed <1. 0 Yld 0. 99 Yld 1. 00 Yld3 1. 1 Yld when other criteria require low FSu and fail-safe can be obtained by 
Titanium judicious local beef-up. Therefore FSu = 1. 25 is recommended due to the 
I fact that large portions of this structure are designed by thrust loads 
.. 
which have high predictability. Locall.:et:f-up required for fail-safe at +217 
I FSu = 1. 25. FSy = 1. 00 is selected since design requirements all 
require an FSy < 1. 0 which is not c·onsidered desirable. 
VI. Wing Box Fail-Safe 100 Note 5 NA 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-6Al-4V 1. 26 Ult NA 1. 00 Ult 2. 95 Ult 1. 26 Ult or 1. 4 and It is inefficient to design all lower spar caps to FSu =2. 95 for fail-safe. -625 
0, 999 Yld Annealed or 0. 97 Yld 1. 19 Yld3 1. 5 Ult Therefore use FSu = 1. 26 for fatigue life requirement. Beef-up lower +858 a. Lower Spar Caps spar caps locally for fail-safe. 
'fitanium 1. 19 Yld 1. 1 Yld 
b. Other Structure Flight Shear & 1. 4 Ult 1. 4 and Use same safety factors as for baseline, but beef-up structure locally +288 
I 
Compr .• ' 1.1 Yld4 1. 5 Ult for fail-safe. 
.1. 1 Yld •. 
VII. Vertical Tail Box Fail-Safe 100 100 1.5 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-GA1-4V <1. 1 Ult 1. 02 Ult 1. 30 Ult <1. 1 Ult 1.30Ult 1. 4 and Factor of safety determined by reliab lity requirement for ultimate. -420 
Safe-Life 0. 999 Yld Annealed 1. 0 Yld3 1. 5 Ult Yield design is not critical due to low desing ult stresses which remain 
Titanium 1. 1 Yld within the elastic range of the material. Aircraft conditions are not 
critical. 
-!; (floW} 
-1940 
Notes: 1. FSu =x. xx or FSy = y. YY indicates that the use of either FSu or FSy is sufficient to fulfill the design requirement, but that the use of both is not necessary. 
2. NA =Not Applicable 
3. Apparent Factor of Safety 
4. Recommended Factor of Safety 
~: .·• 
5. Inspection for cracks, which could grow to failure, is not required b'ecause of fail-safe capability; however, a visual imspection for gross failure 1s required every flight. 
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on :ill components for which such a de~ign philosophy was considered practical. This 
practice is considered especially desirable since it can give a structure suffering from 
unpredictable damage the ability to continue functioning. This is especially ilnport::mt 
for structure such as the wing lower spar caps which are so severely loaded and would 
require very detailed inspections at relatively close intervals without the use of the 
fail-safe philosophy. For this analysis, the change from the baseline to the fail··safc 
philosophy was made for the wing and the tl~rust structure. The crew module and 
vertical tail box were fail-safe for the baseline, and tl:erefore no change in philosophy 
was requiroo for those components. Fail-safe design fol~ the L02 tank and LH2 tank 
was determined to be impractical in Sections 6. 1. 1 and 6. 2. 1, respectively. Fail-safe 
design for the aft orbiter support fram~ was considered unnecessary due to its oxtrcnnely 
large safe-life and the difficulty of inspecting it for even gross failures; it is inside the 
liquid hydrogen tank and completely sealed in insulation to prevent contact with tile LH2. 
Since Table 9-2 was used as the example case for the method of analysis, the analysis 
of the individual structural components can be found in Section 9. 2 where the example 
analysis is given. 
This set of requirements gives a weight for the analyzed components, which is 1940 
poWi.ds less than their corresponding baseline B-9U weight. This is primarily due to 
an 180~-pound weight decrease for the thrust structure. 
9. 3. 3 EXTENDED SERVICE LIFE AND INSPECTION INTERVAL ANALYSIS V:.riTH 
SAFE-LIFE APPROACH., The analysis presented in Tab' .. e 9-3 for extended service 
life and inspection interval is basically the same· as for the baseline set of design re-
quirements given in Section 9. 3. 1, with two exceptions; 1) the selected service life 
has been increased to 500 missions, and 2) the inspection interval has been increased 
to 500 :missions for all components except the wing and the thrust structure. For the 
wing, the inspection interval has been increased to 50 missions from ti1e baseline of 
25 missions to minimize the number of inspections during the life of the vehicle. The 
thrust structure inspection interval has not been increased from the baseline value of 
100 missions in order to avoid a very large weight increase. 
The method of analysis for the indivi.dual components is tlJ.e same as for the baseline 
requirements, as presented in Secti.on 9. 3. 1. The results of the analysis show that 
large increases in factor of safety and weight are necessary for components for which 
safe-life is the critica1 design requirement. Thus~ the L02 tank, LH2 tank, and wing 
box show large factor of safety and weight increases and the analyzed components show 
the large total weight increase of 5640 pounds over the baseline B-9U components. 
9. 3. 4 INCREASED SAFE--LIFE SCATTER FACTOR ANALYSIS ViliTH SAFE-LIFE 
APPROACH. T.ue analysis with the safe-life scatter increased from the baseline value 
of 1. 5 to 4. 0 is presented in Table 9-4. The analysis is made using the safe-life ap-
proach, and the scatter factor is increased for all components. An analysis was made 
for the increased safe-life scatter factor since there is no value for this factor that 
·•. 
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has been widely accepted '\Vithin the aerospace industry. To determine the effect of a 
more conservative value 0 f the safe-life scatter factor) a value of 4. 0) which is equal 
to the fatigue scatter factor, was selected. 
The method of analysis for the CQmponents is the same as fo1· tlw baseline rcquit·cmcnts, 
as presented ir.. Section 9. 3. 1. One difficulty may be encounted wh~n determining the 
factor of safety required for safe-life, since the scales for many of the cm·ves presented 
in Section 5, the Safe-Life Analysis, have a built-in scatter factor of 1. 5. In such cases, 
it is necessary to multiply the numbers on the scale by 1. 5 to remove the scatter factot·. 
Once this has been done, a value can be read from the curve by using a number of flights 
equal to the scatter factor multiplied by the service life; in this case ·100 missions would 
be used for a scale from which the scatter factor had been removed. Some figures in 
Section 5 provide a scale with the scatter factor already removed. In this case, it 
would be necessary only to read the curve for 400 missions. 
The results of the analysis show that large increases in factor of safety and weight are 
necessary for components for which safe-life is the critical design requirement. Thus, 
the L02 tank, LH2 tank, thrust structure and wing show large factor of safety and 
·weight increases. Of particular note is the fact that the thrust structure weig·ht in-
creases 2613 pounds for the increased scatter factor of 4. 0 and a 100-mission service 
life, whereas there was no· weight increase for 500 missions and a scatt'er factor of 
1. 5 in Table 9-3 because the inspection interval was held to 100 1nissions. For the 
increased scatter factor of 4. 0, the service life and inspection interval are both of 
necessity covered by the scatter. factor. and there is therefore a large increase in 
weight. The weight increase of all the analyzed components over the baseline B-9U 
is a large 6432 pounds. ; · 
! 
. ~ 
' 
., 
.i 
l 
t. 
i' 
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_, ~ \::: .. l----,. Design, Life, and Reliability Requirements Type of Loading Factors of Safety to Meet Requirements j · · Safe · 
Component and 
Service Inspection Safe-Life Fatigl}e FS FS Design Life Interval Scatter Scatter Reliability Load Type of ,Fs FS FS FS Apparent or Baseline ~Weight Elements Philosophy (Missions) (Missions) Factor Factor Factor Source Stress Material Fatigue Safe-Life Reliability Fail-Safe Recommended Criteria Remarks (I b) I 
Table 9-3. Optimum Factor of Safety Identifjcation- Extended· ServicA Life and Inspection Interv"J Requirem. "'lltP (Safe-Lile Approach) 
I. Crew Module Fail-Safe 500 500 NA 4.0 0. 999S Ult Internal Tension 2219-TS7 1. 26 Ult NA 0. 99 Ult ·1. 2 Ult or 4. 2 Ult or 2. 0 Ult Factor of safety determined by fail-safe 0 Skin, Frames and 0. 999 Yld Pressure Aluminum or 0. 98 Yld 3. 4 Yld 3. 4 Yld3 1. 5 Yld requirement. Proof test, 01 = 1. 5, required. Ellipsoidal Dome 1. 02 Yld (Bulkhead) 
II. L02 Tank Safe-Life 500 500 1.5 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 2219-T87 <1. 1 Ult 1. 75 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 1. 75 Ult or 1. ·1 Ult Factor of safety determinec;l by 500 mission safe-life requirement. +946 
a. Skin and Ellipsoidal O. 999 Yld Pressure Alum: .um <1. 0 Yld or 0. 99 Yld 1. 37 Yld3 1. 1 Yld Proof test, 01 = 1. 37, required. 
Domes (Bulkheads) 1. 37 Yld 
b. Stringers Flight Compr. 1. 25 Ult on 1. 4 and Stringers are critical in compression; therefore, safe-life does not -198 
liftoff thrust 1. 5 Ult control FS. Since stringers are designed by liftoff+ ground winds, 
+ 1. 4 ult on 1.1 Yld the reduced FSu = 1. 25 and FSy = 1. 0 (estimated) are used on the 
winds thrust loads, which are deterministic in. nature. Aircraft-type load. 
1. 0 Yld4 conditions (FSu = 1. 5 for baseline) are not critical. . 
III. LH2 Tank Safe-Life 500 ' 500 1.5 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 2219-T87 <1. 1 Ult 1. 58 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 1. 58 Ult or 1. 4 and Factor of safety determined by safe-life requirement. Proof test, +2964 
a. Ellipsoidal Domes 0. 999 Yld Pressure ·Aluminum <1. 0 Yld or 0. 98 Yld 1. 28 Yld3 1. 5 Ult 01 = 1. 28 required. 
(Bulkheads) and Skin 1. 28 Yld 1. 1 Yld 
b. Stringers and Belt 
. Flight Com~r 1. 25 ult on 1. •1 and Stringers are critical in compression; therefore, safe-life does not -•122 
Frames 3g max thrust 1. 5 Ult control FS. Since 3g maximum thrust produces na.'\:imum compression 
+ 1. 4 ult on 1. 1 Yld in many areas of t11e tank, FS11 = 1. 25 and FSy = 1. 0 (estimated) are used 
other cond . on the 3g thrust loads, which are deterministic in nature. Airc1•aft-type 
1. 0 Yld4 ·load conditions (FSu = 1. 5 for baseline) are not critical. 
IV. Aft Orbiter Safe-Life 500 500 1. 5 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Flight Tension 2219-T87 <1. 1 Ult 1.14 Ult 1. 32 Ult NA 1. 43 Ult or 1. <1 Ult Factor of safety determined by reliability requirement for yield. +100 
Support Frame I 0. 999 Yld Aluminum <1. 0 Yld <1. 0 Yld 1. 15 Yld 1. 15 Yld3 1. 1 Yld FSu = 1. 43 gives 0.999 yield reliability :;tnd an ultimate reliability j 
Sta. 2666 of >0. 9999. 
v. Thrust Structure Safe-Life 500 100 1.5 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-6Al-·1V 1. 2 Ult 1. 40 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 1. 40 Ult or 1. 4 Ult Factor of safety determined by safe-life (inspection interval) 0 
0. 999 Yld Annealed or or 0. 99 Yld 1. 29 Yld 1. 1 Yld requirement. 
Titanium 1.1 Yld 1. 29 Yld 
VI. Wing Box Safe-Life 500 . 50 1.5 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-6Al-4V 1. 73 Ult 2. 39 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 2. 39 Ult or 1. 4 and Increased FS needed for fatigue but this is covered by the still higher +2330 
a. Lower Spar Caps 0. 999 Yld Annealed or or 0. 97 Yld 2. 25 Yld3 1. 5 Ult FS required for safe-life (inspection interval). Inspection interval 
Titanium 1. 63 Yld 2. 25 Yld 1. 1 Yld increased from 25 missions for baseline to 50 missions in order to 
minimize number of inspections during vehicle life of 500 missior,.s. 
b. Other Struc1ure Flig:ht Shear & l. 4 Ult 1. ·1- and Only tension critical struc1ure is flaw growth critical. Theref(•re, 0 
Compr 1. 1 Yld4 1. 5 Ult · use the baseline factors of safety (estimated) due to the high wind 
1. 1 Yld load variability of the critical max aq condition. 
! 
VII. Vertical Tail Box Fail-Safe 500 500 1.5 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-6Al-<1V . <1. 1 Ylt 1. 38 Ult 1. 30 Ult <1. 1 Ult 1. 38 Ult 1. 4 and Same as baseline except factor of safety is determined by safe-life -80 
Safe-Life . 0. 999 Yld Annealed 1. 0 Yld3 1. 5 Ult requirement. ''• 
Titanium 1. 1 Yld 
--
j I;(~W) +5640 
; 
Notes: 1. FSu = x. xx or FSY = y. yy md1cates that the use of e1ther FSu_ or FSy is ,sufficient to fulfill the design requirement, but that the use C?f both is not necessary. 
2. NA = Not Applicable 
3. Apparent Factor of Safety 
4. Recommended Factor of Safety 
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Table 9-4. Optimun1 li'actor of Safety Identification ~-Increased Safe-Life Scatter Factor Requirement (Safe-Life Approach) 
Design, Life, and Reliability Requirements Type of Loading Factors of Safety to Meet Requi.x:ements 
Safe I 
Service Inspection Safe-Life Fatigue FS FS 
Component and Design Life Interval Scatter Scatter Reliability Load Type of FS FS FS FS Apparent or Baseline ~Weight 
Elements Philosophy (Missions) (Missions) Factor Factor Factor Source Stress · Material Fatigue Safe-Life Reliability Fail-Safe Recommended Criteria :~emarks (lb) 
I. Crew Module Fail-Safe 100 100 NA 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 2219-T87 <1. 2·Ult NA 0. 99 Ult 4. 2 ult or 4. 2 Ult or 2. 0 ult Factor of safety determined by fail-safe requirement. 0 
Skin, Frames and 0. 999 Yld Pressure Aluminum <1. 0 Yld 0. 98 Yld 3, 4 Yld 3. 4 Yld3 1. 5 Yld Proof test, a = 1. 5, required. 
Ellipsoidal Dome 
(Bulkhead) 
n. L02 Tank Safe-Life 100 100 4. 0 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 2219-T87 <1. 1 Ult 1. 66 Ult l. 00 Ult NA 1. 66 Ult or 1. 4 Ult Factor of safety determined by safe-life requirement. +706 
a. Skin and Ellipsoidal 0, 999 Yld Pressure Aluminum <1. 0 Yld or 0. 99.Yld 1. 30 Yld
3 1. 1 Yld Proof test, et = 1. 30, requir·ed. 
Domes (Bulkheads 1. 30 Yld 
' 
b. Stringers Flight Compr 1. 25 Ult on 1. 4 and : Stringers are critical in compressiqn; therefore, safe-life does not -198 
liftoff thrust 1. 5 Ult control FS, Since stringers are designed by liftoff+ ground winds, 
+ l. 4 Ult on 1. 1 Yld the reduced FfSu = 1. 25 and FSy = 1. 0 (estimated) are used on the 
winds thrust loads, which are deterministic in nature. Aircraft-type load 
1. 0 Yld4 conditions (Fsu = 1. 5 for baseline) are not critical, 
m. LII2 Tank Safe-Life 100 100 4. 0 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Internal Tension 2219-T87 <1. 1 Ult 1. 49 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 1. 49 Ult or 1. 4 and Factor of safety determined by safe-life requireme~1t. Proof test, +1523 
a, Ellipsoidal Domes 0, 999 Yld Pressure Aluminum <1. 0 Yld or 0, 98 Yld 1. 20 Yld3 1. 5 Ult a= 1. 21, required. Aircraft-type load conditions not critical. 
1. 20 Yld I 1. 1 Yld 
<11 (Bulkheads) and Skin 
b. Stringer and Belt Flight Compr 1. 25 Ult on 1. 4 and Stringers are critical in compression; therefore, safe-life does not -422 
Frames 3g max thrust 1. 5 Ult control FS . Since 3g m9.ximum thrust produces maximum compression 
. . 
. + 1. 4 Ult on 1. 1 Yld in many areas of the tank, FSu = 1. 25 and FSy = 1. 0 (estimated) are used 
' 
other cond on the 3g thrust loads, which are deterministic in nature. Aircraft-type 
_' ~ 1. 0 Yld4 load conditions ·(FSu = 1. 5 for baseline) are not critical. 
I 
.· IV. Aft Orbiter Safe-Life 100 100 4. 0 4.0 0. 9999 Ult Flight Tension 2219-T87 I <1. 1 Ult 1. 13 Ult ,1. 32 Ult NA 1. 43 Ult or 1. 4 Ult Factor of safety determined by reliability requirement for yield. +100 
' 
\ Support Frame 0. 999 Ult Aluminum <1. 0 Yld <1. 0 Yld 1.15 Yld 1.15 Yld3 1. 1 Yld FSu = 1. 43 gives 0. 999 yield reliability and an ultimate reliability 
':jj*; 8~'1. 2GGG 
! 
' of >0. 9999. 
v. Thrust Stt"1.1Cture Safe-Life 100 100 4,0 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-6Al-4V <1. 1 Ult 1. 55 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 1. 55 Ult or 1. 4 Ult Factor of safety determined by safe-life requirement. +2613 
0. 999 Yld Annealed <1. 0 Yld or 0. 99 Yld 1. 42 Yld3 1. 1 Yld 
Titanium 1. 42 Yld 
',,' 
·VI. Wing Box Safe-Life 100 25. 4. 0 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-6Al-4V 1. 26 Ult 2. 56 Ult 1. 00 Ult NA 2. 5t3 Ult or 1. 4 and Factor of safety determined by safe-life (inspection interval). +2530 
.. 
2. 40 Yld3 
·, Lower Spar Caps ' 0, 999 Yld Annealed or or 0. 97 Yld 1. 5 Ult Aircraft conditions not critical. ,. a. 
.· Titanium 1.19 Yld 2. 40 Yld 1. 1 Yld 
•, 
,, 
C· b. Other Structure 1. 4 Ult 1. 4 and Only tension critical structure is flaw growth critical. Therefore, 0 .-''~ ; !<'light Shear & 
. , ... 
1.1 Yld4 " Compr 1. 5 Ult use the baseline factors of safety (estimated) due to the high wind : ~~ .. · 
",-· 1.1 Yld load variability of the critical max aq condition. 
,. 
.. 
·vn. Vertical Tail Box Fail-Safe 100 100 4. 0 4.0 o. 9999 Ult Flight Tension Ti-6Al-4V <1. 1 Ult 1. 21 Ult 1. 30 Ult <1.1 Ult 1. 30 Ult 1. 4 and Factor of safety determined by reliability requirement for ultimate. -420 
" 
Safe-Life 0. 999 Yld Annealed 1. 0 Yld3 1. 5 Ult Yield design is not critical due to low design ult stresses which remain 
~~,:~~ ::. t' Titanium I 1.1 Yld within the elastic range of the material. Aircraft conditions are not critical. 
--
., E(~W) . +61!32 
' 
·~. ' 
'·.:;-'. 1. FS = x. x;x or FS = y. yy indicates that the use of either FS or F is sufficient to fulfill the desi n re but t}Ulat the use of both is not necessar . .. uireinent :· 
2. · NAu= :-:ot Applicable 
u g q y 
. 3;· Apparent Factor of Safety 
:j, hccon\mcndcd Factor of Safety 
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SECTION 10 
COSTS 
This section presents a cost analysis of the B-9U booster and the cost ili1pact of struc-
tura.l design requirements and criteria changes. Four s.ets of structural desig11 require-
ments were established in Section 9 and their weight and structural changes identified. 
These sets of requirements are: 
n.. The baseline st;ructural design requirements presented in Section 2. 5. 
b. A set of stl·uctural. desig11 requirements requiring fail-safe, where practical, on 
all components investign.ted. 
c. A set of structural design requirements for an eh'tended service life vheicle and 
requiring periodic structural inspections (e. g., inspection interval specified in 
criteria) for safe-life qualification. 
d. A set of structural design requirements that specified an unusually large safe-
life scatter factor. 
The cost impacts for these design requirements were ___ ex.fi ... ·essed in terms of cost incre-
ments from the cost :1aseline f~r the baseline B-9 U booster, which· was deficient in 
certain aspects of safe-life.· Therefore, the costs developed for Item a) the baseline 
design requirements, differ from the cost baseline because the booster that results 
from the analysis of baseline requirements in Section 9 removes the deficiencies. 
10.1 APPROACH 
The baseline prog-ram that was used as the point of departure determining cost differ-
ences (delta. costs) of the four sets· of design requirements was the B-9U booster pro-
gram, as documented in Reference 28. Although seven major structural components 
were investigated for the study, no changes were found to be necessary for the baseline 
crew module, and the aft orbiter support frame was included in the liqtlid hydrogen 
tank for the purposes of this cost analysis. Therefore, delta costs were calculated 
for five of the seven major structural elem~nts (L02 tank, LH2 tank, thrust structure, 
wing, and vertical tail) in each of the four cases. The total program cost differences 
associated with each structural component consisted of three major elements -direct 
. . 
costs, cascaded co~ts, and g-rowth (weight spiraling) costs. 
10.1.1 DffiECT COSTS. The direct cost differences were those program costs that 
could be attributable to the specific subsystem hardware element being analyzed, such 
as the thrust structure, wing, etc. Weight and complexity changes from the baseline 
design resulted in differences attributable to the subsystem's engineering design and 
development (ED&D), test hardware, flight vehicle production, test article conversi~n, 
10-1 
and operational spares costs·. The basic methodology used in deterrnining these 
changes in ED&D and hardware costs consisted of locating the detailed estimate of the 
corresr)onding B-9U element(wing, ~hrust structure, etc.) on a logarithn1iu plot of 
cost versus weight and passing a parametric scaling line through the point. The slope 
for unit manufacturing cost scaling was 0. 667, as was used in the shuttle pararnctric 
cost model. Similar plots of component ED&D costs were made with 0.187 slopes. 
Since materid types and manufacturing techniques were not changed from the baseline 
B-9U configuration, no complexity factor changes were made. The respective unit 
manufacturing and ED&D cost estimating relationships are shown in Figures 10-1 and 
10-2. Using these plots, theoretical first unit (TFU) manufacturing and ED&D costs 
for the components required by the baseline, fail-safe, eA.-tended service life and in-
spection interval, and increased safe-life scatter factor design requirements were 
determined. The D.TFU costs were then multiplied by appropriate test hardware quan-
tities, production units, test article conversion units, and spares units and added to 
the .6.ED&D to obtain the total direct cost delta for each component within each case • 
. Tooling cost differences, which norn1~lly would contribute to the direct cost difference, 
were felt to be negligible for this analysis because of the relatively small weight changes 
encountered and the absence of any significant shape, surface area, or manufacturing 
differences in the components. 
10.1. 2 CASCADED COSTs·. The cascaded cost differences are those program costs 
that are not attributable to any specific subsystem or hardware component, but rather 
are a function of the complete .booster program task. Elements included in the ca.scad-
. ed costs are vehicle installation, assembly, and .checkout (IA&C/0), vehicle system 
engineering and integration (SE&I), and booster vehicle program management. In our 
analysis, the IA&C/0 cost differenc,es were assumed to be negligible beacuse the major 
effort in this program element is re:lated to tasks involving vehicle subsystems and not· 
the major structural elements of concern to this study. The SE&I costs are calculated 
as a percentage of the booster engineering design and development effort in the baseline 
cost model. This same percentage (15. 5%) was applied to the summation of direct 
ED&D delta costs calculated for the suqsystem components (L02 tank, LH2 tank, thrust 
structure, wing, tail) to obtain the cascaded SE&I delta costs. Booster program man-
agement is similar to SE&I in that a percentage of booster ED&D costs is taken. This 
percenta)'·e (3. 5%) was combined with the 15.5% for SE&I to account for the total vehicle-
level cascaded cost idfferences. 
10.1. 3 GROWTH ·cosTS. The vehicle growth cost differences are those program costs 
that occur because of the spiraling effect of increased weight in a subsystem or group 
of subsystems. This ~spiraling phenomenon appears when some incremental weight is 
introduced into a structural component such as the wing; this in turn causes g,Teater 
loads ::n the carry-through structure necessitating a structure beef-up. These increases 
requi1:e additional main propulsion and attitude controi system thrust, more propellant 
tankage, etc., to achieve the same performance characteristics. The vehicle g,Towth 
·costs account for this l?henomenon and are applied in the form of a prog-ram cost penalty 
. 10-2 
\ 
. 
! j 
: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
••• f I 
1 
. 
. 
10 
TFU 
COST 
(M$) 
Figure 10-1. Theoret.;.~~.l First Unit Cost Estimating Relationship 
per pow"ld of structural weight inc·rease. ~,or this study effort, vehicle g-ro\vth cost 
penalties were developed from ;,_ series of cost model runs on a set of vehicle configu-
rations that had been synthesized with varying amounts of contingency weight. The 
plotted results of these cost model runs gave the isoiated program delta costs corres-
ponding to the spiraling effect of an increase in subsystem weight. The actual values 
.that resulted and which were used to generate the vehicle growth cost difference are: 
Nonrecurring Program {Development Phase) Cost= $725/lb wt increase 
Recurring Production (Porcurement Phase) Cost = ·$49/lb wt iD.crease 
Recurring Operations Program Cost= $101/lbwt increase · 
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Figure 10-2. Engineering Design and Development 
Cost Estimating Relationships 
·These cost penalties were applied to the total structural weight differences assocaited 
with each design concept (baseline~ fail-safe,' eA-'tend~d .~ervice life an·d inspection 
interval, increased safe-life sc~ttor factor derijgn .requirements). 
Operational manpower for vehicle turnaround activities is not included in the cost 
calculations for several reasons. These types of activities are kept separate from the 
booster vehicle operations costs (spare and repair parts) by NASA, as indicated by the 
separate shuttle operations cost element (WBS 5. 0).1 Tllis is a reasonable approach 
because of the opeational base concept wherein the refurbishment crews are shared 
1. WBS refers to the NASA Work Breakdown Structure for the Phase B Space 
Shuttle progra~. 
' ·, 
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between t~e orbiter and booster vehicles for more efficient utilization. In Reference 
25, a contract recently completed on this same subject, vehicle turnaround labor re-
quirements were analyzed by Convair Aerospace's operations personnel. The results 
of that analysis indicated no operational cost differences would be a~tirbutable to a safe-
lif~ or fail-safe design concept. No unique design changes that would specifically change 
. turnaround operations requirements were attributed to the e::-..iended service life or the 
increased safe-life scatter factor cases and, therefore, no cost savings or penalties 
were applicable :for these concepts. . . 
10.2 GROUND RULES AND ASSUlv:!PTIONS OF ANALYSIS 
The following list of ground rules and assumptions apply to the costs developed in this 
analysis: 
a. All cost deltas represent increases from the baseline B-9U configuration prog-ram 
costs of Reference 28. 
b. The delta weights used for costing are shown in Table 10-1. (Reference Tables 
9-1 through 9-4.) 
c. The follow:.Lllg equatio~s were used to evaluate TFU and ED&D delta costs due to 
safe-life and fail-sa£~ ~eight increases: 
TFU ED&D 
Winrr !:I 0.02036 (wt)0.667 7. 941 (wt)0.187 
. ·-.. 
Thrust Structure 0. 02687 (wt)O• 66~ 4. 52167 (wt) 0.187 
LH2 Tank (including aft 0.00907 (wt)0.667 2.79049 (wt)0.187 
orbiter support frame) 
. L02 Tank 0.00501 (wt)0.667 0. 714 (wt)0.187 
Vertical Tail 0.00823 (wt)0 •667 J..387 (wt)0.187 
d. The following hardware qu~'1tities (equivalent units) were assumed for calculating 
direct cost differences due to TFU changes: 
Test 
Test Production Article Operational 
Hardware Articles Conversion ;;:pares 
Wino-!:I 3.5 2 0 ···---. 0.2 
Thrust Structure 6.21 1 0.3 0.01 
Lii2 Tank (including aft orbiter .. 6.01 1 i0.3 0.005 
support frame) 
LOz Tank .. : 5.01 1 0.3. 0.005 
Vertical Tail 3.5 2 0 0.2 
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·Table 10-1. D. Weight for Costing (Pounds) 
Design Requirements (D.wt. lb) 
Extended 
Service Life Increased 
Structural Baseline and II".spection Safo-Life 
Element B-9U Safe-Line Fail-Safe Interval Scatter Factor 
Crew Module 0 +0 +0 +0 +0 
L02 T?-nk 0 +81 +81 +748 +50S 
LH2 Tank 0 .-322 -322 +2642 +1201 
Aft Orbiter (Included in 
Support Frame L~2 Tank 
Thrust Structure 0 +0 -1800 +o'· +2613 
Wino- 0 +1705 . +521 +2330 +2530 0 
Vertical Tail 0 -4.20 -420 -SO -420 
Vehicle .0 +1044 -1940 +5Q4J +6432 
e. Four booster operational vehicles are.assumed to perform the _445 flight missions 
over 10 years • 
. f. No main :·')cket engine costs are included. 
g. No prime contractor's fee is included. 
h. All costs assume constant 1970 dollars. 
i. It was assumed that no changes were required from the B-9U major g,Towtd test 
program. 
j. No cost calculations for the crew compartment structural element were made as 
no weight differences· from the baseline B-9U were identified. 
k. Since the aft orbiter s'upport frame cost is :an integral part of the LH2 tank, all 
design changes to that item a_re accounted. for in th.e LH2 tank cost differences. 
10. 3 RESULTS 
The baseline configuration for program costs utilized in this study are shown at J:-!ASA 
WBS level 4 in Table 10-2o The Convair Aerospace-developed cost model that \'13.;) 
used to generate these total prog-ram costs also served as the basis for calculating the 
various direct, cascadedt and growth cost increments associated with the design con-
cepts analyzed unde~ this contract= The model calculates unit manufacturing costs on 
10-6 
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3-00 BOOSTER 
Tn.blo 10-2. Baseline B-9U Prog1.·am- WBS Level •1 
Summ~u·y Costs ($ n1illion) 
Recur.::ing Recurring 
Nonrecurring Production Operations 
3211 442 ' 144 
-01 ·Structural Group 1294 227 14 
-02 Propulsim.1 Group 552 88 31 
-03 Avionics Group 364 46 59 
-04 Power Group 27'6 38 26 
-05 Environmental Control 32 2 1 
and Life Support 
-06 Booster Vehicle 59 41 
Installation and Assembly 
-07 Combined Subsystem 150 
Development Test 
-08 System Engineering 162 
Integration 
-09 Booster Facilitie~ 12 
-10 System Support Equ~pment 273 13 
and Services 
-11 Booster Management 37 
Total 
Program 
3797 
1535 
671 
469 
340 
35 
100 
150 
162 
12 
286 
37 
parametric cost estimating relationships (e. g., cost as a ·function of sub-element 
weight1 materials, and manufacturing techniques) at various levels of detail down to 
NASA vr.BS level 6, which corresponds generally to the structural sub-components 
analyzed in this study, such as the LH2 tank, wing~ thrust structure, etc. These cal-
. culated tu"1it costs are introduced into the total program cost calculation wherever hardr• 
ware requirements are identified (i.e., ground test articles~ spares, flight test articles, 
production vehicles, etc.). In addition, engineering desig11 and development, tooling, 
and test program costs are combined to give booster non-recurring program costs. 
Production hardware manufacture and test article conversion activities are accumu-
lated into total recurring production program costs. Recurring operations are then add-
ed to non-recurring and recurring production costs to obtain total program costs. 
Table 10-3 is a cost calculation summary of the B-9U baseline that breaks down the 
structural group line item. This breakdo'\vn identifies the structural sub-elements to 
\VBS level 6 (LH 2 tank, thrus~ structure, etc.), and shows the distribution of total pro-
gram cost by the various cost elements t:hat comprise the non-recurring, recurring 
production, and recurring operations phases of the booster program. The aerodynamic 
surfaces (WBS 3.1. 2), thermal protection system (WBS 3.1. 3), and landing system (WBS 
3.1.4) costs are similarly broken down and, together with the body structure, sum tO tho : 
$1.535 billion previously sho\vn in Table 10-2. 
! 
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Table 10-3. Basnline B-9U Structural Group Cost Calculation 
.. 
wns Tlllo TFU E:DD Too linE CTH FTH FTS Tnhl l I I N.;,nrrC'urra,., 
J, I Structural GrDUiJ I LO, 615 28L, 7LI 277,060 )88, 68~ l21, l77 lO,IH 
\,I. I Dod 1 !it ru( ture u. )01 88,907 l!li,JIO Z70, Ul 1)6,616 1,002 
l. 1,1, I :.u1 Tanll 18, Oll )9. 472 71,1 Z4 )(,, 06l o. 160 J<7,riH ), 1.1.1 1.0, Tar.& ), 417 9. 940 10, ~SI L,BH O,OH 27.0H ), 1,1, I c .. L,n 1.176 Z,H2 Z.HZ O, OJS •• 7 l? 
), 1.1. 4 J'"...,d 5u~?t Structure 1. 697 .. s. 091 ),JH O, OSI s. ~Jio 
J, 1.1. s ZnJ~rtan._ 11,61) 46, 4SZ 2 ), Z26 0,116 (.~. 794 
J, I. I. o ":hruat Str 2), 09Z 9t., 9a& 46,164 o. :31 141.401 ),I. I. 7 Mauna/!ic:pa.ra\ian 1. JBI 4. 14) z. 7oz 0.27• 7. 181 ),1.1 •• D••• He•& Shlcld 7,901 )),184 IS, 802 o. 079 4~. ObS 
lAve I s s~m· 68,907 54. 898 14), llOS 
),1,2 Aero•ur(•c•• 44.202 78,U6 lOS, )44 61, )25 88, 404 4,420 
[....eYI'l S Suma 71.126' 7S,I ~b ),1,2. I v .. ruc•l Stab1l1aer 4. 6)1 
. 17, 48) 6,4aJ 9, Z62 o. 4ol )), L?~ ),1,2, 2 Ca. nard 
naelC StruC\\Ir• 2,141 6, l9o 2,569 4, 2a2 O, Zl4 1), 41.1 
TPS o. 847 2. 741 o. 776 l,Z94 O, OLS ~· 876 ), 1.2.) w,na 
D.a1lc Suucture 2&, l2Z 6Z, 979 )9, 651 st., L44 z. 8)) loZ.I07 
7'~ 8, 461 I 5, 745 11,84S 16, 9ZZ o. 84o 4S,JS8 
), I, l 'therma.l Prot echon Syatem 46.892 76. 118 67.426 S6,l.':•. 9),784 14, Ob7 
Level S S~oama 76.118 b7, 4Z6 14l,S44 ), I,), I Ce niH L All TPS )4,675 41.650 69, 7SO I 0, 46Z lll.Ol·.! 
l, I, l, 2 Noac TPS IZ, 017 14.420 Z4, 0)4 ), 60S 4Z, OS9 ).1. 4 Land~n& Gta r I. Z86 4 ), 610 0, 707 z. 57) 0,64) 
. 
WIJS Tilh Production To a. I Rccurrina Rccurrina Tolol 
Ha.rdware TAC Production 0;-er•Uon• Pro•r•m 
.. 
).I &tnaclu r•l Grou~ Z06,177 ZI,007 227,184 I l, 706 ISH,IZS ), I, I Dody Slr~cl~r• o8, lOS Z0,49Z as. 8oo 1. 555 691.774 ), I, 1,1 ur2 T•nl< 18, OJI s. 409 Zl, ~40 0,090 171. )68 ), I, I, 2 !.Oz Tonk I :::~: I.OZS ~.HZ o. 017 )I, Sl6 ), 1.1. ) Cobin .. O,Hl 1. sa 0, OZ4 6; Z9Z ), 1.1. 4 l'"wd Sup?t Structure I,·L97 , . 0, 509 2. ZOL 0,0)4 10.776 ), I. 1. S Jntc run \c. II, hi) ), 484 Is. 097 O,ZJZ as. 1 zl ), •• 1. 6 Thruet Str Zl, 09Z ' 6, 928 )0, ozo 0,2)1 17l, 6SZ ), 1.1. 7 Mt.hn;:/Sc;-.ar•tion I, l81 o. 414 I, 795 0.690 9. 61o6 
1.1.1. a Due Heal Shield 7, 901 z.no 10,271 O,Zl7 . 59, S74 L•v•1 S Suma 14),80S 
),1. 2 Aeroaurl•c•• 88,404 o.o 88,404 a. &41 4)4, 864 t...·val S Suma 78,12t ),1, 2,1 Ve rhca1 St•blll&ar 9, ZbZ o.o 9,2bZ . o.9Z6 4), 880 3 ••• 2. z 
-
Can• rei 
. . 
ll••'c Structure .. 
'4,28Z .. 0,4l8 18,171 4, 28Z 0,0 TPS I I, Z94 0,0 1.294 0,1 )0 6, 300 ), I, Z, l Wtn~ I . 
Da•lc Structure 56, lo44 o.o S6, 644 s. (,64 224,41 S TPS 16, 92Z 0,0 16. 92Z 1.692 6), 972 
3,1, 3 Thermal Protection Syatem 46, 89Z o.o 46, 89Z 2. 345 JS6, 902 Level S Suma 14l. 544 . 3.1. 3,1 Conlor lo All TPS 34,875 o.o )4,875 1, 744 ass. 681 ),1. ), 2 Note TPS az. ol7 o.o IZ,OI7 o. 601 54,677 ),1. 4 LAndin; Cur 2. 573 0,515 3, 087 0,965 s1, S8S 
. -· .... ·----·--. 
. .. . 
. 
TFU = Theoretical First Unit 
FTH = Flight Test Hardware 
EDD = Engineering Design & Development GTH = Ground Test Hardware 
FTS = Flight Test Spares TAC = Test Article Conversion 
a:?•.:H 
601, •I d 
))7, lol9 
J07, ots 
47, Sll 
The booster program cost penalties t..~at were determined for the baseline, fail-safe, 
e:h."tended service life and inspection interval, and increased safe-life' scatter factor de-
sign requirements are shown in T~bles 10-4 through 10-7, respectively. The direct 
cost differences are shown at the structural element level. The cascade effects and 
weight spiral effects are s.hown at the vehicle level and represent the net e~ect of all 
the structural elem-ant changes for each.concept. · · 
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t,;ost 
Element 
L02 Tank 
LH2 Tank 
Thl·ust Structure 
Wing 
Tail 
VchiclQ 
Total Program 
Cost 
Element 
L02 Tank 
LH2 Tank 
Thrust Structure 
Wing 
Tail 
Vehicle 
Total Program 
Table 10-4. Baseline Safe .... J..ife Design 
Requirements - Delta Costs 
ACosts (M$) 
Engineering 
Design and Test Production Operations Cascade 
Development Hardware Hard,~re Hardware Effects 
0.006 o. 065 .. 0.017 0 . 
-0.016 -0.216 -0.065 0 
0 0 0 0 
0.269 1.943 1.110 0.111 
··0. 047 -0.350 -0.200 -0.200 
0.040 
0.212 1.442 0.862 0;,091 0.040 
Table 10-5. Fail-Safe Design Requi-rements -
Delta Costs 
ACosts (M$) 
Engineering 
Design and Test Production Operations Cascade 
Development Hardware Hardware Hardware Effects 
0.006 0.065 0.017 0 
-0.016 -0.216 ·::: -0.065 0 
' 
-0.416 -6.953 -1.456 -0.011 
0.083 0.616 0.352 0.035 
-0.047 -0.350. -0.200 -0.020 
' 
-0.074 " 
-0.39Q -6.838 -1.352 0.004 -0.074 
' 
I 
't• ., 
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. 
Weight Total 
, Spiral Prog;rn.m 
o.oss 
-o. 297 
0 
3.433 
-O.Gl7 
0.914 0.95·1 
-O.D14 3. 5G1 
i. 
I 
Weight· Total 
Spiral Prog;rn.m 
0.088 
-0.297 
-8.836 
1.086 
l 
-0.617 I 
r 
-1.698 -1.772 1 
I. 
-1.698 -10.348 
I 
I 
l 
I 
l 
I 
l 
; 
l 
Table 10-6. Extended Service Life and Inspection Interval 
Design Requirements - Delta Costs 
~Costs (1·!$) 
Engineering 
Cost Design and Test Production Operations Cascade Weight 
Element Development Hardware Hardware Hardware Effects Spiral 
L02 Tan!< 0.037 0.491 0.127 0 
LH2 Tank 0.130 2.206 0.661 0.002 
Thrust $tructure 0 0 0 0 
Wing 0.366 2.639 1. 508 0.151 
Tail -0.008 -0.070 -0.040 .-0. 004 
Vehicle 0.100 4.935 
Total Program 0.525 5.266 2.256 0.149 0.100 4.935 
.· 
: 
Table 10-7. Increased Safe-Life Scatter Factor Design 
Requirements - Delta Costs 
D. Costs M$ 
Engineering 
Cost Design and Test Production Operations Cascade Weight 
Element Development Hardware Hardware Hardware Effects Spiral 
L02 Tank 0.026 0.336 0.087 0 
LH2 Tank 0.059 1. 028. ' 0.308 0.001 
Thrust Structure 0.563 9.806 2.053 0.016 
Wing 0.397 2.863 1.636 0. J ;.1 
Tail 
-0.047 -0.350 
-0.200 -0.020 
Vehicle 
·- 0.190 5.628 
Total.Program 0.998 13.683 3.884 -0.161 0.190 5.628 
., 
,. 
' J 
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Tot.J..l 
Program 
0.655 
2.999 
0 
4. 66•1 
-0.122 
5.035 
13.231 
Total 
Program 
0.449 
1.396' 
12.438 
5.060 
-0.617 
5.818 
24. 54t1 
SECTION 11 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECO!vlMENDA TIONS 
Tnis section summarizes the analytical results obttined from tl1e analysis of tl1o base-
line B-9U booster vehicle. It also makes conclusions and recommencb.tions based on 
the trade studies of structural factors of safety versus service life 1 insp.;Cti011 inter-
val, fatigue, rei.i.ability, weight, and cost, and the experimental tests of 2219-TS7 
aluminum and rn··6Al-4V annealed titanium specimens performed to verify the results 
of fraciure mechanics analyses. 
Table 11-1 presents the results of the fatigue, safe-life, fail-safe, and reliability 
analyses conducted on the baseline B-9U booster structural components, and represents 
the capability of these components when designed for static strength and the criteria of 
Section 2. 5. 
All structural components investigated show adequate fatigue life for the assumed stress 
concentration factor (i.e. , Kt' = 3. 0) and the scatter factor of 4. 0 on life. The majority 
of the components show fatigue lives many times greater than the required design ser-
vice life. The wing box lower spar caps have a fatigue life of 182 missions, which is 
the lowest of the components. 
The results of the safe-life analysis of structural components containing initial flaws 
are similar to the fatigue analysis, with many components _having a safe-life-to-failure 
in excess of the 100-mission requirement with initial flaw sizes within reasonable non-
destructive detection limits. The wing box structure shows a very short safe-life-to-
failure (i.e., three flights}. T'.nis short life is r.:1.used by the severity of the wing load 
s-p3ctrum and the poor flaw growth properties of Ti-6Al-4V annealed titanium. 
The results of the fail-safe analysis show that the. propellant tanks and orbiter support 
frame have no fail-safe capability when obvious partial failures are assumed. Tl~e 
fail-safe analysis also shows that the c-:.·ow module and vertical tail have a fail-safe 
capability of 100% limit load (a design goal on the crew module) and that the wing and 
thrust structure have significant fail-safe capability, although not sufficient to provide 
for limit load residual strength. 
Tne results of the reliability analysis show that all baseline components except the aft 
orbiter support frame have structural reliabilities well in excess of the requirements 
of 0. 9999 for ultimate strength and O. 999 for yield strength. While the aft orbiter 
support frame meets the ultimate requirement, its 0. 998 yield reliability just barely 
misses meeting the requi' •. :ement. The frame is more critical than the other compo-
nents investigated due to the high variance of its critical loads. 
• I 11-1 
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Ta.J?le 11-1. Summary of Am=tlytical Results for Baseline B-9U Booster 
Com~:1'!ct DcscrJpUo:1 1 s~r.-urc~ 
- Initial Critical 
Fbw FL'w Sl:l' FL1\'.,. S!Zc 
Fati[;UC Aspect ~, 
•cr Life to 
Type or Ll[e2 Ro.Uo (2CJ) (2C0 rl Lc:U.: 
Component MotcrW L.o:..d allr:llt (missions) 'I')"!>" or n~w (~/2c) (Inches) (in<:hcs) (mlsslo:c:) 
A. ere·" Module. w~u 2219-Tdi rre5S".Jre 15.0 2.5 x106 Throc;;h croci: 
-
1.70 2.500 
2.00 
2.~0 
. 
B. L02 T•n:< Wo.l1 2219-1'87 Pressure ~.8 2019 a.Sur~c o. 10 0. 05·1G o. 010, (ur.pcr dome ~o!or) b.SurC.cc 0.40 o. ro ~t 
-
. c. Throu;h 
-
(0.1767)1 (0.3066) 
c·. Lll:z T~nk '1\'o.ll 2219-1'87 Prc~u:c 40.6 2314 a. Sur!~ce o. 10 o. 0620 I o. oso~ (uw-:r d-m1e e<r~•!or) b.Sur!oce 0.40 O.ll6=t 
-
e. Throu:;b 
-
(0.2278) (0.2196) 
fU~bt 4L 1 6·110 l'U;;ht Conditions Nc! CriUccl 
D. Thruol Struclurl' Tl-(;..-\l-1\' Thrust 92.9 877 o..Corncr - o.:oo 0.40JG 
b. Throut:,b cr:!ck 
-
0.100 0.1E9·1 
from I/~ ln. 
hole 
i. \"crtl<-•11':>11 r.,x Co~cr Ti-GAI-1\' FIJ~h~ J.l..O 12,500 Throoch crack - 1. 00 ~.912 
i. ACt Orbiter Sup;><>rt 2219-T37 Hi;;ht 35.0 ~630 a. Corner cr:tck - 0.100 O.S!lG 
Frame b. Throuzb crac:. 0.100 0.2~06 -
- !rom 1/4 ln. 
hole 
G. Wlr~ Dox Ti-CAI-1\' Fll,:ht 91.2 162 a.Corncr - 0,100 0.~106 
b.Throut:h cr:tck 
-
0.100 0.1631 
!roc 1/4 ln. 
h~le 
Notes: 1. Wben ~ot <!dine~, L'>c comr->~cr.t Is co:r-":>on to v ;h !he B-9U d~l!., "'lni: ond B-IG!! sv.ept vdn;; confi&'JroUons. 
2. Sco.tter r."'ror cr 4 on Ufc bc!Jdcd; KT ~ 3. o. 
'· Scatter [;t.Otor or l. 5 on life lucl~~cc!.. 
4. ~llo.l:::urn Wl-sofc <~;:>~!Jill:, ro~ all a!:&'Jtr.cd p:u-tbl r~lluri'S or L;e l)'f'IO specified. 
&. ~!~-urc to ro;>!d r~c:Ure ... ~d :.rrcs: ~~. to bll-s3!e <>;abillt)·. 
-
.. 
291 
1 
-
626 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
F:~.l!-S:t!,~ 
S.Ut.~-I.IfC" Fon-s~r~ 
to F•il•u·c ./.5.!0.::::.:-d I'arU~I Co;"hllltr~ 
(mlsslo~) Fo.llurr 1'< ~r limit lood) Rcm:J.rk!l: 
5S.15 151 -C 5.-L-...:.'\ lv:1;iturftn:1l 100 J"r-acturc :.rn:::t occurs Just ~yor.J 
1929 t..'lrc::-;~'""C'r..acl or!;:t- lntcr:-cction of cr;~ck: vdth. Ur:t 
)17 uti=; Crom :l fr:Un<" fr.;~mc 
rh'\!t 
. 
-
291 
- -
::o fo.JI-so!e cn1•>billt)' with 
-
obvious pnrtlal !ollurcs 
867 
626 
- -
-
160 
1.6 L-1. clrcumfcrc~tl~l 
ll:..ru-c:"'l.Ck 
15SS a.&~..:!.! b-::tm t!i.1r;on:!.l 96 On!:;· sm~ll or.• a of lhru•l tlruc:Ur~ 
101 b. r:-_-,.:.s.: Lc:tm c:1p 63 Crltlcol With "-'"Umcd r>rti>J faiJuru. 
53~ C~'J:-.!o:ofse crad: throuz,h 100 Cover sb.t.-cl lq COnlprca!l!o:-. rer.utt..-. 
sl::!:o ::.~ •l!·ln;;cr::. In hiGh foll·r.~c C>l••l,llit)'. 
l>rJ.:t: -
-
:O:o f:~i1-s:afc c:~p:aMlltr wlt11 o'..~\·lous 
lor&<> p:a.rtlal b.UurC'!I. 
31 o.. IA:.-e •por cop Llllcd 47 Critical c1cm'..·ntf; 3TC :dj.::accr.t to 
~ b.~: dia~o:'..ll Called 66 foiled 11.crnl.crs 
--
Str"'(tun.l n..·U:.!.~:uy 
> 0.9,~~' I 
ultlm>k (: )1old I 
-
> 0.9~'~' 
u1Um.1~' t yluld 
> 0.9'~" 
111t1n.11<: C, ) lei~ 
> o.~,~~ 
u1t1m.11r. C: yield 
O. 9l"S 
ullhn.1b~ 
,.0. 9"7 ul!hn>lu 
0.938 yield 
,. 0.99~9~9 UIUUI>Ir. 
,. o.~~~" )'lo.l~ 
,' 
In Table 11-2 the resulting weight and cost deltas are summarized for each of the. four 
sets of design requirements established in Sections 9 and 10. 
Table 11-2. Trade Study \Veight and Cost Changes 
Design . 
He quire men ts 
Baseline 
(Safe-Life Approach) 
Fail-Safe 
Extended Service Life & 
Inspection Interval (Safe-
Life Appro:wh), 500-
Mission Life 
Increased Safe-Life 
'Scatte1· Factor (Safe-Life 
Approach) s. F. = 4. 0 
Reference 
. Table 9-1 
Table 10-4 
Table 9-2 
Table 10-5 
Table 9-3 
Table 10-6 
Table 9-4 
Table 10-7 
D. \Veight 
(pounds) 
.· .+1044 
-1940 
+5640 
+6432 
.6. Cost 
($ million) 
+3.561 
-10.348 
+13.231 
+24.544 
The fail-safe design is the only set of requirements that produces a weight decrease, 
although it is only slightly more than 1% of the total baseline weight of 160,603 pounds. 
Likewise it is the only set of requirements that produces a·cost decr"ase, although it 
is only slightly less than 1% of the $1.1f. ": , '.lion cost of the structur._ :. group less t11e 
TPS and landing gear. The fail-safe desir .. approach has the additional advantages of 
enabling a damaged structure to continue functioning, and not requiring very detailed 
inspections at relatively close intervals as is required for the wing lower spar caps 
for the baseline requirements (safe-life approach). The fail-safe design approach of 
Table 9-2 is therefore selected as the optimum criteria for design of the components 
selected for investigation. The design criteria, most critical design criterion, and 
factors of safety for tension structure for the fail-safe design approach are presented 
in Table 11-3. , 
Although the selected design criteria are collectively called "the fail-safo design 
approach", it should be noted ·L1at the fail-safe approach has been and should be applied 
only where fue fail-safe design philosophy is practical to apply. Tne inherent features 
of the structural arrangement of a part~cular component must be taken into account and 
taken advantage of, if pOssible. The multiplicity of members in thrust structures and 
low-aspect-ratio wings m:ike them examples of co1np:ments that lend thcm.sclvos cas ily 
to fail-sn.fo design. P1·opcllant tanks with their monolithic construction are examples 
of components that are almost impossible to make fail-safe without very large weight 
penalties. Therefore, each component must be given very careful consideration. 
'~ . 
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Table 11-3. Optinutm Design Criteria. (Fail-Safe D~sign Approach) 
-
FacWrsl Safe Safe- l'>10$l Service Inspection Life Fatigue Critical ·. 
. Design Life Interval Scatter Scatter Reliability Design of 
Component Philosophy (1\Hssions) (Missions) Factor Factor Factor Criterion Safety 
Crew Module Fail-Safe 100 100 NA 4.0 0. 9tHJ9 ult Fail-Safe FSu = 4.2 or 
•. 
' 
. 
o. 99~ yld }'Sy = 3.·1 
L02 Tank Safe-Life 100 100 1.5 4.0 0. 999fl ult Safe-Life FSu = 1.5S or 
- 0.999 yld 100 Missions FS = 1.23 
S.F. = 1.5 
y 
~·· ~ .,.. ... : .... - ., .. . .. 
·-
.. 
LH2 Tank Safe-Life 100 100 1.5 4. 0 0. 9999 ult Safe-Life FSu = 1.-?0 or .. 
o. 999 yld 100 Missions FSY = 1.13 
? S.F. = 1.5 .. 
. - .. 
Aft Orbiter SuppOrt Safe-Life 100 100 1.5 4.0 0. 9999 ult Yield FSu = 1.~3 or 
Frame . o. 999 yld Reliability FSY = 1.15 
Thrust Structure ·Fail-Safe 100 See note NA 4.0 0. 9999 ult Fail-Safe 
•' 
FSu = 1.25 or 
.. I o. 999 yld FSy =.1.00 
-·· 
Wing Box- FRil-Safe 100 See note NA 4.0 0. 9999 ult Fail-Safe FSu = 1. 2G or 
0.999yld & Fatigue 1-'Sy = 1.19 
Vertical Fail Box Fail-Safe 100 100 1,5 4.0 0. 9999 ult Ultimate FSu = 1.30 or 
! Safe-Life o. 999 yld Reliability FSY = 1.0 
: 
-
Note: 
' 
Insp<::ction of cr:tcks that could grow to failure is not required because of fail-safe capability; howe··:cr, a visual insp:!ction for gross 
failure is required every flight, 
·-
-
Inspection of Table 11-3 reveals that for pressure-designed sb.·ucture large app;.1.rcnt 
factors of safety resulted from proof test and fail-saie considerations for tension struc-
ture. Conversely, it shows that reduced' factors of safety are feasible on highly redun-
dant struci~ral systems (Le., thrust structure and wing) using a fail-safe design 
approach. 
The large wcir.·ht and cost increases fol.~ the extended service life and insp0ction inter-
val (safe-life approach) and increased safe-life scatter factor (safe-life approach) indi-
ca~ th.e high sensitivity of structural weight and cost to safe-life calculations, since 
the prima1-y effect of the criteria changes from the baseline for these sets of require-
ments is to increase the number of missions for \~hich fracture mechanics analysis 
must show that components have adequate safe-life. This high dependence on fracture 
mechanics analysis was the reason that the experin1ental test program of Appendix I 
was undertaken. It was desired to obtain experimental verification of the ann.lytical 
methods used for flaw g-rowth prediction and determination of proof factors. The results 
of the test program indicate, however, that the f2·acture mechanics calculations \Vere 
highly conservative, and that, on the basis of the flaw growth data obtained, safe-lives 
of the components analyzed would be much larger t."lan those calculated in Section 5 of 
the r~port. This indication has a very significant impact on t~e results of this report, 
since ·the most critical design criterion for seve1·al of the componenis was safe-life. 
Significantly larger safe-lives would have the effect of requiring lower proof factors 
and factors of safety and consequently W) uld result in decreased weights and cost.s. 
Since weights and costs are the primary bases on which study results are judged, ·L.ne 
conclusions as to what constitutes the optimum criteria would be significantly altered. 
Obviously since the procedure developed to determine :factors of safety is so heavily 
dependent on the fracture mechanics analysis for safe-life, it is necessary to have 
accu1·ate fracture toughness and flaw growth data for the structural materials under 
investigation. It is therefore recommended that such data. be obtained before the 
methods devdoped in this report are applied to other structural systems. 
In the reliability area, better information is necessary as to m.ean material strengt~s 
and strength variabilities of candidate materials. In addition, more research is re-
quired in the area of load probability distributions. 
In conclusions, a rational method has been developed by which structural factors of 
safety may be developed for Space Shuttle and other aerospace 7ehicle struct·ures. 
This 1nethod may be applied in any degree of detail desired. The results of fue analy-
sis, however, are highl¥ depende~t on the quality and quantity of the analytical data 
oeveloped. 
l 
• l 
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APPENDIX I 
E.XPERIMENTAL TEST PROGRAM 
An experimental test program was conducted to assess the effect of life cycle lo~d and 
cnvn·onment..1.l coaditions on· proof factors, factors of safety, ~nd structural weight by 
experimental verification of the a..11alyticil methods used for flaw g-rowth predictions 
and determination of proof factors. The importance of e: ... :perimental verification of 
these effects stems from the fact that the results of. fracture mechanics analyses sig1li-
ficantly :llfect apparent factors of safety in Space Shuttle booster components. 
I.1 TEST PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 
The test program consisted of six aluminum and six titanium) surface-flawed, tensile 
test specimens subjected to two life cycle stress spectra and two environmental spectra, 
as described in Table I-1. For each alloy, two specimens were designated as control 
specimens. The life of these specimens was determined in the mild laboratory environ-
ment exclusive of any proof test preload. Two specimens, identical to the control 
specimens with respect to specimen and flaw geometry, were subjec.ted to a proof test 
preload prior to the applicati~:m of the same stress and environmental spectra as that 
seen by the control specimens. These specimens were used to deterime the effect of 
a production proof test on tank service life. Two additional specimens, also identical 
to the control specimens with respect to specimen and flaw geometry, were subjected. 
to the same stress spectra as that sec::n by the control specimens exclusive of a proof 
test prelo~d. The environmental spectra for these two specimens differ ·from that for 
the control specimens in that, during the prolonged.'period~ of sustained loading, these 
specimens were subjected to a 3. 5% NaCl solution. These specimens were used to 
j determine the effect of an ag~essive environment ontank service life>,\ 
I. 2 TEST SPECIMEN DESCRIPTION 
The test specimens for this program were simple, tensile-type specimens fabricated 
from 0. 50-inch 2219-:T87 aluminum plate and 0.125-inch Ti-6Al-4V alUlealed sheet. 
Figures I-1 and I-2 present the detail specimen configurations. Elliptical surface flaws 
were developed in the center of the test section by Elox starter notches and low-stress, 
high-cycle fatigue precracking. 
I.3 DEVELOPMENT OF S~RESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL SPECTRA 
I.3.1 ANNEALED Ti-6Al-4V TEST SPECIMENS.· The six T~-6Al-4V annealed test 
spccimei1s and the associated load spectra (i.e., ST-1 and ST-2) and environmental 
spectra (i.e., ET-1 and ET-2) were selected to represent the baseline Space Shuttle 
booster thrust beam tension caps. 
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Table I-1. Flaw Growth Test Program Description 
Material 
2219-TS? Ti-GAl-4V 
Environinent 
EA-1 EA-2 ET-1 ET-2 
(Lab .A...ir) (Salt) (Lab Air) (S:llt) 
Stress Spectra I Number of Specimens 
1.. SA-l l No Proof 2.*, 2 ! j 
2. ST-1 } 2* 2 
' 
3. SA-2 } Preceded 2 ' 
4. ST-2 } by Proof 2 I 
* Conb:ol specimens 
Fig"llre I-3 presents the assumed thrust beam. cap stress spectrum for a typical booster 
flight. Also shown is the selected simplified test spectrum which includes a built-in 
residual tension stress. This built-in residual stress was assumed in order to pro-
vide a long period of su~ta.ined stress during which alternate environmental spectra 
. could be appliede 
Table I-2 presents the titanium specimen test spectrum, derived from Figure I-3t tak-
ing; into consideration practical test and real time conditions. The stress spectrum 
was applied in 10 flight blocks consisting of 10 applications of Step 1 followed by one 20-
hour application of Step 2. This procedure was followed until a total of 400 flights was 
accu1nulated on the specimens. When failure had not· occurred by this time, a constant 
ampJ.itude fatigue stress of 93.0 ksi was applied to accelerate failure. 
Stress spectrum ST-2 was identical to stress spectru ..... 3T-1 (shown in Table I-2) with 
the exception that stress spectrum ST-2 included one application .of a simulated pro- · 
ductiqn proof test preceding aJ;>plication of the basic test spectrum, where: 
Proof factor ( Ct} = 1.15 
· cr f = 1.15 (93) = 107 ksi proo 
Time at proof = 5 minutes 
Temperature at proof = 70°F 
The environmental spectrum ET-1 was selected to be the ambient conditions existing 
in the Convair Aerospac~ Materials Laboratory and was designated ''Lab Air.'' Spectrum 
ET-2 was identical to spectrum ET-1 described above, with the exception that spectrum 
ET-2 included the application of a 3. 5% NaCl solution to the surface flaw during the 
application of the sustained ·stress of Step 2. · 
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Figure I-3. Thrust Beam Cap Stress Spectrum/Flight 
Table I-2. Titanium Stress Spectrum, ST-1 (One Flight) 
Stress Cycles per Time per Temp 
Description (ksi) Flight Flight (oF) 
1. Thrust Load 93.0 1 220 sec 70 
2. Built-in Residuals 10. 0 1 2. 0 hrs 70 
1.3.2 2219-TR7 ALUMD~UM TEST SPECIMEN~. The six 2219-T87 aluminum test 
specimens and their associated load spectra (i.e., SA-l and SA-2) and environmental 
spectra (i.e., EA-1 and EA-2) were selected to repr~sent the baseline Space Shuttle 
booster J_,H2 propellant tank wall at the upper dome equator where maximum pressure 
load stresses exist. · 
Figure I-4 presents the assumed LH tank pressure load spectrum for a typical booster 
flight and ground operation. Total real time testing to such a complex spectrum would 
have required a prohibitive test time and been totally impractical. It was therefore 
necess~ry to develop a simplified test spectrum with reduced elapsed test time. Table 
.I-3 and the curve labeled "Simplified Test Spectrum" fonnd in Figure I-4 present the 
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Table I-3. Aluminum Stress Spectrum, SA-l 
Pressure Stressl Cycles per Time per Tcn1p 
Description (psi) (ksi) Flin·ht b Flio·ht b (oF) 
1-
1. Tank Lockup 12.5 21.5 '2 1 2 min -100 
' 
2. Ascent ' 
. 
12 (a) 12.5 21.5 100 sec -100 
(b) 22.3 38.4 '2 1 125 sec -100 
3. Entry 15. 5 26.7 12 7 min +150 
4. Atmospheric Flight 5. 5 9. 5 1 2 hr +70 
Notes: ; 
' 
pR p 198 = 1720 
' . 
1 .. I (] =- = o. 115 p t . . 
m1n 
' 
2. Stress levels applied consecutively with no return to zero until Step 3 
is complete. 
final selected load and test spectrum. The long periods of sustained pressure occur-
ring during safing, storage, and tanking were eliminated due to the negligible effect 
they would have had 'upon the final test results. 
Original plans called for the stress spectrum to be applied in 10 flight blocks consisting 
of 10 applications of Steps 1 through 3 followed by one 20-hour application of Step 4. 
It was anticipated that one 10-flight block could be applied every working day with an 
elasped test time of approximately 22 hours per day. 
Shortly after starting the actual testing, it became apparent that the inclusion of. 
the temperature effects, as shown in Table I-3, was creating an intolerable situation 
in the test lab in respect to the real time testing situation.. Consequently, the decision 
was made to drop the temperature effects with all subsequent testing to be accomp-
lished in a "lab air" environment. As testing progressed, it became evident that 
to complete the testing; as scheduled, s'ome alterations would have to be made with 
respect to the 10 flight blocks per day specification. It was decided that 30 flights, and 
I 
as many as 40 flights, could be applied each day (with a 20-hour application of Step 4 
overnight) so that the testing could be completed in a reasonable length of time. Table 
I~4 sumn?arizes the stress and temperature spectra that each specimen was actually 
subjected to and for the first 400 flight cycles. When failure had not occurred during 
the first. 400 flight cycles, all steps in the spectrum with the exception of Step 2 were 
. I-·6 
\ 
I 
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Table I-4. 2219-TS7 Aluminum Test Specimenz 
Test History for First 400 Flight Cycles 
Key to Chart 
b.. Application of 10-flight cycle block with temperature cycling included followed 
by a 20-hour sustained loading period (overnight). 
0 Application of ·10-flight cycle block excluding any temperature cycling followed 
by a 20-hour sustained loading period (overnight). 
0 Application of 3 0-flight cycle block excluding any temperature cycling follo\ved 
by a 20-hour sustained loading period (overnight). 
0 Appl.ication of 40.-flight cycle block excluding any temperature cycling followed 
by a 20-hour sustained loading period (overnight). 
* Completion of 400 Flights. 
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eliminated. The specimens were then continuously cycled from zero w the rna..'i:imum 
stress (38.4 ksi) dictated by Step 2b in order to accelerate failure. 
Stress srcctrurn SA-2 was identical to stress spectrum S.A-1 (Table I-3) with the ex-
ception that stress spectrum SA-2 included one application of a simulat~d production 
proof test preceding application of the basic test specn~um, where: 
Proof factor ( Ct) = 1. 23 
a f = 1.23 (38.4) = 47.1ksi 
· proo 
Time at proof = 5 minutes 
0 Temperature at proof = 70 F 
The environmental spectrum EA-1 was selected to be the ambient conditions existing 
in the Convair Aerospace Materials Laboratory and was designated "Lab Air." Spec-
trum EA-2 was identical to spectrum EA-1 with the exception that spectrum EA-2 in-
cluded the application of a 3. 5% NaCl solution to the surface during the application of 
the sustained stress Step 4 •·. 
I.4 RESULTS OF THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
Figures I-5 and I-6 present the rqsults of the analytical analysis performed to deter-
mine initial flaw sizes to be ini-roduced into the test specimens. Tho analyses were 
done using the same load and environmental spectra as th8.t seen by the control speci-
mens for both materials. The flaw shape assumed was a/2c = 0.1 for all cases. 
Material toughnesses and flaw growth rates used are shown in Section 5. The analyses 
were performed using the computer program "CRKPROP. 1•1 Selected initial flaw sizes. 
were those that were predicted to fail· in 400 flights. 
I. 5 TEST RESULTS 
I. 5.1 TITANIUM SPECIMENS. Basic results of the tests conducted on the Ti-6Al-4V 
test specimens are shown in Table I-5. Data for this table was obtained by monitoring 
the front surface flaw length,, and back surface flaw length following flaw breakthrough. 
Table I-6 shows the stress and environmental spectra breakdown and specimen identifi-
cation number. Table I-7 gives the initial flaw size and shape, as measured from the 
, fracture surfaces of each of the specimens. Table I-7 indicates that the flaw sizes and 
shapes obtained in the·specimens by Elox notching and fatigue precracking were consider-
ably different than those requested based on the theoretical analysis (i.e., 3.:1 = o. 0.423 
inch, a/2c = 0.1, see Figure I-6). 
Figures I-7 throu;·r;h I-9 are plots of the front surface flaw ~ength versus the number of 
load cycles; dat.:.. i-1~ the plots came from Table I-5. Specimens subjected to the same 
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Table I-5. Ti-6Al-4V Flaw Growth Life Cycle 
Load and Environment Test Data 
Specimen Identification 
Load ~~~----1~·-~l~~--~~--~T~-~3~~---r=--~T~-r10~1=-~-r~~T~-~~~~~:~~~T_-~10~0~~-+~~--·rr-~2~~~ 
Cycle 'I Front nacl< I 1-'ron:. Back Front Back Front Back Fror.t Back 1-'I'On~ Baclt 
~o. (inch) (inch) (Inch) (inch) (inch) (Inch) (inch) (Inch) (inch) (Inch) (inch) (inch) 
0 Dimjlllng Dimpling 
10 
20 
30 
70 
!'.10 
100 
uo 
120 
lo!O 
lfiO 
1GO 
o. 4lol 
o. •il!l 
170 0. •10:i min 
o. •150 max 
180 o .. •125 
l!Ju 
1!/G 
200 
20·1 
210 
:!20 
:!30 
2·10 
2li0 
2GO 
270 
280 
200 
3(10 
:JJ 0 
a:.:o 
3!10 
3•10 
o. •150 
0. •1G5 
O. ·AGG 
o. ·170 
6.470 
o. •175 
0,47G 
0,475 
0.·180 
o. <l:l!i 
O,•HHi 
o. ·105 
O.GOO 
350 0. GOO 
3GO 0, 515 
O,OG 
0.175 
0,200 
3G1 
370 
380 
300 
·100 
430 
·150 
4G·1 
o. 515 0,30 
0,525 0.420 
0,530 0,4GO 
0,545 0,400 
0,505 0,575 
0.645 0,625 
FnUcd 
I 
0,381 
0, 45 max 
0,430 
o. 450 
o. ·150 
0, 4GO 
o. 460 
o. 465 
0,475 
0,480 
o. 475 
o. •lll5 
0,<105 
O,GOO 
0,500 
0,510 
o. 515 
o. 525 
Largo 
Dimple 
o. 170 
0.275 
o. 35 ~, 
o. 41CJ 
0, •Jol5 
o. •165 
0.175 
0.500 
0,500 
0.530 0.515 
0,570 0.550 
o. 580 o. 570 
0,600 0,580. 
0,645 0,630 
0,780 0.745 
. '·"r 
0. -14 Smooth o. 42•1 Smooth 
0,438 
0,433 
>+0. 03 
0.450 
<+3/32 
0.445 
0,450 
0,450 
Slight 
Dimpling 
0,•1G5 
0.4G5 
0.470 
0.470 
0.475 
o. 475 
0,475 
0.400 
O,GOO 
o.noo 
0,500 
0,500 o. 125 
0,200 
o. 500 o. 350 
0.520 0.425 
0,525 0.480 
0.540 o. 515 
o. 550 o. 5•15 
0.565 o. 570 
0, 665 0, 675 
0,755 0,765 
Fallcd 
I-10 
0.490 
0,500 
SligM 
Dimpling 
o. 500 Large 
Dimple 
o. 405 o. 100 
o. 405 0.35 
o·. 520 o. 46 
0. 545 o. 50 
o. 545 o. li25 
o. 555 o. 545 
o. 575 o. 575 
o. 5!)0 o. 500 
0, GOO 0. (jQQ 
0, G30 0, G20 
0, G45 0, G35 
0, 675 0, GGO 
o. 700 o. 705 
o. 830 o. 850 
Fnilod 
0.~55 
0.~50 
0,455 
+0, 03 
Growing 
+0,05 
Smooth 0, G02 
O,G05 
0.408 
+0,02 
Slir;ht 
Dimpling 
Gl·owing 
o. <175 . o. 08 o. ·100 
0. G 0. 6 0, 525 
o. 630 0.625 o. 635 
Smoo~h 
Slight 
Dimpling 
0,155 
0,55 
0,50 
0. G10 
0, G85 0. 685 0, G50 0, G30 
l~ailcd 
o. 715 o. 70 
Fnilod 
I 
Specimen 
Number 
T-1 
T-3 
T-101* 
T-4* 
T-100 
T-2 
Table I-6. Titaniurn Specimen Number, Spectrum 
Designation, and Test Environment 
Proof Loaded 107 ksi 3. 5 Percent Salt VIator Solution 
for 5 Minu tcs En\1l~onment During Sustained Loading 
Yes (ST-2) No (ET-1) 
Yes (ST-2) No· (ET-1) 
No (ST-1) No (ET-1) 
No (ST-1) No (ET-1) 
No (ST-1) Yes (ET-2) 
No (ST-1) Yes (ET-2) 
* Control Specimens 
Table I-7. Titanium Specimen Initial Flaw Sizes 
Specimen Initial Flaw Depth :. .. itial Surface Flaw Length Initial Flaw Shape 
Number ai (inch) (2c)i (inch) ar/(2c)f 
. 
T-1 0.085 ·. 0.420 0. 202'! 
'• 
I 
T-3 0.085 .. o. 385 0.2208 ! 
' l 
T-101* 0.080 0.:410 o. 1951 
. ... 
• 
T-4* o. 080 ' 0.425 0.1882 ; ' 
( 
T-100 0.080 0.445 0. 1798 
T-2 o. 085 0.495 o. 1717 
* Control Specimens 
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FigUre I-7. Flaw Growt;h in the Ti-6Al-4V Test Specimens, T-4 and T-·101 
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Figure I-8. Flaw Growth in the Ti-6Al-4V Test Specimens T-1 and T-3 
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Figure I-9. Flaw Growth in Ti-6Al-4V Test Specimens T-2 and T-100 
stress and environmental spectra were plotted together. In addition to displaying the 
differences between like specimens, these three' plots indicate the amount of scatter 
contained in the raw data. Figure I-10 is a plot of the front surface flaw length versus 
the number of load cycles for all six specimens (curves obtained from Figures I-7 
through I-9) plotted together for comparison purposes. Fig\lre I-ll shows the com-
parison between the theoretical prediction and the actual test results for the control 
specimens (T-4 and T-101 only). 
Table I-8 shows the average g;rowth rates obtained for like specimens using end point 
analysis along with the average growth rates used in the theoretical analysis. The aver-
age·~r for the ·specimens was calculated using the equations: 
(AKr)INITIAL + (AKr)FINAL 
(~{)AVERAGE·= 2 
For both the specimens and theoretical analysis, (AKrhNITIAL was calculated us:ing the 
initial flaw size. For the specimens, (AKr) FiliAL was calculated using a flaw depth 
equal to the thiclmess of the specimen. For the theoretical analysis, (AKr)FINAL was 
calculated using the critical flaw size. 
• I 
.. 
'· I 
! I-13 
~ :, 
·;;:: 
CJ 
c:: 
:.::. 
·.· 
CJ 
C'l 
~ 
c.:; 
A. 
~ 
-,_,. 
.... 
~ 
-..... 
w 
,. u 
-:: 
::.:.. 
c:: 
::. 
Cf.l 
~ 
~ 
0 
c:: 
"' 
o.s~~-------------.-.. -------r------~----~~~---.--·1 
I 
.. I 
O.G I I 
. I f;:~oo) ~~L~ROOF; 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
---r- -=._,----- I 
!--f--SlJ I I 
0.1 
o.o 
o.o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
D 
8 
T-101} NO PROOF; . T-1 } PROOF TESTED; 
T-4 LAB AIR T-3 LAB AIR 
5 10 . 50 100 500 
NUMBER OF LOAD CYCLES 
Figur~·I-10. Front Surface Flc~.w Length Versus Number of 
Load Cycles - Ti-6Al-4 V Test Specimens 
I (2c) CR = o. 8•10 i rcH - __[ I r K = 138 KSI ..{iN, 
c (2c) CR "' Q, 7GO INCH - 1_ DERIVED FROM THE 
1\ • 120 KSJ .fiN. -::B. SPECIMEN T-4 
DERIVED FRQ:\1 TilE 
SPECIMEN T-101 
GROWTH FOLLOWING DREArl!ROUGH17-
I 
7" a= 0,125 INCH ., I 
BREAKTirOUGll 'l 
·-a"' 0.110 INCH 
aCR = Q, 088 INCH I 
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Figure I-11. Comparison of Test Results and Theoretical 
Predictions for Ti-6Al-eV Test Specimens 
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I-14 
------------~ ---------~~-
. ' 
soo 
Specin1en 
Number 
T-1 
T-3 
T-101* 
T-4* 
T-100 
T-2 
l~'ron1 
Analysis 
Table I-8. Titanium Test Specimens1 Aver3.ge E::-..-perfmental Flaw 
Growth Rates and Analysis Flaw Growth Rates 
.. 
Growth in the 
Thickness Average Growth 
Direction Before Rate Using Avera.o·e 0 
Cycles to Breahihrough Endpoint Analysis Growtl1 Rate 
Average 
ilK I 
Breakthroucrh .. (inch) (Lrlch/ cycle) (inch/cycle) (ksi /inch) · 0 
. 
8. 6 X 10-5 350 0.03 l 9. 6 X 10-5 57 :~so 0.03 1. 1 x lo-4 I 
340 0.03 s. s x 1o-s l 1.1X10-4 57 230 o. 03 : 1. 3 x lo-4 
1. 9 x 1o-4 \ 160 0.03 l 1.9x1o-4 57 150 0.03 2.0xlo-4 
400 0.046 1. 1 X 10-4 1.1x1o-4 4 .... 0 
* Control Specimens 
Table I-9. 2219-T87 Alum.inuu1 Flaw Growth Life Cycle 
Load and Environment Test Data 
I. 5. 2 ALUMINUM SPECil\IJ:ENS. Basic results of the tests conducted on the 2219-T87 
aluminum test specimens are shown in Table I-9. Data for this· table was obtained by 
monitoring the front surface flaw length, and back surface flaw length following; flaw 
breakthrough. 
Table I-10 presents the stress and environmental spectra breal\:down versus specimen 
identification number. Table I-ll gives the initial flaw size and shape, as measured 
from the fracture surfaces of each of the specimens. This table indicates that the 
initial flaw sizes and shapes o.btained in the specimens by Elox notching and fatigue pre-
. cracking were considerably different than those requested based upon the theoretical 
analysis (i.e., ai == 0.0693inch, a/2c == 0.1, see Figurei-5). 
FigLU·es I-12 through I-14 are plots of the front surface flaw length versus the number 
of load cycles; data for the plot came from Table I-9. Specimens subjected to the same · 
stress and environmental spectra were plotted together. In addition to displaying the 
differences between like specimens, these t..'lree plots indicate the amount of scatter 
contained in tp.e raw data. Figure I-15 is the plot of the front surface flaw lenG,th ver-
sus the number of load cycles for all six specimens (curves obtained from Figures I-12 
through I-14) plotted together for comparison purposes. Table I-12 shows the average 
I-15 
,! : 
: I l ; 
• I 
··-.... 
.; -' . . ·>.'· . 
' ,I • • • " • ··:·~ . 
Table I-9. 2219-T87 Aluminmn Flaw Growth Life Cycle Load and Environment Test Data 
Load Surface Flaw Length {inches) 
Cycle 2-1 I 2-12 I 2-6 2-7 2-11 2-13 . 
No. Front Back Front Back Front Bach. I Front Back Front I Back Front Back 
70 0. 70 -
90 0.69 - 0.66 -. 
100 .. 0.71 -
.. 
120 0.70 - 0.69 - 0.69 - 0. 70 -
.. 
.· 130 . 0.71 -
.· . 
150 0.73 - 0.74 - 0.69 0.27 0.69 - 0.66 -
170 0.71 -
.......... ..... . -:-"' ... o> ... : 
180 0.73 0.76 0.26 0.69 0.29 0.74 0.27 0.67 - ... . .. . . - . 
200 0.71 -
210 0.73 
- 0.77 0.26 0.70 0.30 0.75 0.46 0.67 -
230 . 0. 71 -
240 0.74 0.40 0.80 0.62 0.70 0. 37 0.77 0.50 0.70 -
270 0.74 0.41 0.82 0.66 0.70 0.40 0.81 
290 0.71 -
300 0~76 0.48 0.87 0.70 -
. . 
"320 0.72 -
330 0.80 0.65 0.70 0.60 0.71 -
360 0.70 0.59 0.705 - o. 71 -
370 0. 82 0.74 "-
400 0.80 O.G5 0.92 0.84 0.72 0.68 1. 05 0.76 0.720 0.07 0.72 0.150 
782 1. 85 1. 85 
832 1. 67 l. 67 
877 1.74 1. 74 
878 1. 85 1. 85 
904 1. 87 1. 87 
10-16 I 
-
1.48 1. 48 
--
Specimen 
Number 
2-1* 
2-12* 
2-6 
2-7 
2-11 
2-13 
Table I-10. Aluminum Specimen Number, Spectrum 
Designation, and Test Environment 
: 3. 5 Percent Salt \Vater Solution 
Proof Loaded : Environment Dul'ing Sustained Loading 
::.\'o (SA-l) ; No (EA-1) 
·' 
No (SA-l) ., ,. No (EA-1) 
.. 
Yes (SA-2) No (EA-1) 
Yes (SA-2) No (EA-1) 
No (SA-l) Yes (E.A-2) 
No (SA-l) Yes (EA-2) 
*Control Specimens 
Table I-11. Aluminum Specimen Initial Flaw Sizes 
Specimen Initial Flaw Depth Initial Surface Flaw Leng-th Initial Flaw Shape 
Number ai (inch) (2c)i (inch) a1/(2ch 
2-1* o. 10 0.73 o. 137 
2-12* o. 10 0.70 0. 143 
2-6 o. 10 0.69 0. 145 
2-7 o. 10 '0.69 · .. o. 145 
2-11 o. 10 0.66 0. 152 
2-13 o. 10 o. 70 0.143 
*Control Specimens 
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Figure I-12. Front Surface Flaw Length Versus Number of Load Cycles - 2219-TS7 
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Specimen 
Number 
2-1* 
2-12* 
2-6· 
2-7 
2-11 
2-13 
From 
Analysis 
Table I-12. Aluminum Test Specimens, Average E:h.1Jerin1ental Flaw 
Growth Rates and Analysis Flaw Growth Rate 
I . 
Growth in Depth Average Growth Avera.n·e Direction Before Rab Using Average b 
b.Kr Cycles to Breakthrough Endpoint Analysis 
1 
Growth Rate 
Breakthrough (inch) (inch/cycle) (inch/cycle) (ksi /lnch) 
240 0.025 -4-, 1. 042 X 10 1. 215 X 10-4 42.3 
' 
180 0.025 1. 389 X 10-4 
.150 0.025 1. 667 x 10-4 1. 528 x 1o-4 ·12. 3 
180 0.025 r 1. 38D X 10-4 
400 0.025 0. 625 X 10-4 
o. 625 x 1o-4 42.3 
400 0.025 o. 625 x 10-4 
~100 o. 019** o. 475 x 1o-4 o. :1:75 x 1o-4 28.3 
* Contxol Specimens 
** Based on ai = o. 0693 inch and acr = 0.08765 inch. 
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,: growth r<:.tes obtained for like specimens using the end point analysis approach along 
with the average g;rowth rates U?ed in the theoretical analysis. (t:.Krbverage was c:ll-
culatcd by the same method described in Section I. 5.1. 
I. G E}..'"PETI.ThiENTAL TEST CONCLUSIONS 
I. G.l ANNEALED Ti-GAl-4V TESTS. A number of significant conclusions can b0 
drawn from the results of the tests performed on the titanium specimens. Most irnpor-
tn.nt of·these is the fact that the specimens did not fail a~ .:mrface-flawed specimens 
subjected to a condition of plane strain as predictec by ~he theoretical analysis. They 
failed, inst~ad, as through cracks with mixed mode or plane stress conditions existing 
at the time of failure, exhibited ty the 45 degree slant or V-slant appearance of the 
fracture surfaces. This meant that the plane strain conditions (K Ic = ksi in.) 
assumed in the analysis were conservative and did not result in realistic life pre-
dictions. This graphically shown in Figure I-11, where analysis methods predicted a 
life of nine load cycles while the test specimens exhibited a life on the order of 35 to 
50 times higher than predicted. 
Referring to Table I-8, it can be said that the average growth rates used in the theo-
retical analysis were higher than the resulting average growth rates obtained from the 
control specimens T-4 and T-101. This is due to the fact that a significant decrease 
in growth rates cru1 be expect~d with decreasing t:.Kr. However, analysis grO\v'&.:h rates 
for an average .6.Kr of 46 ksL[in. were identical to the co;:1trol specimen's growth rates 
for an average .6.Kr of 57. ksiJi.n. The result was shorter life predictions from analyt-
ical methods due to the u~e of conservative growth ;L·ates. 
It was difficult to determine t:'-e effect, if any, of the preload proof test upon specimen 
life. Although the results from the proof-tested specimens (T-1 and T-3) seemed to 
indicate some sort of growth ret~:edation resulting in slightly longer life and slightly 
lower growth rates than found in the control specimens (T-4 and T-101), the data, in 
general, was inconclusive (see Fig,ure I-10 and Table I-8). However, a comparison of 
the control specimens and those specimens subjected to the salt water environment 
(T-2 and T-100) definitely shows the detrimental effect of the aggressive environment 
as evidenced in the drastically reduced specimen life and accelerated growth rates for 
the salt water specimens. 
I. 6. 2 2219-T87 ALUMINUM TESTS. The most significant result of the tests perform-
ed on the six 2219-T87 aluminum test specimens is the fact that they did not fail as 
surface-flawed specimens subjected to a condition of plane strain as postulated in the 
theoretical analysis. AU·six ~pecimens failed, instead, as through cracks with mixed 
mode or plane stress conditions existing at the time of failure .. This condition is 
visually exhibited by the 45 degree slant or V-slant' appearance of the fracture surfaces. 
l 
.. 
I-20 
·-
,; 
I 
I ) 
I 
One conclusion to be drawn f!·om these results is that tho pl~'1e strain conditions, as-
sumed by the theoretical analysis for the surface flaw geometry, did not actually exist. 
This could be a result of the interaction of the crack tip plastic zone with the back-free 
surface of the specimen. ·This interaction tends to rela...x the plane strain conditions 
which effectively increases the material touglmess in 1;!1e affected region. 
Another conclusion that could be drawn from the test results is that plane strain condi-
tions actually did exist for the surface flaw at the crack tip, but that the actual plano 
strain toughness of the material was much higher than the value assumed in the theoreti-
cal analysis. A sufficiently high tough11ess would result in the critical surface flaw 
crack depth being larger th:1.1."1 the thic!mess of the material. This could also explain 
the sm·face flaw gro\ving through the thickness and failure occurring as a through crack 
rather than failure occurring with the surface flaw configuration. 
In either case, it is evident that the theoretical analysis was highly conservative and 
did not result in realistic life predictions. In fact, the analysis methods used would 
have predicted a specimen life of Oife flight for a specimen with an initial flaw size of 
ai = 0.100 inch (see Figure I-5). This was, however, the initial flaw size on all six 
specimens. It is not felt that any importance can be assigned to the fact that the anal-
, ysis was performed assuming a flaw shape of a/2c = 0.1 and that the actual specirnens 
possessed flaws whose shape was approximate!~ a/2c = O.lLL The difference is neg-
ligible to al 1. intents and purposes. . 
Referring to Table I-12, it can be said that the growth rates used in the theoretical 
analysis were conservatively high. Growth rates for all six specimens wore on the 
order of 1 x 10-4 inches/cycle for an average of. ~Kr of 42.3 ksiJin. Average growth 
rates used in the analysis were abo on the order of 1 x 10-4 inches/ cycle, but for an 
average .6J<r of 28.3 ks'i.Jin. WH.h a large decrease in . .6KI, as from 42.3 to 28.3 
ksi·Jin., one could expect at least an order of magnitude decrease in the correspond· 
ing .growth rate. Analysis growth rates did not reflect tllis reduction. 
It is impossible to detect any eftectJ either advantageous or detrimental, of the preload 
proof test or the salt water environment on the specimens as compared to the control 
specimens. As seen in Figure I-15, there are no discernable differences between the 
three different specimen uypes. It is pOSpible that any differences that might have exist-
ed were masked by the various load histories of each qf the specimens. This is evident 
from Table I-4 where it can be seen that some specimens received temperature cycling 
for as long as 60 flights, while other specimens saw no temperature cycling at all. In 
addition, some specimens were subjected to as much as 460 hours of sustained loading, 
while others received as little as 340 hours. 
In summary, it can be s~id that the analysis methods, with respect 'to predicting fail-
ure mode and specin1en life, were conservative and did not result in realistic life pre-
dictions. Also, no definite conclusions can be dra·wn from these. tests concerning the 
effects of a preload proof test or a salt water environment upon specimen life. 
l 
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I. 6. 3 TF.ST R ESTJLTS Th1PACT UPON REPORT •. The most signiiicant re3ult of the 
e: .. :pcrimental test phase is the indication of the overwhehning conservatisn1 in tho theo-
retical analysis concerning fracture mechanics. The results of the theoreticG.l fracture 
mechanics analyses performed in Section 5 have a significant effect upoi1 requir8d 
factors of safety for Space Shuttle booster components. This impact cau. be reduced 
considerably depending upon the weig:ht one attributes to the test results. In any event~ 
it is felt that the impact of fracture mechanics and safe-life predictions is much smaller 
than that shovm i.n Section 5. 
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